Election of the Day: Norway

On Monday, September 8th, for the 70th time since the constitution of 1814 was enacted, Norwegians will elect a new Storting. The Storting is Norway’s unicameral legislative body, with 169 seats. It is elected by party list PR across 19 multimember constituencies. The number of seats in each constituency is determined using a formula that takes into account population and geographic size, ensuring rural overrepresentation. (There is a fascinating and important book yet to be written by some bright enterprising scholar on the comparative politics of rural overrepresentation, which seems to be pretty common, although achieved by a wide range of electoral mechanisms.) 150 seats are selected through standard PR lists, while the remaining 19 (one per constituency) are “levelling seats”, apportioned to parties who cross a 4% national threshold but are underrepresented on the initial seat allocation, to bring the final composition of the Storting closer to the national vote. (This tends to reduce the rural overrepresentation in the initial 150 seat distribution.) Norwegians over 18, as well as 17 year olds who will turn 18 in 2025, are eligible to vote. This includes all felons and incarcerated persons (there was a constitutional provision to deny the franchise to those convicted of treason or electoral fraud, but that was repealed in 2022), so in theory at least Anders Breivik could cast a lawful ballot, should he wish to do so.

As one might imagine, this system tends to produce a significant number of parties with representation in the Storting. After the 2021 election, the Labour party (26%, 48 seats) formed a minority coalition with the Centre Party (13.5%, 19 seats), relying on smaller left wing parties, usually the Socialist Left, to pass budgets and legislation. The Labour party is a typical social democratic party in many ways, and is typically the largest and government-leading party in Norway. (The last time Labour wasn’t the largest party after an election was 1924, however, non-Labour politicians have been prime minister for roughly 40% of the last century, including a broad conservative coalition from 2013-2021.) The Centre party is an agrarian Euroskeptic protectionism-embracing party that typically allies with Labour, especially lately.

The 2021 election saw the end of a conservative governing coalition and a return to power for Labour, led by Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre. In order to pass legislation, Støre needed the support of Centre, to his right, with whom he formed a formal coalition, and the Socialist Left, to his left, with whom he and Labour had informal arrangements. In January, Centre left the coalition, severely damaging his ability to govern, but probably boosting Labour’s chances in today’s election. (This didn’t lead to a snap election because Norway’s constitution doesn’t allow for snap elections.) Why did the collapse of his government boost his chances? First, because Centre’s support has collapsed (they’re polling less than half of their 2021 level of support) and association with Centre was probably dragging down Labour. Second, because it opened up a position for Jens Stoltenberg, a popular former Labour PM (2005-2013), in the cabinet as Finance Minister, after Centre leader Trygve Magnus Slagsvold Vedum vacated the office. (It is conventional in Norway for the leader of the largest junior party in a coalition to hold this position.) The proximate cause of Centre leaving the government was evidently disagreement about the implementation of EU energy policies they claimed would decrease stability and increase electricity prices for consumers. Norway isn’t an EU member of course but through the EEA agreement is a kind of partial member for a variety of purposes, and subject to certain rules and regulations as a result.

Before the divorce with Centre, Labour appeared to be well on their way to their worst result in over 100 years, running under 20% and in third place, behind the Conservative Party and the Progress Party (the legacy center-right party and the right-populist anti-immigrant parties, respectively.) Evidently voters were impressed with Labour going solo; they surged back into first and nearly to 30% and have declined slightly recently. Election-eve polling suggests they are likely to replicate or slightly exceed their 2021 vote and seat share. That’s the good news. The less good news is that the aforementioned Progress Party, after receiving a declining vote share in the last three elections, is likely to make a significant comeback, and will likely be the second largest party in government. The Conservatives have been declining in the polls all year but remain likely to claim 3rd place. Still, the position of Labour and the left generally is much better than it was at the beginning of the year, leading some to declare this another “Trump killed conservatism” election along with Canada and Australia. (Whether that’s a fair assessment, or whether the shift had other primary causes, I cannot say.)

Looking further down the list, the four other parties of potential significance on the left side of the ledger (Centre plus three parties to Labour’s left: the socialist left, red party, and green party) are polling in the 6-7% range. If polling is accurate, Labour will unlikely be able to govern with Centre and the Socialist Left alone; they’ll need to add either the Red or Green party, or possibly both, to get to a majority. This is likely to be tricky, particularly as the Greens and Centre appear to be at odds with each other in some pretty fundamental ways. The precise margins and those levelling seats may matter a great deal.

What is this election about? The coverage I’ve read suggests a lot of the usual suspects–cost of living, frustration with immigration, etc–but there’s an interesting issue more unique to Norwegian politics: their wealth tax. Norway has actually taxed wealth since 1892, but has recently been ramping up the rates, particularly on the ultra-wealthy. This has allegedly led to a “flight of the billionaires“, and both the Progress Party and the Conservatives have been campaigning on a radical reduction or elimination of this tax. Labour has essentially defended the status quo, while the Centre party, true to their name, have been dithering and unclear about their position. If polls hold, the wealth tax probably does too, but even a modest error in conservative’s failure may lead to a rollback in the coming years.

Norway has extensive early voting, so when the polls open in several hours. it’s likely that more than half of the votes have already been cast–worth keeping in mind when thinking about Labour’s (and Conservative’s) modest declines and Progress’s rise in the past month or so. Most likely outcome remains a narrow, unwieldy center-left coalition, whether formal or informal, but that is far from assured. We’ll all know soon enough.