Proxy

Well, the “Ethiopia would have attacked anyway” defense of US support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia is looking worse all the time, which leaves the “it was a good idea” justification. Apologies are due Matt and Brad. This justification defense is a good deal less compelling when not attached to the inevitability argument. The strategy animating the campaign looks to me a lot like the “Afghan Model”, the use of proxy forces supported by US advisors, special operations forces, and air power. We established in 2001 that the model can overthrow a low capacity regime with extraordinarily weak military forces, and we’ve demonstrated it again in the last month. What with the partial withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, the continued use of air strikes against Somali targets, and what appears to be the introduction of a substantial peacekeeping contingent, this is going to look a lot more like Afghanistan than Iraq. Doesn’t provide all that much comfort, given the failure of much larger and more capable NATO forces to stabilize that country.

If you’re untouched by any clash of civilizations wankery, the question comes down to whether it’s better to allow a low capacity jihadist sympathetic regime or to further radicalize Somalis (and some foreign allies) through a protracted guerilla war. Things could work out, but I’m increasingly pessimistic.