More on Chinese Military Prep
By Lots of good points made and questions asked in the Chinese Military Preparation comments below, so let me answer in a new post.
The article cites anonymous Pentagon officials and defense analysts in support of the claim that the Chinese could seize Taiwan before the United States Navy could meaningfully intervene. I agree with JadeGold that something fishy may be going on here, and that the Navy may be playing for more cash. The USN has been searching for a mission since the end of the Cold War (and, really, since August 1945), and the threat of a Chinese naval buildup helps justify the budget. On the other hand, the concerns the analysts identify are genuine; senior naval officers are notoriously conservative regarding the loss of major vessels, and the presence of a few hard to detect Chinese submarines might well drive US carrier attack groups far out to sea.
The concern about Israeli tech transfers to China is also genuine. The Israelis have certainly never made the mistake of identifying the national security interests of the United States as their own, and have been happy to transfer technology to whoever is far away and willing to pay. I would also be concerned about Israeli transfers of USAF and USN tactical doctrine to China. Bill Rice at Dawn’s Early Light suggested that part of the cause of the abysmal performance of the USAF in the Cope India exercise was concern that the Indians might let American tactics slip to the Chinese. USAF exercises with the IDF Air Force are certainly more rigorous than any with India, and I wouldn’t be shocked to find that the Israelis have passed on some info along with the tech.
Wagster and RepubAnon briefly debate the economic impact of a conflict between China and the United States, and come to opposite conclusions. Wagster believes that the economic costs will deter China, and RepubAnon believes that the economic damage the Chinese could inflict on the US would be sufficient to do the job without resort to arms. I can’t fully agree with either.
The economic devastation question works both ways. In short, the US and China are dependent on one another; either could cause devastation in the other. The Chinese can rationally believe that seizing Taiwan in a brief war would present the United States with a fait accompli, and that the United States would not risk the economic damage that further conflict would entail. Brave statements by the United States will not dissuade this belief; of course US rhetoric would be in support of Taiwan, but rhetoric will not mean action when the pin hits the shell. Similarly, any scheme on the part of China to ruin the US economy would be accompanied by devastation of the Chinese economy, which is hardly something that the leadership is looking for.
What we have to remember is that the legitimacy of the CCP rests on two pillars. The first of these is nationalism, and is why we’re seeing anti-Japanese demonstrations all over China. I know that some people here have questioned whether the Chinese people in general would support an attack on Taiwan; I don’t. By every indication I’ve ever seen, anecdotal and public survey, support for the reclamation of Taiwan is extremely high on the mainland. Letting Taiwan go would strike at one of the fundamental ways in which the PRC justifies itself. The second pillar of the CCP is economic growth, and it is fair to ask how much prosperity the CCP is willing to give up in exchange for the re-establisment of control over Taiwan. Personally, I think they would be willing to endure quite a bit of pain AS LONG AS they believe such pain would be short-lived. I think they can make a reasonable assessment, based on the past behavior of the United States, Europe, and Japan, that while the bad behavior of the PRC may result in condemnation and sanctions in the short-term, the desire of the West for access to the Chinese market will win out in the long term, and that any sanctions will pass before long. This assessment may or may not be accurate, but it’s accuracy isn’t that important; what’s relevant is whether they can reasonably believe in it, and whether they’ll act according to that belief.