Via the Lede.
Joe Buff has an idea:
The two boomers may have been practicing sub-on-sub combat maneuvers, including the classic close-trail so well dramatized in “Hunt for Red October.” Would two boomers ever fight in a real life war situation? Oh yes! It’s public info that SSBN crews train hard so that, if they ever do have to launch their missiles, they and their sub can then stay immediately useful and relevant by switching over to the attack as an ersatz SSN, to go on the hunt for enemy SSBNs. (Their extreme quiet, powerful passive sonars, and heavyweight anti-sub torpedoes make them decent platforms in that role.)
In addition, it’s public info that to save money and maximize utility of all navy assets, SSBNs while transiting to and from their patrol areas will sometimes serve as “training targets” for anti-submarine forces. Either of these situations could account for why the Royal Navy and French SSBNs were so close together to begin with that they collided while submerged. Statistically speaking this seems more likely to explain it, rather than a totally random encounter against astronomical odds under the high seas.
Doesn’t make a lot of sense to me. Why would French and RN subs hunt one another, rather than subs from their own respective fleets? The upside, I suppose, is exposure to different tactics, but the downside is a serious loss of operational security. Also, as some commenters at Defense Tech point out, the odds of collision aren’t all that astronomical, given that subs trying to do exactly the same job would try to hide under the same ocean conditions.
Savana Redding still remembers the clothes she had on — black stretch pants with butterfly patches and a pink T-shirt — the day school officials here forced her to strip six years ago. She was 13 and in eighth grade.
An assistant principal, enforcing the school’s antidrug policies, suspected her of having brought prescription-strength ibuprofen pills to school. One of the pills is as strong as two Advils.
The search by two female school employees was methodical and humiliating, Ms. Redding said. After she had stripped to her underwear, “they asked me to pull out my bra and move it from side to side,” she said. “They made me open my legs and pull out my underwear.”
Ms. Redding, an honors student, had no pills. But she had a furious mother and a lawyer, and now her case has reached the Supreme Court, which will hear arguments on April 21.
Liptak quotes a professor asking if “we really want to encourage cases…where students and parents are seeking monetary damages against educators in such school-specific matters where reasonable people can disagree about what is appropriate under the circumstances?” Of course, there’s another way of asking the question: “should the courts provide at least some disincentives that compel public officials to place some weight on the privacy of their students when responding to anti-drug hysteria?” I’m going to answer “yes.” And, certainly, if this counts as “reasonable” I’m not sure what isn’t going to qualify.
I fear, though, that this apologism might convince some justices. In addition to the always bad-for-civil-liberties WO(SCOPWUS)D context, students have been particular subjects of collateral damage (cf. this case, upholding mandatory drug testing without individualized suspicion for students participating in any extracurricular activities.) Alito’s record on such issues is appalling, and Roberts seems similar if not quite as radical. Thomas has all but argued that schoolchildren abandon most of their constitutional rights. Breyer (who concurred with Thomas’s opinion in the drug testing case) is highly unreliable.
Still, I have some hope that the set of facts here is so appalling — a wholly arbitrary, extremely degrading search, for ibuprofen, of a good (and innocent) student — that the Supreme Court will vindicate Redding’s rights. The school’s action in this case is an example of what one justice called an “immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use.” Perhaps this case will awaken Scalia’s sporadic libertarian conscience.
I was a little ambivalent about Joe Nocera’s critique of the Madoff investors. In particular, the investors claiming that more regulation was needed may be self-serving but they’re also right; the SEC really should be able to stop a decades-long high-prominence Ponzi scheme. The fact that Madoff wasn’t cold-calling poor, lonely widowers shouldn’t be used to undermine the fact that very real regulatory failures occurred here (this may not be Nocera’s intention, but it could be an effect.)
Still, while where fraud is concerned even suckers deserve an even break, Nocera is certainly right that many of the Madoff investors were, in fact, egregious suckers. This article has plenty of examples, but I think this sums up for me:
If you want to know about Bernie Madoff,” said Mary T. Browne, the renowned psychic and author, who counsels many heavy hitters on Wall Street, “you need to talk to my friend Carmen Dell’Orefice.”
Maybe it was the same physic who told Fred Wilpon to invest some of his Madoff “profits” in a four-year contract with the decaying corpse of Luis Castillo. At any rate, I’m not sure when the “blaming the victim” line is unacceptably crossed, but I have to say that there are pretty distinct limits to the sympathy I can have for Aspen swells who brag about how “Bernie’s in T-Bills!” without ever stopping to wonder about how said investments could be bringing them 12 points a year. For many of the victims, Nocera is certainly right that if they didn’t know they were being scammed it was because they didn’t want to know.
With respect to the regulatory failures, this is equally telling (and scary):
The most relentless skeptic was Harry Markopolos, an accountant and private fraud investigator mostly unknown outside of Boston, who repeatedly sounded the alarm about Madoff to the S.E.C., starting in 2000. When the S.E.C. took no action, Markopolos began a crusade to prove his point. In 2005 he sent regulators a 19-page memo entitled “The World’s Largest Hedge Fund Is a Fraud.” He was referred to the New York branch chief, Meaghan Cheung, who, he wrote in an e-mail to one of her colleagues last year, didn’t “have the derivatives or mathematical background to understand the violations,” much less prosecute them. The S.E.C. eventually opened an investigation into Madoff but closed the matter in November 2007 without bringing any claims against him. Cheung, 37, who left the S.E.C. last September, had difficulty defending her findings in the Madoff case, telling the New York Post after his arrest, “If someone provides you with the wrong set of books, I don’t know how you find the real books.” Markopolos, who lambasted the S.E.C. in a congressional hearing in February, said, “I felt like I was an army of one.”
Yes, if someone lies to you, that’s pretty much the end of it; you certainly wouldn’t want to see if any of the lies check out. In particular, I can’t see the value in, oh, checking with some of the alleged counterparties in the fictitious trades that Maddoff was claiming to make and seeing if they were in fact made. I mean, they were in his books! Evidently, the S.E.C.’s hand were tied.
The Bush years: the catastrophic effects of incompetents regulating frauds who were frequently exploiting the greedy and/or the moronic.
I dunno, I also don’t have much trouble believing that Saint Larry does, in fact, sincerely believe in a lot of nutty conservertarian ideas; he certainly wouldn’t be the first talented academic to do so. And in particular, I don’t have a great deal of faith in someone who was still saying that everything in financial markets was just fine in 2005 and his ability take the problem seriously enough now.
Mr. Trend has a thoughtful post about why he studies military dictatorships in Latin America:
But studying dictatorships has a particular oppression looming over it. Environmental destruction, strike-breaking, and war all have really ugly components. Yet, at least to my way of thinking (and I think a lot of people’s more generally), dealing with issues like methodical torture, disappearances, and murders in lop-sided “battles” is really, really hard to deal with. I’m pretty sure every Latin Americanist who studies dictatorships (not just Southern Cone) passes through a phase somewhere in their professional path where they seriously worry, “is there something WRONG with me for wanting to study this?” At least for me, it wasn’t just some passing question I waived off – it ended up involving some pretty heavy moral and philosophical reflection in my second year of my Master’s. And I’ve known many people who started off wanting to study dictatorships, but once they really got into how awful those governments could be, they opted out, choosing to focus on some other issue either topically or temporally (or both).
Trend’s musings spurred a couple of thoughts. First, I’m quite interested in how academics come to study what they study; my recollection from graduate school is that student’s dissertation topics rarely matched up very tightly with what they had intended to study when they arrived. Figuring out how academics ended up specializing in particular topics and subfields is sort of interesting in and of itself.
This inevitably leads to the second question, which is “how did I end up specializing in security and military doctrine.” This has a relatively straightforward answer; I never really outgrew an adolescent fascination with weapons of war. The fascination slept for a while during undergrad, but awoke when I reached graduate school. Consequently, I focused on security studies, and eventually found enough space in the literature to write about how military organizations interact with one another. I credit Group Captain Lionel Mandrake for providing the proximate inspiration for my dissertation.
Anyone have an interesting story about how you came to study what you study?
Thank God I read Lord of the Rings…
There are two novels that can change a bookish fourteen-year old’s life: The Lord of the Rings and Atlas Shrugged. One is a childish fantasy that often engenders a lifelong obsession with its unbelievable heroes, leading to an emotionally stunted, socially crippled adulthood, unable to deal with the real world. The other, of course, involves orcs.
The idea that Raul Castro may have moved against Venezuelan proxies in Cuba is fascinating, but there doesn’t seem to be much to it. That is, I have no doubt that the removal of Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Lage Davila and Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque can be understood as Raul consolidating his power, and further that he understands that his most stable support comes from the army. What I don’t see is the Venzuela connection; it’s possible that Chavez was working with Carlos Lage Davila, but there doesn’t appear to be any strong evidence. When dictatorships experience peaceful leadership transitions, these kinds of things happen; Raul’s position is less stable than that of his brother, and consequently he moved early on to consolidate his power and authority by removing potential rivals.
I hasten to add that when we gamed out the Cuba succession two years ago at Patterson, Raul disposed of Carlos Lage Davila and several other competitors on the first day. The circumstances were different, of course, but the point is that you don’t need a conspiracy in order to have a purge.
I will say that where I am in agreement with the optimists is on DeLong’s point 2 here — the politics. I don’t think a quickly exhaustible store of “political capital” is the appropriate metaphor here; the financial crisis is not like health care, not least because it’s in the interests of many powerful social and political actors to have the financial crisis solved. If anything, nationalization will be more viable if the Geithner plan fails. (And if Brad is worried that he’s disagreeing with Krugman, what ’till he hears that we’re agreeing with Mickey Kaus. Obviously, I’m missing something.)
The problem is that the political question is less important than the substantive question; even if the better option isn’t foreclosed, it’s still not desirable to do the worse option first unless it’s necessary. So the question then becomes whether or not a Swedish-style nationalization is politically viable right now, and I don’t know the answer to that question. If it isn’t, Geithner may be the worst option except for all the rest, but if it is and Obama just doesn’t want to go to the mat, I still think Krugman is right that it’s a serious mistake.