I’ll just note how ironic it is that the man who popularized the term “no free lunch” proved that if you were willing to argue against taxation and government regulation, there would always be a rich person willing to buy lunch for you.
Author Page for Robert Farley
Eight times in the 10 years (1969-78) that Hayes and his protégé, Bo Schembechler, glowered at each other across the sideline, their teams played for the Big Ten championship. Each coach took his team to the Rose Bowl five times. Hayes went 1-4, Schembechler went 0-5, and neither record should come as a surprise. After coaching against each other, they and their teams were spent.
I’d say there’s probably an alternative explanation for that 1-9 record against the Pac-10.
- I’m hardly the first to note this, but what’s the point of the BCS system if the computers get neutered to the degree that one of the founding purposes of the system (to eliminate the distinction between a loss in the first game and a loss in the tenth game) is lost?
- I think Chait gets the better of this exchange. Although I wouldn’t give up the Oregon-UW rivalry for anything, I’ll admit that on the Oregon side it comes with a healthy dose of ressentiment. That may change if Husky football continues its spiral into pathos…
- Since I’m in Ohio this morning I feel compelled to cheer for the Buckeyes. Cheering for a Buckeye is something that I’ve never done before.
Prediction: Michigan has the reach, but Ohio State has the patented coma lock. And is at home. And is better than Michigan. Ohio State 30, Michigan 17
The flicks I’ve seen in the last couple of weeks…
Departed: I didn’t like Departed quite as much as Scott, although he’s probably right that it’s the best American film thus far this year and the best Marty since Goodfellas. There were parts of the first half that had me chuckling because they seemed more like an expert, loving homage to Scorsese than an actual Scorcese film. I thought that Marty put just the right limit on Nicholson, although he might have gone a bit far with the bizarre sex scenes. The Damon/Dicaprio love interest paid off in an unexpected but not wholly satisfying manner. My biggest problem with the film came in the final act, as I really didn’t have the faintest idea where things were going following Nicholson’s death. This was a good thing in the sense of keeping me on my toes, but was not so great in that the film didn’t lead naturally to any particular conclusion, and thus that the actual finale felt a bit contrived and tacked on. Nevertheless, he had me from the first frame, and I very much enjoyed the film.
The Queen: I have an unhealthy appreciation for monarchy. Of Mirren’s performance much has already been said, and I find myself inclined to go back and take a look at the HBO Elizabeth miniseries. The look on her face in the church at the end, having been forced to appear at the funeral of a woman she loathed, was priceless. Mirren also conveyed the everyday Elizabeth Windsor, the one whose responsibilities included not only symbolic leaderhips of an empire but the very real management of a troublesome family. Michael Sheen did a fine job as Tony Blair, obviously impressed by the royals (perhaps over-impressed) but also capable of seeing what they could not. I wonder if the real Blair reacted so angrily against the contempt that the rest of the Labourites seemed to have for the monarchy. The interaction between Blair and Elizabeth was remarkable, as the initially out of his depth Blair came to the conclusion that he needed to offer forceful advice to the Queen who so obviously intimidated him. Charles fumbling attempts to build an alliance with Blair suggested to me that the Queen Mum was probably correct in believing that the monarchy is in serious trouble when Elizabeth passes. I’m not sure why, but the scene in which the Queen finally arrives at Buckingham Palace to be greeted and eventually accepted by the ambivalent throng almost made me fall apart…
Babel: I like Amores Perros almost (but not quite) as much as Y Tu Mama Tambien, and also thought that 21 Grams was strong. Inarritu keeps it up with some excellent work on Babel. I was impressed by how well he managed Pitt, who is an actor with some gifts but also with limited range. He handled Pitt with kid gloves, never letting him get out of his depth or into an area that might embarass his abilities. The rest of the film was quite good as well, even if the Japanese portion was only tenuously attached to the rest of the stories. I noticed that the fates of the protagonists (if not the situations that they had been placed in) seemed to correlate with their socioeconomic status; the wealthy Americans suffered but came out essentially alright, the Japanese dealt with loss but emerged without a noticeable change in status, the Mexican woman lost her job and her status but kept her family, while the impoverished Moroccans, through little fault of their own, found themselves imprisoned, beaten, tortured, and worse. Perhaps Inarritu was suggesting that crisis is endemic, but its effect upon us is mediated by money, citizenship, status, and so forth. Anyway, quite a solid film.
Last month, a Chinese Song class diesel electric submarine approached, apparently undetected, to within 5 nautical miles of the USS Kitty Hawk, well within both missile and torpedo range. The submarine then surfaced, and was reported by a recon aircraft. What’s going on here?
Diesel electric submarines are remarkably difficult to detect, but I’m nonetheless kind of surprised that one was able to get so close to a USN supercarrier. Kitty Hawk has an escort group and multiple recon aircraft whose job it is to detect approaching submarines. Indeed, a carrier battle group normally includes a nuclear attack submarine specifically to deal with undersea threats. Even if, as PACOM chief Admiral Fallon has suggested, the group was not conducting anti-submarine exercises, they have to be embarassed by the failure to pickup the Chinese sub. I’m also a bit surprised that the Chinese sub was of the indigenously built Song class rather than of the newer and quieter Russian Kilos.
It’s possible, of course, that the sub was detected well before it surfaced, and that the resulting discussion over the exercise has simply been an effort to convince the People’s Liberation Army Navy that it has greater capabilities than it really does. I have my doubts, however. As the surfacing of the sub indicates, naval prestige was at stake. I can hardly imagine a US admiral, much less the captains in command of the various escort vessels, admitting that a Chinese submarine had slipped through the protective net of a supercarrier if it hadn’t actually happened. In any case, I suspect that ASW exercises will get a bit more attention in the Pacific over the next few months, and that a Chinese sub skipper may get a promotion.
Cross-posted at TAPPED.
In a speech delivered a month after his reelection, Lincoln carefully surveyed the North’s resources and manpower and concluded that the nation’s wealth was “unexhausted and, as we believe, inexhaustible.” Southern soldiers began to desert in droves. Through the long, bloody summer and fall of 1864, the South had hung on only because of the belief that the North might tire of the conflict. But Lincoln did not tire. Instead, he doubled the bet — and won the war.
Pay close attention to the double step. Stuntz refrains from directly asserting that Southern soldiers began to desert in droves because of a passage fifty paragraphs into a report that nobody read, because saying that would make him sound stupid. He’s certainly happy, however, to imply that this is the case, leaving the idiocy to the readership of the Weekly Standard. Here are some other reasons that Confederate soldiers may have been deserting in the winter of 1864-1865:
- June 1864: US Grant begins his ten month siege of Richmond
- September 1864: Sherman captures and burns Atlanta
- October 1864: Sheridan defeats Early in the Shenandoah Valley
- December 1864: George Thomas destroys Confederate Army of Tennessee at Nashville; Sherman plows through Georgia on his way to Savannah
Sherman’s March through the heart of the South, combined with the blockade, had almost completely cut off the northeastern corner of the Confederacy from supply. Starving soldiers tend to desert, especially when their homes are at the mercy of enemy armies wandering through the countryside and when they have no prospect of victory. In short, the South was defeated not by Lincoln’s rhetoric but by the invasion of its territory and the destruction of its armies.
Now, this butchery of history wouldn’t be all that notable if it weren’t part of a much larger tendency to ignore results in favor of rhetoric, what Yglesias calls the Green Lantern Theory of Geopolitics. This is why we get metaphors like “doubling down” and why guys like Hitch and Insty reject the formulation of plans or the analysis of military operations in favor of “Just Win, Baby!”. As the Raiders have discovered, however, in the absence of the material necessary for victory and compelling strategic and operational planning, the will to win leads to disasters profound in scope…
Japan withdrew from the London Naval Treaty in 1936. The chief Japanese negotiator, Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto, feared that concessions on the part of his negotiating team would lead directly to assassination upon return to Japan. Japanese nationalists believed that the Washington Naval Treaty system was holding Japan back and preventing it from becoming a first rate power. Freed from the constraints of international treaties, Japan could build a world-beating fleet that would push the Western powers out of Asia and help usher in a new era of Japanese dominance. The partisans of this position didn’t call their organization “Project for a New Japanese Century”, but they might as well have.
Yamato was the first of a new generation of battleships. The IJN believed that the United States would never build battleships too large to move through the Panama Canal, and calculated that the maximum displacement of such ships would amount to about 60000 tons. Ships of that size could not, it was thought, carry guns larger than 16”. The IJN problem was then to design and build battleships that could destroy the largest ships the Americans were likely to build. These ships were to have a speed of at least 30 knots, carry 18” or larger guns, and have extensive range with good fuel economy. Yamato met one of the three conditions. Commissioned in December 1941, Yamato carried 9 18.1” guns in three triple turrets, displaced 66000 tons, and could make 27 knots. Her armor weighed more than an entire World War I dreadnought, and could absorb enormous damage. A 31 knot version was rejected as too large, and the IJN unwisely decided to sacrifice speed for armor. Yamato was also initially designed with diesel engines for economical cruising, but problems with the diesels led to the use of a standard power plant that burned so much oil it would have made Dick Cheney blush. Yamato was an immensely powerful ship, but the Japanese sacrificed operational mobility for surface tactical effectiveness. Four more ships of the class were ordered, but only Musashi was completed as intended. Shinano, the third sister, was completed as an aircraft carrier support vessel. And just to show you that I’m not a hard-hearted man, and that it’s not all displacement and gun caliber: She was beautiful; she was graceful; she was referred to by her crew as “more beautiful than any woman”.
Upon completion Yamato became the flagship of the Combined Fleet, a designation she held until replaced by Musashi in 1943. Admiral Yamamoto sat on Yamato’s bridge as the USN destroyed four of his carriers at Midway in June 1942. Because of her speed and enormous fuel requirements, the IJN did not use Yamato in the Guadalcanal campaign. This must be regarded as a serious error, as Yamato’s presence might well have changed the character of several of the engagements of Savo Island. This was not a time at which the IJN should have emphasized fuel economy. Yamato withdrew from the Central Pacific with the rest of the fleet as American carrier groups launched ever more devastating attacks on Japanese bases.
Yamato was present at both the battles of Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. At the latter she, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna served as the core of Admiral Kurita’s strike force. Although American battleships were successfully decoyed away, the Japanese attack on US transports and escort carrierswas foiled by the extraordinary courage of a few American destroyer captains. Musashi sank under the weight of nearly 30 bombs and 20 torpedoes, demonstrating that unsinkable super-battleships could, indeed, be sunk. After the battle Yamato withdrew to Japan, where she rode out several air attacks.
By April 1945 the Imperial Japanese Navy was largely spent. In A Glorious Way to Die, Russell Spurr recounts the circumstances that led to Yamato’s final mission. In response to the invasion of Okinawa, the Army guaranteed that it would devastate the American fleet with kamikaze attacks on unprecedented scale. Upon being informed of this, the Emperor asked “And what of the Navy?” This set in motion a plan under which most of the remainder of the IJN, including Yamato, a light cruiser, and eight destroyers would sail for Okinawa, fight their way through the defending warships and transports, and beach themselves on the island. The crews would then abandon ship and reinforce the Okinawa garrison. Although the IJN was noted for its bravery and loyalty, this plan did not meet universal acclaim. Several admirals and captains thought this a waste not only of their remaining ships but also of the lives of their crewmen. They pointed out that Yamato, super-battleship that she was, could not hope to destroy the entire USN. Moreover, the approach to Okinawa would require ten hours of sailing in daylight without air cover. The US carriers would certainly find and destroy the task force before it reached its target. Such concerns were brushed aside. Most of Spurr’s information comes from direct interviews with Japanese and American survivors of the sortie, although he also relies on some archival material. Spurr wisely lets the narratives speak for themselves, refraining from imposing an interpretation when accounts conflict, although he uses his own expertise to suggest the most likely course of events.
The task force set sail on April 5, and was detected almost immediately by US submarines and reconnaissance aircraft. Admiral Raymond Spruance initially ordered his battleship squadron to prepare to meet Yamato. This squadron included New Mexico, Idaho, Tennessee, Colorado, Maryland, and West Virginia. The American carrier commander, however, had other ideas, and wanted to destroy the Japanese with air strikes. The decision was eventually made to launch the air strikes and rely on the battleships as a back up. This was certainly the correct call. Although the six elderly battleships would almost certainly have been too much for Yamato to contend with, it’s quite possible that she would have take one or two, along with several thousand American sailors, with her.
The airstrikes began five hours into Yamato’s daylight trek. They immediately inflicted heavy damage, and soon sank several of Yamato’s escorts. Yamato continued at speed, but suffered heavy damage from bombs and torpedoes. She began to list, and her steering failed. The final wave of American torpedo aircraft delivered the coup de grace, and Yamato rolled over and sank with nearly 3000 of her crew. To their eternal dishonor, the American pilots then strafed the Japanese survivors, destroying lifeboats and liferafts and interfering in the rescue operations of the remaining escorts. These attacks on shipwrecked sailors also violated all applicable laws of war. Spurr confirmed the attacks on sailors with both Japanese and American witnesses.
Yamato’s destruction capped an absurd story with a tragic ending. The effort that went into her construction would better have been spent on aircraft carriers and other ships. Her final journey was a sickening waste; while some of the Japanese admirals realized that the 3000 men who died on Yamato might better have been employed building a new Japan, others did not. When Japan surrendered, the IJN attempted to destroy all photographic and technical data on Yamato and her sister, leaving Western analysts guessing as to her exact characteristics well into the Cold War. Yamato has been the centerpiece of several feature films, but is perhaps best known in the United States as the platform onto which the wave motion gun was fitted in Star Blazers. The American redub renamed the ship Argo, but in the Japanese version Yamato sailed once again on what was assumed to be a suicidal mission to save Earth from radioactive destruction. Apparently, the theme song to Space Battleship Yamato (Japanese version) remains popular in the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force.
Trivia: What was the first American battleship to be hit by a kamikaze?
Ah, it’s been a while. Mickey:
Just a reminder: Rep. Henry Waxman, the aggressive incoming liberal chair of the House Government Reform committee–who is chiding his Republican predecessors for not investigating (in AP’s words) “the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal, the controversy over the leak of CIA operative Valerie Plame’s name, and the pre-Iraq war use of intelligence”–voted for the war. … All future beat-sweeteners about Waxman should be required to (unlike AP) mention this fact before reporting Waxman’s righteous indignation. [Maybe he was duped by all that manipulated pre-war intelligence–ed. Please. He’s a smart, well-connected guy. I think he’s hard to dupe.]
I know it’s hard, Mickey, but would you mind explaining that to me one more time? The fact that Waxman voted for the war means that he ought not to be asking questions about it? That’s rather an odd theory of democracy, now isn’t it? I mean, if I had supported the war, I sure as hell would want to know why it had gone wrong, why Abu Ghraib had happened, and why the Bush administration had played around with bad intelligence. Indeed, if I were a Democrat who had voted for the war I would really want to know those things. So what gives, Mickey?
If I may hazard, Mickey is either putting forth a theory of democracy that allows a remarkable degree of executive authority (we give up our right to question the executive on the day that we vote for him) and that’s just a little bit reminiscent of an odd combination of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt, or he’s engaging in sniping so transparent a fourth grader could see through it. In short, if Waxman voted for the war the he must have supported the way in which it was conducted, which means that his decision to question the war is nothing but dirty dirty liberal Democratic liberal political sniping, and IN A TIME OF WAR no less.
Mickey cut his teeth in the 1990s on fairly complex policy questions, but now he can’t manage to sort out the difference between political sniping and good governance. He’s still pimping the argument that immigration reform should have been critical to the election, going so far as to argue that the failure of the Republicans to adopt his strategy for victory means that, in fact, George Bush wanted the Democrats to win. The possibility that the disastrous execution of the war on the part of the administration might have mattered even to those initially supportive doesn’t, apparently, even cross his mind.
Ah, finally some sensitivity to Palestinian sentiment;
“If it was up to me, I would send the gay community, who insisted on celebrating in Jerusalem, to Sodom and Gomorrah,” said Eli Yishai, one of Israel’s deputy prime ministers and the leader of Shas, an ultra-Orthodox party that belongs to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s governing coalition.
Noting that Christian and Muslim clerics also opposed the event, Mr. Yishai told Israel radio, “If we cannot be sensitive to Jewish feelings, perhaps we can listen to those of other religions.”
Brian Ulrich points out the controversy associated with the demarcation of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Unable to control more than a few square blocks of Kabul, the Afghan government is nevertheless refusing a border settlement favorable to Pakistan, even in return for more active cooperation against the Taliban. Insanity. A couple observations:
1. It’s interesting that the norm of territorial sovereignty is so deeply embedded that even recently created (re-established) states without any control over their territory and with profound incentives to come to an agreement refuse to give an inch.
2. I expect that Karzai is playing to a nationalist constituency, but seriously, how powerful can that constituency be and how could it be relevant in the face of the far more severe problem presented by the Taliban? The settlement of this issue will hardly result in the destruction of the Taliban, but the war cannot be won without Pakistan’s cooperation.
3. What’s the US doing to help? That’s a serious question; the State department may be quite active in trying to mediate an agreement. Then again, maybe not.