The 1991 Iraq Model
By Charles Duelfer was the top CIA officer dealing with Saddam Hussein’s regime and weapons programs. He writes an occasional blog and has offered some thoughts on Iraq in 1991 as a model for Iran after the war. I disagree on a number of points, but I think his post should have wider distribution.
The conflict with Iran will end with at least two elements: One will be some sort of political agreement to cease hostilities. Second will be an intrusive weapons inspection mechanism to account for the Iran nuclear program (and possibly other WMD and ballistic missiles).
At the end of the 1991 Iraq war, both these elements were done with UN Security Council resolutions. This looks doubtful for the current Iran case, but there are important similarities with respect to the Iraq case.
First, note the weapons inspection function in Iraq was not arms control, but coercive disarmament. Iraq did not voluntarily agree to accept weapons inspectors. It was coerced as part of a UN Security Council ceasefire resolution. Basically, the inspectors (dubbed UNSCOM) could do anything, anywhere in Iraq, to account for and destroy Iraq’s WMD capabilities. In addition, it was to conduct extraordinarily intrusive monitoring to assure Iraq did not reconstitute its programs–without end. Importantly, the UNSC linked lifting the embargo on Iraq oil sales with a positive report by inspectors that Iraq complied with these conditions.
It is important to note that the agreement was a “ceasefire resolution”, not a peace treaty. If Iraq was found to be non-compliant with the terms (i.e. not cooperating with the inspectors), military enforcement could be re-commenced (and sometimes was).
There were some structural problems with this arrangement, but it created the most intrusive set of inspections since the Versailles Treaty.
I have no clue what end state President Trump envisions. Perhaps, he will only know it when he sees it, and it may depend upon circumstances at that moment (ok, this is different than pornography, but not entirely). However, it is important that consideration be given now to what will be acceptable later.
UNSCOM is not a perfect model for today’s circumstances. The UNSCOM inspection regime was under the UN Security Council (but operated with a very strong US element). It’s hard to imagine that happening again.
The IAEA has the most expertise and current capacity for nuclear inspections in Iran. It will inevitably contribute in whole or in part (they have done a remarkable job under Director Grossi in very difficult circumstances). IAEA played an important role in the coercive mechanism in Iraq in the 1990s. Possibly coercive special authorities for IAEA could be agreed that would satisfy the US and others, but as a UN organization it must be responsive to a wide range of members—some with veto power. So this seems doubtful.
It is also hard to imagine a unilateral inspection mechanism run by the US without some sort of international component. Maybe using the Trump-initiated Board of Peace? Or some new purpose-built organization?
I offer no specific proposal, but from long experience in Iraq, the details will be important. The task of credible accounting following a devastating war where records, buildings, equipment, have all be destroyed, dispersed or looted, will be extraordinarily difficult. The skills involved will go beyond those normally associated with civil arms treaty inspections. Think of destroyed bunkers with leaking toxic agents, the presence of unexploded ordnance, hostile domestic forces probably not under the control of a government, etc.
Finally, the Iran war may not require US “boots on the ground”, but the post-conflict disarmament inspections will. And the risks of casualties will be significant.
Forceful credibility should be the goal.