On the Limits of Airpower

Some follow up thoughts to the Foreign Policy piece on airpower over Iran and Ukraine that I wrote a few weeks back:

Israel and Iran may yet return to war in 2025, as key questions of the military balance have yet to be solved. And while the evidence remains fragmentary, the early verdict of the Twelve Day War leads us in a familiar direction; airpower is an essential tool of statecraft, but has critical limitations that cannot be wished away by material superiority and tactical wizardry.

The Twelve-Day War left Israel in a dominant position over Iranian airspace, able to go where it wanted and do what it wanted without a serious threat from Iranian defenses. However, it did not compel Iran to yield on Israel’s critical demands and did not destroy the Iranian regime.

Israeli air forces ended the war triumphant but exhausted, having destroyed most of their initial priorities before moving down the endless list of less critical military and regime targets.

Same as it’s ever been.

Some other stuff:

• The Pentagon’s acquisition puzzle is probably unsolvable.
• Howard Altman speaks with an Israeli F-16I pilot about the strikes on Iran… I can understand why folks wouldn’t want to read this but there’s some awfully interesting technical detail about the strikes and the systems.
• Some more detailed lessons learned accounts…
• What happened when Hitler went after Germany’s central bank…