Election of the weekend #1: Timor-Leste

This Sunday, Asia’s youngest county, and the world’s most Catholic country (that isn’t a neighborhood in Rome) will conduct their 5th parliamentary election. There are 65 seats in parliament, determined by a closed list, proportional representation vote. 17 party lists are competing in this election. The two primary parties in Timor-Leste are the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), who currently hold 23/65 seats, and the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT), who hold 21. The current government is a coalition of FRETILIN and two smaller parties. While the last election took place in 2018, FRETILIN didn’t form this coalition until 2020; CNRT initially lead the coalition but tried to force an early election by voting against their own budget in 2020; when the dust settled FRETILIN swooped in and formed a new coalition. Timor-Leste has a semi-presidential system, with Presidential elections held on a different cycle. Last year CNRT took the presidency easily, thanks in part to having recruited Nobel Peace Prize Winner, former president (2007-2012) and hero of Timor-Leste’s long brutal struggle for independence Jose Ramos-Horta to run under the CNRT banner. He won the run-off with 62%. (Ramos-Horta had been an independent politician for decades, since leaving FRETILIN in 1988; he aligned with CNRT for this election.) CNRT captured the presidency by recruiting a revolutionary war hero and the country’s second president to run for president; their parliamentary leader, Xanana Gusmão; is also a revolutionary war hero and former president (the country’s first, from 2002-2007). While I am unaware of any publicly available polling data, conventional wisdom seems to be that CNRT should be strongly favored in this election, and will likely replace FRETILIN as the leader of the next coalition government.

Ideologically, both FRETILIN and CNRT are on the center-left, and have their roots in the struggle for independence under the brutal Indonesian occupation of the last quarter of the 20th century, with radical pasts and more moderate, pragmatic presents. FRETILIN was the primary institutional organ of resistance to the Indonesian occupation, which transitioned into a political party as the occupation ended. CNRT was created by then-outgoing president Gusmão as an alternative to FRETILIN in 2007–one that would be more inclusive of the various ethnic groups and factions in Timorese society, while attracting and developing private sector economic development. These divisions appear to be on the table once again, as a key issue in this election revolves around natural resources. Timor-Leste is something of a Petrostate, with a very high level of government expenditure given their GDP, 80% of which is funded by state-owned natural resources. This revenue is likely to decline as the decade progresses, and restored upon completion of the Greater Sunrise natural gas project, which should start generating revenue in 2030. This is a joint project of a Timorese parastatal and Australian company, which is the source of the conflict. The current government seems content to send the raw product of Greater Sunrise to be processed in Darwin, while the CNRT wants to develop processing facilities in Timor-Leste, and if the Australians aren’t willing to get on board, they’ll turn to the Chinese for help. Whether CNRT is likely to turn to China, or is simply preparing to bargain for a better deal with Australia, I can’t say. To state what I imagine is, by now, obvious: I have no relevant expertise here and could be misreading the available information. Many entries in this series will make clear who I think LGM readers aligned with the general politics of this blog should be rooting for; that is not the case here. In the event that we have readers more knowledgeable about the current politics of Timor-Leste, please do chime in to correct or augment what I’ve provided here.