Surge is not a Strategy

Donald Stoker is correct insofar as he notes that the success record of insurgencies isn’t great. Yglesias and Drum note that the successful counter-insurgency campaigns that Stoker points out were fought by local governments rather than occupying powers, which is more or less correct, although there are some definitional problems. The Greeks, for example, relied on direct US support to fight the communist insurgency in the 1940s and 1950s, and several of the other counter-insurgency campaigns that Stoker promotes included both local and foreign forces.

The problem with Stoker’s piece is here:

But the strategy of “surging” troops could offer a rare chance for success—if the Pentagon and the White House learn from their past mistakes. Previously, the U.S. military cleared areas such as Baghdad’s notorious Haifa Street, but then failed to follow up with security. So the insurgents simply returned to create havoc. As for the White House, it has so far failed to convince the Iraqi government to remove elements that undermine its authority, such as the Mahdi Army. Bush’s recent speech on Iraq included admissions of these failures, providing some hope that they might not be repeated.

There is simply no plausible account for how an addition of 10% to a dramatically undersized counter-insurgency contingent could possibly have the effect that Stoker expects. It’s patently absurd, and debates about whether or not counter-insurgency is possible or whether this particular operation is local or an occupation are utterly irrelevant in face of the fact that this is not a new strategy; it’s an augmentation (and a poor one at that) of the strategy that has already failed.