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Japanese F-22

[ 0 ] February 25, 2006 |

Ryan at Capital Cadre highlights this story on the F-22:

Momentum is building within the Air Force to sell the service’s prized F-22A Raptor — which is loaded with super-secret systems — to trusted U.S. allies, with Japan viewed as the most likely buyer, service and industry officials tell Inside the Air Force.

A Lockheed Martin official heavily involved in the Raptor program told ITAF Feb. 14 that a proposal to alter course and sell the Raptor to Japan is working its way through the Air Force. Lockheed is leading development and production work on the service’s newest fighter.

Several interesting things are going on here. Obviously, it’s no surprise that Lockheed and Boeing like the idea of selling the F-22 on the international market. It’s a little bit more puzzling that Air Force brass like the idea. The notion of selling the most advanced aircraft in the US arsenal even to a committed US ally would seem to make them mildly twitchy. However, given that so many different countries are part of the Joint Strike Fighter research, perhaps this isn’t the case.

Another way to think of this is to interpret it in terms of the more general expansion of Japan’s military role, and of the slow redefinition of the US-Japanese military alliance.

Positive Case

[ 0 ] February 25, 2006 |

Right. Any argument that the US must remain in Iraq in order to stave off disintegration must be accompanied by an account of how the US presence, with a finite extension, will actual resolve the problem. If we’re just delaying the inevitable, then there’s not much point in staying.

That said, such an account can be plausibly given. Military and civil institutions take time to develop, and they could conceivably be stronger a year from now than they are now. Some sort of accord might develop over time between Iraq’s various factions with the US operating as a broker. On it’s face, the case for continued US commitment is not absurd.

However, just to say that a case is plausible is not to say it is accurate. I can’t see much in the way of empirical evidence to demonstrate that the above processes, primarily the strengthening of Iraqi institutions, are actually taking place. Moreover, the continued presence of the US introduces a variety of perversities (association of political elites with an unpopular occupier, prevention of resolution of certain differences, reluctance of institution builders to pay full cost of construction) that can either cancel out what good work could be done, or actual make the long term situation worse.

I think that the burden must be on those who support the continued occupation to explain precisely how the situation will be better in a year or three because of the US presence. In a side note, several Patterson School professors are thinking about putting together a panel on just this subject. Lexingtonians take note.

[ 0 ] February 24, 2006 |

Friday Cat Blogging… Nelson and Starbuck

Most Dangerous

[ 0 ] February 24, 2006 |

Vote early. Vote often.

Why Battleship Blogging Matters

[ 0 ] February 23, 2006 |

Brock points us to this disgrace:

The authorities in Moscow have hastily removed posters congratulating Russian war veterans which mistakenly showed the American warship USS Missouri. The posters were taken down on Wednesday – just hours before Defender of the Motherland Day.

The Russian defence ministry said it did not produce the posters.

A Moscow city hall official said the design “should have been shown to specialists who can distinguish one battleship from another”.

A defence ministry spokesman, Vyacheslav Sedov, said “it was a civilian firm that produced the poster, and the people who made it were simply incompetent”.

“We do have similar ships, beautiful ships. They should have used one of those,” he added.

The poster in question, which clearly depicts a battleship of the Iowa class:

Now, I can understand why the Russians used an American battleship. The Russian Ganguts were hardly the most photogenic of warships, and the other options include the Italian Giulio Cesare and the British Royal Sovereign, both transferred to the Soviet Union late in their careers.

Nevertheless, there is no excuse for such an oversight.

Realists and Neocons

[ 0 ] February 23, 2006 |

There are some things to like in Helmut’s discussion of Fukuyama’s NYT piece, in particular his point about the Cold War providing ideological cover for any policy the US wanted to pursue. But Helmut is dead wrong about realists and neocons; they’re not the same. They’re not close to the same.

“Idealism” is a complete backtrack on all that the neocons stand for, which just is standard old Cold War realism in which the most powerful states get to carve up the global pie. The “end of history” thesis suggests that there is a final victor and it is us. That fits the realist paradigm a whole lot better than it does any idealist notion of foreign affairs.

The above isn’t even a fair description of neoconservatism, much less realism. There is nothing, NOTHING, about realism that suggests, implies, or allows for a final victor that gets to carve up the world. Indeed, nothing could be further from realist thought; no realist would EVER suggest that a concept like “the end of history”, unless by history you mean the development of anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system. History never ends for a realist. Moreover, the processes of power described by realists don’t have a moral content; no realist would ever declare that the Melians deserved destruction at the hands of the Athenians or that the Iraqis deserved to be attacked by the Americans.

And this does not apply simply to neorealism. Hans Morgenthau’s fifth principle of power politics states that the moral laws of the universe cannot be identified with the moral aspirations of a given state. There is NO WAY to reconcile this statement with neoconservatism, which clearly identifies the aspirations of the United States with the laws of the universe. The two are completely antithetical.

But it should have been foreseen by Fukuyama as well as by the other neocons. They do, after all, come from the realist school of international relations. This school – perhaps best exemplified for our purposes here by Kissinger – understands the significance of legitimacy in the international sphere. Legitimacy of behavior in the international sphere requires that others, even those who may have something to lose in a given action, view the action as nonetheless right or appropriate or at least understandable.

We’ll set aside for a second the fact that the neocons loathe Henry Kissinger and focus on the misinterpretation of realism. While some realists include concepts like legitimacy within their edifice (I’m thinking Carr, Gilpin, and Walt to the extent that he can be described as a realist) many don’t, and it can hardly be regarded as a centerpiece of realist thought. On the contrary, the concept of legitimacy is highly regarded by liberal internationalists, who deliberately eschew the other aspects of realist thought.

The clearest element of Helmut’s discussion of Fukuyama is that neoconservatives ought not to be regarded as “idealists”. Why not? At one point, Helmut describes Fukuyama as a neocon “ideologue”, and members of the Bush administration as “ideologues”. There is nothing about the concept of “idealist” that suggests that someone must have the right ideas. If the ideas favored by an idealist are bad or destructive, then an idealist can be even worse than a realist, materialist, or rationalist, however you would like to describe the opposite of idealism. Neocons are idealists; they clearly identify an ideological end point, and see ideas as the prime generators of change and transformation. This doesn’t mean that they’re good, and certainly doesn’t mean that they ought to be called realists. Rudyard Kipling was an idealist; he identified the well being of the world with the hegemony of right-thinking white men. Kaiser Wilhelm II was an idealist; he identified the well being of the world with the glory of German civilization. Otto Von Bismarck was a realist; he pursued the interests of his state without larger consideration of whether the German Empire was in some sense carrying out a historical or divine mission. Neocons are very much like the former two examples, and very little like the latter.

The Iraq adventure was almost universally decried as pointless by realists in the academy and in the policy world. Say what you will about these realists; I hardly wish to argue strongly for the positions taken by John Mearsheimer, but at least he got this one right. The Iraq invasion may have been sold partially (but not wholly) in realist terms, but it makes almost no sense from the realist worldview. Whatever neocons may be, they aren’t Henry Kissinger. If they were, then Iraq would remain in the hands of Saddam Hussein. You can dislike both the realist and the neocon understandings of the world (and I dislike both) while recognizing that they are not reconcilable with one another. It does a dramatic disservice to the discussion of either neoconservatism or realism to conflate the two.

does a much better job of parsing Fukuyama’s NYT piece.

UPDATE: As Helmut’s comment just reminded me, even the security justification for the war on Iraq was sold in liberal internationalist, not realist, terms. Realists tend to prefer to rely on deterrence to resolve problems with weapons of mass destruction, and are certainly loathe to represent any state as “rogue” or “outlaw”. Quite the contrary; realists assumed that Saddam Hussein (and Kim Jong-Il, to give another example) was simply pursuing his own interests, and cared little about the threats to international law, international institutions, and international order that Hussein presented. Realist as a whole could also care less about NGOs, and were uncompelled by the logic of Iraqi cooperation with Al Qaeda. Even to the extent that the administration presented Iraq as a threat, it was a threat on liberal internationalist, not realist, terms.

Lexblogging: The Passion of the Rebels

[ 0 ] February 22, 2006 |

My second game at Rupp Arena was a bit less exciting than the first; in the 103rd meeting of the Wildcats and the Ole Miss Rebels, Kentucky eked out an 80-40 win. That gives Kentucky a 92-11 lead in the all time series. God, the SEC must have been a remarkably boring conference for most of its history; since 1933, Kentucky has won 43 titles. Tennessee, the next most successful team, has won eight. Is there any other major conference that has a similar imbalance?

The Rupp Arena crowd is very smart, and has very high expectations. This is particularly true of the area I’ve beens sitting, because many of the fans have had tickets for twenty years of more. They know all the players, have a refined sense of the game, and expect that Kentucky will dominate. It’s a lot of fun.

Tonight, the Wildcats played like the team they were supposed to be this year. Their next three games are tough; at LSU, at Tennessee, and Florida at Rupp. It will be interesting to see what they’ll do in the tournament.

Wisdom of the Day

[ 0 ] February 22, 2006 |

From Dr. B.

Yeah, it can be like herding cats; then again, as any cat person knows, it’s actually not all that difficult to get cats to do what you want, as long as you don’t treat them like dogs.

Almost Wholly Irrelevant, Except for that Ruling Iraq Part

[ 0 ] February 22, 2006 |

John Quiggin catalogues Insty’s history with Moqtada Al Sadr. Long story short, Sadr managed to fall off the radar screen both of Insty and the administration sometime in 2004, yet is now one of the most powerful men in Iraq. That democracy thing, looks like it’s going great.

I still can’t fathom why Sadr wasn’t killed or arrested in 2004.

A New Dudas

[ 0 ] February 21, 2006 |

Congratulations to frequent commenters JRD and MJD on the birth of Andrew Michael Dudas. If there’s one thing this world needs, it’s another Dudas.


[ 0 ] February 20, 2006 |

While wandering Wikipedia, I discovered this interesting fact; only eighty-two veterans of World War I are still alive. I suppose that this shouldn’t be particularly surprising, given that the youngest is 102 years old. Having never given it much thought, though, I guess I expected that the number would be bigger.

For the record, this is the breakdown:

Living in Australia – 4 veterans
Living in Austria – 1 veteran
Living in Brazil – 1 veteran
Living in Canada – 2 veterans
Living in France – 10 veterans
Living in Hungary – 1 veteran
Living in Germany – 14 veterans
Living in Italy – 12 veterans
Living in Poland – 3 veterans
Living in Russia – 1 veteran
Living in the United Kingdom – 11 veterans
Living in USA – 22 veterans

I’m mildly surprised that the United States has the largest number of surviving veterans, given that US mobilization was smaller than that of the other major powers. On the other hand, World War II must have taken its toll of veterans in the European countries, and US participation in the war came fairly late.

In ten years, I suspect they’ll all be gone.

Big Government Liberals

[ 0 ] February 20, 2006 |

Atrios is quite right; while liberals tend to believe that taxes should be high enough to pay for expenditures, and also tend to believe that a well funded, stable state can usefully fulfill a number of societal tasks, no one believes that big government is a virtue in and of itself.

I don’t know any “big government liberals” in the sense that Andy means. I don’t know anybody who gets a stiffy at the thought of raising taxes and increasing government spending as a share of GDP just for the hell of it. Liberals I know tend to think there are things government should do and we should, roughly, figure out how to pay for those things, though we’re not entirely allergic to deficit spending. When taxes have to go up to cover interest and debt repayment costs no liberals I know are going to go “YAY! HIGHER TAXES! WOO HOOO!”

On the right, the idea that small government is good seems to have escaped its theoretical roots and become a dogmatic assertion, one that is ignored in practice as consistently as it is declared in rhetoric. There is no corresponding
belief on the left in some kind of ideal state of the state.