An American Plan For The Middle East

Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke at Davos. Blinken was interviewed by Thomas Friedman. Sullivan gave a short talk and then did a Q&A with Børge Brende, president of the World Economic Forum.

The two said very similar things; this administration controls its messages carefully. Further, their messages are consistent with a report on what they called foreign policy for the middle class. It was written in 2020, before the election, and Sullivan was a co-author. I haven’t read the report for a year or more, but its themes continue through what Blinken and Sullivan say and do. They were not emphasized in these two presentations, which were consistent with the precepts in the report. This is an administration that has a plan and executes it.

At Davos, both talked about the world situation broadly, but where I think they had something new to say was about Israel and Gaza.

Both pointed out that a narrow approach focusing on Israel and Palestine has obviously not worked. But a broader approach, bringing in neighbors to support a two-state solution and the two states individually, might work.

Sullivan:

Long before October 7th, the United States was deeply engaged in an effort to secure a political horizon for the Palestinian people, with Israel’s security guaranteed as part of that. 

We judged that direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, which had fallen short so many times before, was unlikely to succeed.  We determined the best approach was to work towards a package deal that involved normalization between Israel and key Arab states, together with meaningful progress and a political horizon for the Palestinian people.

….

The pieces are there to be put together to achieve this outcome — and not years down the road, but in the near term, if all of us pull together and make the wise and bold decisions to choose this course.

Blinken:

But I think we’re also seeing something else.  And if you look hard enough, you can really see it.  And it’s a different equation, a different equation that answers the profound needs of virtually everyone in the region, starting with Israel and starting with its age-old question for genuine security.  And it’s this:  You now have something you didn’t have before, and that is Arab countries and Muslim countries even beyond the region that are prepared to have a relationship with Israel in terms of its integration, its normalization, its security, that they were never prepared to have before, and to do things, to give the necessary assurance, to make the necessary commitments and guarantees, so that Israel is not only integrated but it can feel secure.

But you also have an absolute conviction by those countries, one that we share, that this has to include a pathway to a Palestinian state, because you’re not going to get the genuine integration you need, you’re not going to get the genuine security you need, absent that.  And of course, to that end as well, a stronger, reformed Palestinian Authority that can more effectively deliver for its own people has to be part of the equation.

But if you take a regional approach, and if you pursue integration with security, with a Palestinian state, all of a sudden you have a region that’s come together in ways that answer the most profound questions that Israel has tried to answer for years, and what has heretofore been its single biggest concern in terms of security, Iran, is suddenly isolated along with its proxies, and will have to make decisions about what it wants its future to be.

In his January 31 column, Friedman outlined what he calls a “Biden Doctrine” developing on the Middle East. He sees it in three tightly coordinated tracks, which I don’t entirely agree with, but they are a useful place to start.

On one track would be a strong and resolute stand on Iran, including a robust military retaliation against Iran’s proxies and agents in the region in response to the killing of three U.S. soldiers at a base in Jordan by a drone apparently launched by a pro-Iranian militia in Iraq.

On the second track would be an unprecedented U.S. diplomatic initiative to promote a Palestinian state — NOW. It would involve some form of U.S. recognition of a demilitarized Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that would come into being only once Palestinians had developed a set of defined, credible institutions and security capabilities to ensure that this state was viable and that it could never threaten Israel. Biden administration officials have been consulting experts inside and outside the U.S. government about different forms this recognition of Palestinian statehood might take.

On the third track would be a vastly expanded U.S. security alliance with Saudi Arabia, which would also involve Saudi normalization of relations with Israel — if the Israeli government is prepared to embrace a diplomatic process leading to a demilitarized Palestinian state led by a transformed Palestinian Authority.

The three tracks are being pursued simultaneously. But I would reorder and modify them.

I would put Palestinian statehood first. It is the sore point and source of excuses for bad actors in the region. The Houthis, for example, claim they are shelling civilian ships because of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, although they have self-serving reasons pertaining to their own war as well. Hamas is a product of the inequities between Israel and Palestine. A strong Palestinian state that can serve and protect its people would make an enormous difference across the Middle East. Talks among several countries toward this end are ongoing. This is also the most difficult of the three tracks, so we won’t hear much about those talks.

Second is Saudi Arabia. The administration has been working on some sort of security arrangement with Saudi Arabia since it’s been in office. Saudi Arabia wants more in terms of nuclear power technology than the administration is willing to give. Again, not all of these negotiations are made public. The sticking point on nuclear issues has to do with uranium enrichment, which can potentially contribute to a weapons program. If Iran builds nuclear weapons, the Saudis would want to do the same.

I would describe the third track differently: Dealing with terrorism in the area. Make the issue the semi-autonomous groups, not Iran. It’s important to leave a path for Iran to eventually give up support of these groups. The JCPOA was one step in that direction, but Donald Trump destroyed it. An  immediate response to the three American may be accompanied by more.  This includes Hamas and settlers. Continuing violence by substate groups is destabilizing across the Middle East.

The sanctions against Israeli settlers could also be considered part of this third track. Israel is attacking Hamas. Random attacks by any of these groups destabilize the area and maintain enmities. From the executive order:

I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, find that the situation in the West Bank — in particular high levels of extremist settler violence, forced displacement of people and villages, and property destruction — has reached intolerable levels and constitutes a serious threat to the peace, security, and stability of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and the broader Middle East region.  These actions undermine the foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the viability of a two-state solution and ensuring Israelis and Palestinians can attain equal measures of security, prosperity, and freedom.  They also undermine the security of Israel and have the potential to lead to broader regional destabilization across the Middle East, threatening United States personnel and interests.  For these reasons, these actions constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. 

It’s too bad that Friedman stepped on his own column with that animal piece. Blinken and Sullivan gave an overview of the administration’s strategy. It’s not a trial balloon, because they are working all parts of it intensively.

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Thanks to the commenters for yesterday’s input. Obviously I found Friedman’s animal piece more upsetting than some others did. I made up my mind some time back never to analogize humans to insects; I find it horrifying.

Cross-posted to Nuclear Diner