Year Two

Some thoughts at 1945 on the next year of a war that most doubted would last a month:

Much of the rest of the conflict will depend on foreign intervention, but foreign intervention is contingent upon outcomes on the battlefield.

It is hard to say whether Ukrainian strength or Ukrainian vulnerability would have more of an impact on foreign assistance. If Russia’s offensive shows signs of success, Western capitals may feel compelled to rapidly ship additional weapons to Kyiv. If the Ukrainian counter-offensive recaptures substantial territory, it similarly could give President Volodomyr Zelenskyy grist for making an argument that Ukraine needs support to finish the job. The biggest debates will involve further tank transfers, long-range missile transfers, and of course the transfer of modern Western fighter aircraft. 

I close with an extended boxing metaphor because I was watching Rocky while writing the column. This war is very nearly a textbook example of Lawrence Freedman’s argument that theories of the future of war almost invariably fail to take into account the factors that extend wars. I am hopeful that a Ukrainian counter-offensive in the late spring or early summer can make substantial territorial gains and inflict serious damage on fielded Russian forces, but I’m no longer all that optimistic about a collapse of the Russian Army. As I’ve said before, at some point difficult decisions may have to be made by Kyiv and its supporters about how much more pain should be tolerated for diminishing returns. We’re certainly not there yet, though, and the Ukrainians should be given every opportunity to win the war on the battlefield.