Security threats and what to do about them

Over at WhirledView, Cheryl Rofer asks a number of extremely important questions about the nature of threats to U.S. security. In particular, she asks them in the context of a broader discussion about U.S. nuclear strategy.

Cheryl’s interrogation is pointed: she addresses potential first use of weapons, the lumping of chemical and biological “weapons of mass destruction” with nuclear arms, the need for access to oil, potential targeting of Muslim holy sites, etc. Indeed, I would note that she goes well beyond the classic cold war question “How much is enough?”

Cheryl acknowledges, however, that the task is daunting:

I have far more questions than answers. A real threat assessment would require a team of people and months of work to collect the relevant information.

Cheryl points out that the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which involved a huge team of people working for months to formulate US nuclear strategy, has been criticized by mainstream policy actors for failing to account for missions and threats. She references somewhat critical comments from both the Defense Science Board and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Cheryl and these other analysts are indirectly-but-accurately charging that the US nuclear force has a life of its own. It survives year-to-year and decade-to-decade largely because of policy momentum; bureaucratic inertia precludes meaningful critique. Its life is existential, not necessarily justified by any kind of rational purpose — such as specific threats to US security.

Needless to say, I view this as a horrible way to design public policy, let alone US national security and nuclear weapons policy.

In the best of all possible policy worlds, analysts would assess US interests and assets based in large part on a careful calculation of threats to those interests. Policy responses would be designed to achieve US goals at reasonable cost.

Here’s a key point Rofer does not address: threats posed by other nuclear weapons states, potential new proliferants, and even non-state actors, could conceivably be addressed by non-nuclear forces and even non-military policies. Given the security dilemma, it would also be a good idea to assess the way US nuclear posture might provoke new threats.

A “nuclear posture review” should be only a sub-part of a much larger enterprise. How can the US best address the threats to its security interests?

The answer might include arms control (even disarmament), negotiation…even appeasement.

This is a cliché about the impressive size and capability of US military power, but I’ll repeat it anyway since I’ve heard people like Robert Kagan use it in front of audiences: “When you have a hammer, all problems start to look like nails.”