Author Page for Scott Lemieux

Blog Against Racism Day: The Great Dissenter

When it comes to discussing the worst cases in Supreme Court history, I’ve always thought the Civil Rights Cases haven’t gotten a bad enough rap. (I should mention here that I’m talking in terms of consequences more than legal doctrine; many of the most infamously racist cases, because of the racism that has infected American constitutionalism, have been perfectly plausible applications of precedent and original intent.) Dred Scott was an atrociously immoral opinion, but its denial of African-American citizenship was the culmination of Jacksonian ideology, not a cause of it; the citizenship rights of African-American had been eroding for decades before the decision has handed down. The same is true of Plessy; it’s appalling, but by the time the case was handed down, Jim Crow had already left the station for good, and even if the case had been decided correctly it’s doubtful that it would have stood up for long. We can never know what effects the Civil Rights Cases would have had, but I think it’s very possible that it was far more consequential. In addition, it produced a great dissent from the first Justice Harlan, greater in my view than his much more famous dissent in Plessy, and for Blog Against Racism Day I thought I would provide some excerpts for readers unfamilar with this case.

The Civil Rights Cases effectively struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which (similar to the 1964 CRA) created a federal right against racial discrimination in public accommodations. The Supreme Court held that Section V of the 14th Amendment, which gives Congress the ability to enforce the rights (including equal protection, due process, and the privileges or immunities of citizenship), should be narrowly construed as to give Congress only the power to respond directly to state action, rather than to legislate against private inequities that states help to uphold rather than eradicate. While I agree with Harlan that the majority opinion proceeded “upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial” and that the result was that “the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism,” Bradley’s opinion was a plausible enough reading of the text; when I say it’s a candidate for the worst decision in history, I don’t mean that it’s a ludicrously implausible or unprincipled opinion in the manner of Bush v. Gore. Still, in the context of past Supreme Court precedents, the decision is quite disturbing. As Harlan notes, it is instructive to compare how the Court interpreted Congressional power when it came to the Fugitive Slave Act (which it upheld although it was not a directly enumerated power of Congress and had very dubious connections to any enumerated powers) with how it construed federal power in this case. Although the Civil War amendments expanded federal power, and although the Civil Rights Act was much more closely related to an enumerated power of Congress, when it came to protecting African Americans rather than using violence to hold them in bondage the Court suddenly became much less deferential to Congress. The effects of this type of reasoning were extremely important. In addition to striking down the Civil Rights Act, the Court also prevented Congress from intervening against terrorist violence that was used to intimidate black voters. The effect of the Court preventing Congress from intervening against private discrimination and violence against African-Americans in creating and maintaining the apartheid system that emerged can scarcely be overstated. Even in its most conservative era, the Court never permitted formal racial discrimination in granting the vote; the ability of whites, with the collaboration of state governments, to threaten blacks with the loss of their livliehoods, credit, property and lives was crucial to sustaining Jim Crow. As Harlan pointed out, the effect of the court’s gutting of both the privileges and immunities clause and Congress’ ability to protect African-Americans represented the return of slavery in a slightly different form. Indeed, Harlan argued that Congress’ enforcement powers under the 13th Amendment were sufficient:

Congress has not, in these matters, entered the domain of state control and supervision. It does not assume to prescribe the general conditions and limitations under which inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement shall be conducted or managed. It simply declares in effect that since the nation has established universal freedom in this country for all time, there shall be no discrimination, based merely upon race or color, in respect of the legal rights in the accommodations and advantages of public conveyances, inns, and places of public amusement.
I am of opinion that such discrimination is a badge of servitude, the imposition of which congress may prevent under its power, through appropriate legislation, to enforce the thirteenth amendment; and consequently, without reference to its enlarged power under the fourteenth amendment, the act of March 1, 1875, is not, in my judgment, repugnant to the constitution.

Harlan’s dissent has many remarkable passages, but I think it’s particularly worth singling out this one. We’re often told that, civil rights legislation represents some kind of “special rights.” Bradley made that argument in this case, making the claim that African-Americans had to cease becoming the “special favorite of the laws,” which he claimed was the case under the Civil Rights Act. Harlan demolished this argument in a way that is still relevant in our time:

My brethren say that when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficient legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected. It is, I submit, scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws. What the nation, through Congress, has sought to accomplish in reference to that race is, what had already been done in every state in the Union for the white race, to secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more.

It was right then, and it’s right now.

As a historical coda, the Civil Rights Cases remain good law to this day, and their narrow construction of the 14th Amendment has played a role in “New Federalism” cases such as the Court’s striking down an important provision of the Violence Against Women Act. The 1964 Civil Rights Act was upheld under the Commerce Clause, rather than the 14th Amendment, although Congress cited both in passing the legislation. I agree with Justice Douglas that the Court should have taken the opportunity to overturn the Civil Rights Cases, to remove this stain from American jurisprudence and to put Congress’ ability to pass human rights legislation on a more secure and logical footing.

Applied Illogic

In comments to my Ayotte liveblogging below, Aspazia asks for further clarification about Roberts’ argument that doctors could challenge unconstitutional applications of the New Hampshire statute before a medical emergency, but not as a facial challenge. The reason for her confusion couldn’t be simpler: Roberts’ position doesn’t make the slightest lick of sense. Dahlia Lithwick explains the issue well:

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg adds that for a doctor whose license is on the line, the prospect of a possible “defense” is pretty cold comfort. The doctor doesn’t want an opinion from the attorney general. He needs to know in advance that he’s not violating the law. Justice Antonin Scalia needs to change the subject fast and he does, advising Ayotte to make her other argument—the one about why courts shouldn’t find entire statutes invalid based on a few unconstitutional applications. This leads Roberts to ask, for the first of many times this morning, whether Ayotte would accept a “pre-enforcement as-applied challenge” to the statute, brought by doctors facing prosecution.

I am sure that “pre-enforcement as-applied challenge” means something. Perhaps that the doctors facing potential prosecution could come forward to challenge the statute as applied to all of them before the cops actually knock on their doors. What I can’t quite figure out is how Roberts’ characterization truly differs from the position of the plaintiffs here. Ginsburg makes this point better than I can (she is talking to Ayotte because she can’t just ask Roberts, at least not until they get behind closed doors): “You characterize this as an ‘as applied’ challenge. But how is it ‘as applied’ if the doctor doesn’t have to wait for an emergency?” Justice John Paul Stevens adds, “Do you have to wait until the doctor has an actual patient in his office?” The nice thing about finding a whole statute unconstitutional up front, as the district court and the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals did in this case, is that doctors needn’t wait for some woman to be bleeding on a gurney before finding out what they are and aren’t allowed to do.

Ginsburg and Stevens are, of course, right. If a doctor doesn’t have to wait for an emergency to bring a lawsuit–and you can understand why Roberts doesn’t want to publicly embrace this position, although that would be the logical conclusion of following the Salerno rule–then this case is as good as any. There’s no logical reason why a subsequent lawsuit would be “as applied” if it happens before the statute is actually applied against a doctor who performs an abortion without parental consent; the only difference would be the name of the party bringing the suit. At least as he explained it at oral argument, Roberts’ attempt to split the difference between the two competing lines of doctrine is simply incoherent and unworkable.

Sub Silento

Don’t believe me when I say that Alito wants to throw Roe from the caboose? Then take Alito’s word for it. To reiterate the obvious, the only serious question is whether Alito will vote to overturn Roe directly or incrementally.

Ayotte

Oral arguments in the crucial abortion case Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood will be on C-SPAN at 12:15 ET. I’ll have live or post-blogging as interesting developments warrant.

…great question by Souter, which Ayotte simply can’t answer. New Hampshire seems to be arguing that despite the choice of New Hampshire not to include a health exception a doctor who provided an emergency abortion to protect a woman’s health without parental notification would be “constitutionally protected,” but when pressed (Souter asked twice where this constitutional protection came from, and Ayotte refused to answer) Ayotte wouldn’t acknowledge the obvious: that the heath exemption is clearly required by Roe and Carhart, and hence the New Hampshire law is obviously unconstitutional under current law.

…to put the facial challenge issue being dicussed in context, let’s consider what Salerno–the case the statute’s defenders would like to apply in order to protect the statute from being struck down based on a facial challenge–says:

“A facial challenge to a legislative act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the act would be valid. The fact that [a law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid…”

Compare this with Casey: “[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.” To state the obvious, as Souter and Breyer have pointed out repeatedly these two standards are utterly incompatible. And under the Salerno rule, virtually no abortion regulation could be struck down under the standard. The sick irony is that the fact that such regulations generally don’t have much impact on healthy middle-class women in stable families will make them impossible to strike down.

…interesting argument overall. Casey‘s supporters on the court, at least, for once aren’t going down without a fight; it was nice to see Souter going toe-to-toe with Scalia, and Breyer, Stevens and Ginsburg were all active and had good questions. Scalia wasn’t able to dominate proceedings like he normally does. Alas, unless they can get Kennedy’s 6th vote it’s all moot because the case will probably be re-argued.

…welcome to readers from Alas, A Blog! More detailed and considered thoughts about Ayotte here.

"What A Republican Calls Himself When He Wants To Get Laid"

Wow, Roy points out that some people are still claiming that Glenn “Husband Notification Laws Are A Refreshing Balm For My Misogynist Ressentiment” Reynolds is a “libertarian.” Pathetic, really.

In other XFL Media (TM) news, I see that Charles Johnson is taking a page from his colleague’s playbook, claiming that Ward Churchill is “a hero of the progressive movement.” (Omitted: evidence for this alleged hero-worship among progressives of any influence.) No surprise there; Instapundit is, after all, nothing but Little Green Footballs with a law degree.

A Vote of Non-Confidence…For Wingnut Blog Triumphalism

The Martin government has been felled by a non-confidence vote, which means that the holiday season in Canada will be saturated with a bitterly contested election. At least at this early date, it’s difficult to see a majority government emerging from the new election, so the political situation could remain very unstable.

Liberalism Without Cynicism finds Instapundit–via his emailers–giving Captain Cubicle credit for bringing down the “fricken Canadian Government.” As Laura points out, there are some rather monumental problems with this thesis, starting with the fact minority governments in Canada have historically had the shelf life of an Andrew Ridgely solo album, and the fact that all the relevant information has (and would have been) released in Canada by now. Anyway, it’s reassuring to know that Reynolds knows about as much about Canadian politics as he does about most of the stuff he blogs about, although perhaps blog triumphalists just means that they have blogs of an analogous quality to the wank-metal of Canadian mainstays Triumph, which would make much more sense…

The Solomon Amendment

While the big case that will be having oral arguments in front of the Supreme Court this week is Ayotte–which I will have more about later this week–another interesting upcoming case is Rumsfeld v. FAIR, which concerns the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. The Amendment denies funding to a university that “either prohibits, or in effect prevents’ military recruiters access to students equal in quality and scope to that provided to other recruiters,” which the 3CA issued an injunction against enforcing. The question is a difficult one, which hasn’t gotten a lot of attention on liberal law blogs yet. Fortunately, Fantasy Life has a very detailed treatment of the background to the case. It’s a close and difficult case, but like her I am reluctantly inclined to think that the Amendment–while very bad policy–does not violate the First Amendment. The state’s leeway under its spending powers are much greater than if it’s enacting direct prohibitions. I certainly agree with the made by several conservatives that any exclusion from federal law based on “expressive association” has to apply to Bob Jones University just as much as it applies to the Harvard Law School. If the Solomon Amendment cannot be applied to universities, then could schools that lose funding under Title IX sue to be exempt from that too? It’s hard to come up with a principled reason why not. Making the Solomon Amendment non-applicable could have wide-ranging effects on civil rights law, and I think that the government can use its spending power to promote these kinds of purposes.

However, there’s another question of interest: assuming that the Amendment is constitutional, do the policies of most law schools violate it? The amicus brief filed by the Harvard Law School faculty argues that the policy does not. The question turns on whether the military is being denied access “on equal terms.” A policy that banned military recruiting per se would obviously violate the amendment. But Harvard’s policy doesn’t; it has neutral rules requiring businesses that want special access to on-campus recruiting to be non-discriminatory, and the military does not adhere to these rules. If it wants access to campus, it has the option of stopping its discrimination against gay people. As it stands, the military wants a special exemption to rules that apply to other recruiters. The brief argues, quite persuasively, that the language of the statute does not require such special privileges:

In short, the government has chosen to enforce the Solomon Amendment as if it conferred upon the military a unique privilege–one shared by no other employer, including other agencies of the Federal Government–to disregard neutral and generally applicable rules designed to govern the conduct of all recruiters. There is, however, a better way to read the statute–one that could resolve this case without requiring this Court to venture into the constitutional tangle presented in the parties’ briefs. Consistent with the statute’s text, its history, and the government’s own rhetoric, the Court should hold that the statute confers no such unprecedented trump. Rather, like all of its legislative predecessors, the Solomon Amendment applies only to policies that single out military recruiters for special disfavored treatment, not evenhanded policies that incidentally affect the military. Because there is nothing in the statutory text that would support a special rule for anti-discrimination policies, the only alternative would be to hold that the Solomon Amendment confers upon military employers the extraordinary right to claim immunity from any policy–no matter how evenhanded–that they deem burdensome to their recruiting efforts.

[...]

If the government’s enforcement policies with respect to the Solomon Amendment reflected an accurate view of the meaning of “in effect prevents,” then the school’s requirement would presumably be one that “in effect prevented [the] student . . . from enrolling in a[n ROTC] unit . . . at another institution.” And if that were true, institutions of higher learning could presumably be required to modify scores of neutral and generally applicable policies to ensure that their students’ ability to participate in ROTC was not impaired. Like the Solomon Amendment, then, the ROTC provision is most sensibly read to rule out only policies that target ROTC programs and participants for special negative treatment.

This interpretation of the statute seems reasonable to me. I would be tentatively inclined to defer the complex constitutional issues, and simply rule that policies that do not explicitly single out the military for differential treatment do not violate the Solomon Amendment.

Scenes From a Philistine

TBogg notes that XFL Media (TM) co-founder Roger Simon is excited about the prospect of a pro-Iraq War film (apparently designed for those who found The Green Berets a little too subtle), which will obviously do the kind of gangbuster business that America’s Heart and Soul did against Fahrenheit 9/11. (As TBogg notes, the war movies that Willis has recently appeared in have really raked in the dough too.) Simon’s optimism seems to have a solid base. Roy has used his prodigious showbiz connections to acquire a copy of Willis’ script. I think we can all agree that if the executives don’t butcher it this movie will a classic–in the sense of a movie frequently aired on American Movie Classics between Delta Force 8: Delta Against Venus and Iron Eagle 4: This Time, We Know Lou Gosset Jr. Has A Higher Script Approval Ratio Than Nic Cage.

Copyrights and the Court

The discussion of copyrights chez Ygelsias and Atrios compelled me to take another look at the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft. One of the things that’s fascinating about the case is that, as Atrios notes, the Copyright Clause in Article I essentially requires itself to be read pragmatically and consequentially, granting Congress the power to grant copyrights only for the purpose of promoting “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” As many of you may remember, the case concerned the “Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,” which (among other things) gave a 20-year extension to most existing copyrights, extending them to 95 years. The question of the case is whether this extension was consistent with this limitation on Congressional power. The Court ruled 7-2 that the Act was constitutional. This is a tough case, at least for a non-libertarian such as myself, because Congress is entitled to a large degree of deference when it comes to determining what constitutes scientific or artistic progress. While it’s certainly terrible public policy, I would probably even go along with the Court in upholding the extension of the term of new copyrights; as long as the grant isn’t literally perpetual, I don’t know of any principled way of adjudicating when, exactly, a new copyright is too long.

Where I would unquestionably vote with the dissenters, however, is with respect to the extension of existing copyrights. Particularly given how long the original grants are, there simply isn’t any remotely rational connection between expanding existing copyrights and artistic progress. The artistic products in question have already been created; extending the existing copyright cannot contribute to “progress,” and indeed can only inhibit it. The really striking thing about this case is the dissent by Breyer. As many of you are aware, Breyer is famous for his deference to Congressional power, sometimes upholding it by constructing elaborate ex post facto rationales for legislation whose relationship to the actual purposes of Congress are often highly dubious. When even Breyer can’t come up with a halfway plausible story to connect an act of Congress to the public interest, you know you’ve got nothing. As he points out, this is nothing but corporate rent-seeking that simply doesn’t have any connection whatsoever to the ends required by the Copyright Clause:

The economic effect of this 20-year extension–the longest blanket extension since the Nation’s founding–is to make the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual. Its primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors. And most importantly, its practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of “Science”–by which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge…I would find that the statute lacks the constitutionally necessary rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any significant Clause-related objective. Where, after examination of the statute, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, even to dispute these characterizations, Congress’ “choice is clearly wrong.”

I think Breyer is right. On all three points, which I think represent a reasonable standard, the legislation clearly fails; it’s not even close. Moreover, the copyright clause is fairly narrow; the possibility of a less deferential reading of the standard by a future court would not have the dire consequences that, say, returning Commerce Clause jurisprudence to its pre-New Deal state would have. As both dissenters point out, to uphold this Act would be to essentially render the Copyright Clause judicially unenforceable, and I don’t think that this is wise or necessary. But I turn the discussion over to you.

Sexual Assault Myths: More Comparative Perspectives

Shakes Sis has an interesting post about various social and legal problems with enforcing rape laws in Britain. Such problems are of particular interest to me, since a large part of my MA thesis was about an important Canadian Supreme Court decision that impeded an attempt by the legislature to restrict the extent to which myths and stereotypes affected the enforcement of sexual assault law. One of the major problems with enforcing sexual assault law is that a victim’s past sexual history would often be discussed in open court. This both made it difficult to secure convictions based on the appallingly sexist myth that having consented to sexual relations in the past somehow provides evidence of current consent, and also made victims reluctant to pursue legal claims in the first place–who wants irrelevant details of their past sexual lives discussed in open court? Parliament, after studying the issue and finding that a previous law that left a great deal of discretion to judges wasn’t working, passed a “rape shield” law that would 1)prevent the defense from introducing evidence about a victim’s “sexual reputation”–such as was used in the infamous OC rape case–and 2)prevent a victim’s sexual history from being adduced unless it met very narrowly drawn standards of probative value. The Canadian Supreme Court, however, struck down the latter section. The problems with this conclusion are clear–you can’t call a rape victim a slut in open court, but many judges may allow you to discuss her sexual history and hope some members of the jury will draw the inference for themselves–and the Court’s reasoning isn’t very persuasive. What was particularly odd about this is that the Canadian Supreme Court is ordinarily very sympathetic to feminist arguments; I was interested in explaining the case because it was so anomalous. Basically, it’s a classic case of asserting judicial supremacy; even where the court accepts the legitimacy of Parliament’s goals, the Court essentially argued that the legislature had to trust the courts to achieve these goals (despite extensive evidence that the courts couldn’t be trusted to exercise their discretion appropriately in this case.)

The problems with the Supreme Court’s “trust us” approach can be seen in the Ewanchuk case in 1998. A woman went for a job interview with Ewanchuk, who after it was completed repeatedly made physical sexual advances although she told him to stop several times and never expressed consent. Despite the fact that Ewanchuk didn’t even testify, and that the trial court found the complainant to be a credible witness, Ewanchuk was acquitted based on a defense of “implied consent.” The government appealed, but the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the trial court. Judge John McClung–a wingnut who was a hero to reactionaries based on his anti-gay rights rulings–argued that:

…it must be pointed out that the complainant did not present herself to Ewanchuk or enter his trailer in a bonnet and crinolines. . . . she was the mother of a six-month-old baby and, along with her boyfriend, she shared an apartment with another couple…the sum of the evidence indicates that Ewanchuk’s advances to the complainant were far less criminal than hormonal…In a less litigious age going too far in the boyfriend’s car was better dealt with on site with a well-chosen expletive, a slap in the face or, if necessary, a well directed knee.”

It would be difficult to get a better summary of all the various sexist myths that have hampered the enforcement of sexual assault law. By this time, however, Parliament–in response to the Seaboyer decision–had made sexual assault a “reverse onus” defense–if a defense was based on consent, then the burden of proof rests with the defendant to prove that consent was obtained. Obviously, this makes the evidence-free “implied consent” defense the court accepted a non-starter, and the Alberta courts were unanimously overruled by the Supreme Court. Which brings us to our Sunday sermonette, from the concurring opinion by Justice Justice L’Heureux-Dube:

Both the trial judgment and that of Justice McClung do not make the basic distinction that consent is a matter of the state of mind of the complainant and belief in consent is, subject to s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code, a matter of the state of mind of the accused.

This error does not derive from the findings of fact but from mythical assumptions that when a woman says “no” she is really saying “yes”, “try again”, or “persuade me”. To paraphrase Fraser C.J. at p. 263, it denies women’s sexual autonomy and implies that women are “walking around this country in a state of constant consent to sexual activity”.

[...]

Even though McClung J.A. asserted that he had no intention of denigrating the complainant, one might wonder why he felt necessary to point out these aspects of the trial record. Could it be to express that the complainant is not a virgin? Or that she is a person of questionable moral character because she is not married and lives with her boyfriend and another couple? These comments made by an appellate judge help reinforce the myth that under such circumstances, either the complainant is less worthy of belief, she invited the sexual assault, or her sexual experience signals probable consent to further sexual activity. Based on those attributed assumptions, the implication is that if the complainant articulates her lack of consent by saying “no”, she really does not mean it and even if she does, her refusal cannot be taken as seriously as if she were a girl of “good” moral character. “Inviting” sexual assault, according to those myths, lessens the guilt of the accused…

Finally, McClung J.A. made this point: “In a less litigious age going too far in the boyfriend’s car was better dealt with on site — a well-chosen expletive, a slap in the face or, if necessary, a well-directed knee” (p. 250). According to this stereotype, women should use physical force, not resort to courts to “deal with” sexual assaults and it is not the perpetrator’s responsibility to ascertain consent, as required by s. 273.2(b), but the women’s not only to express an unequivocal “no”, but also to fight her way out of such a situation. In that sense, Susan Estrich has noted that “rape is most assuredly not the only crime in which consent is a defense; but it is the only crime that has required the victim to resist physically in order to establish nonconsent.”

All exactly right–this opinion provides a good basis for legal reform, but also explains why, as Shakes Sis explains, even good laws are often so difficult to enforce. These myths are disturbingly resilient.

As a disgraceful coda to the Ewanchuck case, after his arguments were demolished by the Supreme Court McClung wrote a letter to the National Post claiming that the reasoning of L’Heureux-Dube (whose husband had committed suicide) “could provide a plausible explanation for the disparate (and growing) number of male suicides being reported in the province of Quebec.” Lovely fellow.

Why I Am Not A Studio Executive (Or A Populist)

Tom the Dancing Bug asks a good question: what’s the dillio with all these lame movies about big families? If I’m not imagining it, the terrible-looking Rene Russo vehicle this weekend will be followed up in short order with a sequel to the same movie when it was made with Steve Martin. But looking at the boxofficemojo dailies, the question answers itself: Cheaper By The Yours, Mine and Ours is making almost as much per-screen as Walk the Line. Depressing. On the other hand, I’m definitely going to see The Ice Harvest (black comedy? Ramis? Cusak? Thornton? Yes please!), which seems to be belly-flopping. Generally, if you want to know what’s going to make money, put out exactly the opposite of what I like and you’ll be in good shape.

Speaking of which, there’s Rent. I’ve never seen the musical, and…well, I guess I should keep quiet, as nothing can ignite a comments firestorm like criticizing popular middlebrow musicals that provide Uplifting, Morally Edifying Thoughts about Important Social Issues, so I’ll just say that 1)although I was going to say after seeing the preview that Chris Columbus was the ideal director for the project, that’s not strictly accurate–given the redeeming social value, this seems more like a Schumacher gig, and 2)particularly since I once was exposed to the score on CD, I’m entirely persuaded by Carina Chocano (“”Rent” is commodified faux bohemia on a platter, eliciting the same kind of numbing soul-sadness as children’s beauty pageants, tiny dogs in expensive boots, Mahatma Gandhi in Apple ads…How is anyone supposed to get behind a guy whose “films” are just home movies of the homeless and his soon-to-be homeless friends?…Or behind a blocked songwriter who spends an entire year agonizing over a song that turns out to be a bunch of moldy cliches set to power chords?”). But I’m willing to say nothing further on the subject if its partisans will stop claiming that the score has anything to do with “rock” in anything other than the way that Good Charlotte has something to do with punk…

Token Thanksgiving Blogging

Greetings from bucolic central Connecticuit, as I luxuriate in the afterglow of the kind of delicious down-home cooking and family togetherness that a New York bachelor is so rarely able to savor. Alas, such a day leaves one with little to blog about, so enjoy this satire of 76BucsMedia (TM) from TBogg and be infuriated by Sam Alito’s proud membership in an orgainization dedicated to keeping Princeton male, white, and larded with the idiot sons of alumni instead. Happy Thanksgiving to the L,G&M community!