Negotiating On Iran’s Nuclear Program
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Content Warning: Wonky.
The journal Foreign Affairs article titled “Nuclear Deal With Iran?” by Matthew Sharp and Nate Swanson points out that more than the period of enrichment and the existing quantities of enriched uranium needs to be considered for an agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. The manufacture and stockpiling of centrifuges were addressed in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) but haven’t been mentioned by the Trump administration. Additionally, the authors feel that activities that might be associated with nuclear weapons production must also be monitored. This would be more difficult, perhaps impossible.
The authors do not state a viewpoint directly, but the general tone of the article implies that Iran is working toward nuclear weapons. This is not consistent with Iran’s approach before Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA in 2018. At that time, Iran’s nuclear program was consistent with the JCPOA.
Leading up to the JCPOA, they had used the ambiguity in their nuclear program as a lever toward removing sanctions. They made it clear that they had some of the capability to build nuclear weapons, but they ended an explicit program toward that end in 2003 and stated more than once that their goal was not nuclear weapons. Although factions within Iran wanted a nuclear weapons program, IAEA inspectors found no evidence of such a program. In a few areas, however, Iran pressed the boundaries.
Trump’s constant repetition of his claim that Iran wants nuclear weapons and would readily use them has pulled the discussion in that direction. Iran explicitly stated that its increase in enrichment after 2018 was intended to counter the US withdrawal, and they would be willing to go back to JCPOA terms.
After two attacks by Israel and the United States, it is not clear whether the faction desiring nuclear weapons is dominant. At this point, it is probably helpful for authors to state their assumptions on this subject. Mine are stated above, with the possible turn to weapons as Iran repairs the damage of the two attacks.
The Foreign Affairs article is framed in a way that might have influenced policy during the negotiation of the JCPOA, but it is likely to have little influence on the current negotiations. The primary negotiators, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, probably cannot understand the article and the points it makes, let along the verification necessary for the article’s proposals. Trump himself has said he wants a one-page agreement, which could not begin to touch what the article recommends.
Sharp and Swanson point out that Iran’s capabilities in centrifuge design and manufacture have improved since 2015. The JCPOA includes significant sections on centrifuge design and manufacture that might be updated to address their concerns. The extent of damage to current facilities could also play into how this would be treated in an agreement. It is possible that the Iranians themselves do not know the status of their facilities. Learning that status is one more point to be added to the negotiations. Alternatively, what it would take to rebuild Iran’s enrichment capabilities from scratch, given Iran’s improvements in the technology, might be the basis, as the authors suggest.
Sharp and Swanson note
The 2015 treaty ultimately focused more on constraining Iran’s ability to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon than on limiting its ability to assemble actual nuclear arms. That was because restricting enrichment is easier than monitoring and derailing all the activities that subsequently contribute to assembling a weapon.
This has historically been the way nuclear weapons proliferation has been controlled, for the reason they give. Manufacture of plutonium and enrichment of uranium are chokepoints; without either of those materials, a nuclear weapon cannot be built.
They go on to argue that a new agreement should cover activities that could contribute to the weaponization of enriched uranium. This will be very difficult, perhaps impossible.
The IAEA cannot inspect weapons manufacturing issues. It is outside their charter. Further, nations that have nuclear weapons are unlikely to provide classified information to enable such inspection. This was the reason that a special body, UNSCOM, was formed to inspect Iraq in the 1990s for nuclear weapons. UNSCOM included scientists and engineers from the weapons laboratories who knew what to look for. A continuing body of this character would have to be formed to monitor such activities in Iran.
In any case, much of this information has been available from Iran’s publications in scientific and engineering journals. I know two people who collect such publications, and I am sure that at least one of them is known to US intelligence services, who likely do such collection themselves. It is easy to conclude from these collections that Iran has the expertise to develop nuclear weapons.
As Sharp and Swanson note, such activities are much more readily covered up than enrichment.
Trump’s approach to negotiation is antithetical to developing a serious and lasting agreement with Iran that resembles the JCPOA. My preference would be for the current negotiations to involve only opening the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps Trump could be persuaded later to support negotiations that can reach a lasting agreement, although there is little evidence that this is possible.
Cross-posted to Nuclear Diner