Not Over Yet?

Apropos of one of the hot spots I left off of my WWIII post;..

But in one of Iran’s fiefdoms, the Axis of Resistance remains strong: Yemen.

The Houthi campaign against shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shows no signs of abating. US and UK strikes against anti-shipping missiles, drones, and supporting infrastructure have not suppressed the intensity of attacks.  Shipping companies continue to divert traffic around the Cape, and both the US and EU-led naval operations in the Red Sea, whilst effective when present, have had insufficient ships at sea to neutralize the threat. This particular battle appears stuck in a stalemate.

Sitting on the sidelines are the Sunni nations of the region. Constrained by a wish not to inflame popular sentiment broadly supportive of Hamas and the Palestinian cause, rulers in the region are silent and have not overtly joined attempts to curtail Houthi activities.  

But anger is mounting within governments at the costs that the Houthi campaign is imposing.  Between January and September, oil exports through the Red Sea fell by 50%, from an average of 8.7 to 4.0 million b/d. In a soft crude market, the extra costs of diverting around the Cape are being borne by producers. General trade and container traffic from the Gulf also has to take the long way round, inflating consumer prices. It would not be a surprise if Gulf rulers were considering deploying a small fraction of the substantial extra costs imposed on them, contemplating if some of this money might be better spent on a renewed attempt to displace or neutralize the Houthis. 

With the Houthi drone strike south of Tel Aviv on December 9, Israel will be contemplating its own action.

Gulf nations have been reluctant to take an overly antagonistic attitude to the Houthis, with the Saudis in particular seeking instead to extend and deepen the ceasefire negotiated with the Houthis in 2022 – a means of exiting a disastrous and expensive war which they had effectively lost. But patience is fraying, and with both Iran and Russia on the back foot, and the Axis of Resistance collapsing, the balance of advantage is shifting. And there is a particular annoyance that the Houthis have not withdrawn from the port of Hodeidah, part of the 2022 UN agreement which their opponents honored but which the Houthis took advantage of instead.

Houthis need to take some care here… the harm of the Red Sea Campaign is falling primarily upon regional states (longer travel distances mean less if the trip is very long in the first place), and it cannot be lost upon Egypt and the Gulf States that Iran has not done a very good job of protecting its proxies in the region. Of course the Saudis tried to discipline the Houthis for several years and it didn’t work out, but they’re making general pests of themselves at a time when their chief protector looks confused and disoriented. And it hardly seems unlikely that the United States and some European allies will want to participate (at least on background) because of the strain that patrolling the Red Sea is placing upon naval assets. Given that the Russians have been low-key supporting the Houthis with targeting data, it’s also a way to land a light jab against Moscow.