Controlling The Narrative

Last week, AP diplomatic reporter Matt Lee badgered State Department spokesman Ned Price about sources for intelligence information. I’m seeing others make similar points to Matt’s on Twitter and in the comments on my latest post at Lawyers, Guns & Money.

The concern is whether the intelligence is accurate, often expressed in a context of the runup to the Iraq war of 2003, implying that the US government might be lying to achieve a particular point. This misses the point of releasing the intelligence and the structure of the situation.

Colin Powell’s testimony to the United Nations was intended to justify an incipient attack by the United States on Iraq. The US intelligence releases are intended to delay or avoid a Russian attack on Ukraine.

The release of intelligence information about the Russian buildup and plans every few days is intended to undermine the Russian military campaign by controlling the narrative and confusing the Russian government and military.

Releases saying that Russia will stage a provocation to justify an attack are part of controlling the narrative. Russia has done such things in the past; it’s important that they not get away with it again. Other releases suggest that there may be dissent within the Russian military and that the US and UK are able to listen in on Russian communications. All that undermines any public case that Russia may make in favor of an attack on Ukraine. And it looks like they are beginning to make a case.

That is the analogy to Colin Powell at the UN, if one feels it necessary to make that analogy.

The intelligence releases are intended to undermine confidence between the Kremlin and the military or to waste their time hunting down leaks. Additionally, they will have to consider the effect of the US narrative on public opinion.

To these ends, whether the intelligence releases are true or false matters little. Unless the information released is wildly wrong, a Russian attack will overwhelm the news and little attention will be focused on the releases. Inaccuracies can be attributed to the usual limitations of intelligence. For the purpose of confusing the Russians, some inaccuracies can add to the confusion.

In a broader sense, the accuracy of the releases matters to the credibility of the US government, so it’s likely that they are as good as the intelligence community can produce.

Here’s a shorter version from Michael Kofman:

Cross-posted to Nuclear Diner