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Immediacy

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F-15A Eagle of the 101st Fighter Squadron flying over New York City after September 11, 2001. U.S. Air Force photo by Lt. Col. Bill Ramsay – http://www.af.mil/photos/media_search.asp?q=102nd, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=3767162

I quite enjoyed this long oral history of Air Force One on 9/11; it clarified quite a few questions regarding what seemed to be the slow response of the group immediately around George W. Bush to the attacks, and the confusion that ensued across the rest of the day.  Long story short, the people around the President performed as if they were in a crisis that they had only imperfectly anticipated and prepared for.  Aspects of the response (concern that Al Qaeda could track Air Force One, or even the electronics carried by the Secret Service team) sound absurd in retrospect, but at the time seemed within the realm of plausibility.  In particular, the account suggests that two of the most common critiques of the GWB team’s performance on 9/11- that they were slow to respond to the initial reports in Florida, and that they were slow to return to DC- aren’t entirely fair.  With respect to the former, the short delay in the elementary school had absolutely no impact on the broader response, and with regard to the latter there was considerable disagreement on Air Force One as to where the plane should be headed.  One exchange that reflects the confusion:

Maj. Scott Crogg: It was very somber [at the air base]. We got these cryptic messages from Southeast Air Defense Sector. We knew we’re on the hook now—it might not be for Air Force One, but for anything. Houston’s the fifth-largest metro region, it’s got all this oil and gas infrastructure. I asked maintenance to put live missiles and arm up the guns. Two heat-seeking missiles and rounds from a 20-mm gun isn’t a lot to take on a hijacked plane, but it was the best we could do.

Andy Card: Then we hear that Flight 93’s gone down. We’re all wondering, Did we do that? It wasn’t a big deal on the plane. It lingered deepest in the president’s conscience. Most people on the plane hadn’t been privy to that conversation.

Col. Mark Tillman: All of us thought, we assumed we shot it down.

Another interesting tidbit; limitations on communications technology in 2001 meant that the people on Air Force One knew less about what was going on than people watching at home in their living rooms. The aircraft had pretty good contact with the relevant military and civil authorities around the country, but those authorities had very little idea what was going on; they were all watching CNN, trying to piece bits together.  This resulted in a President and immediate staff that was less well-informed than your typical viewer at home.

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