Book Review: Dragon in the Tropics

This is the fourth in an eight part series on this year’s Patterson School Summer Reading List:

1. Jason Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters
2. CJ Chivers, The Gun
3. Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country
4. Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics

Dragon in the Tropics traces the course of Venezuelan politics since the late 1990s. Corrales and Penfold describe in great detail the steps that Chavez has taken to limit electoral democracy in Venezuela.  He has effectively taken control of the media, of the electoral watchdog organizations, and of the social welfare state. The Chavez government has also initiated a variety of practices intended to increase its ability to monitor society, and to enforce political orthodoxy. This included greater state input over private hiring and firing decisions, minimization or elimination of protections designed to insulate certain jobs (teachers, for example) against political pressure, and the development of societal organizations that parallel the state but can act independently to preserve Chavez’ power.  The tactics exist to some extent in every democracy, and by no means absolutely preclude the victory of opposition forces.  Rather, they help stack the deck in favor of the incumbent, to the extent that Chavez and his supporters have significant (but not necessarily insurmountable) electoral and political advantage. As Corrales and Penfold argue, at some point Venezuela ceases to be a democracy and becomes a hybrid democratic/authoritarian system, similar to Russia, Georgia, and a wide variety of other states.  Corrales and Penfold also make clear that most of the steps are entirely legal, representing either innovative approaches to circumventing the law or violations of longstanding political norms.

Chavez surely has made some significant achievements. The breadth of the social welfare state has expanded, although at the expense of turning welfare programs into political patronage. Venezuela’s GINI coefficient has declined during Chavez’ tenure, and the situation of Venezuela’s most impoverished citizens seems to have improved. Chavez has significantly increased the power of the executive, undoing a series of practices that were common in Latin America (limitations on Presidential re-election, for example) and that limited the ability of the state to enact serious reform. Venezuela’s oil wealth (and the high oil prices of the last decade) has granted Chavez considerable freedom in expanding and maintaining the clientilist state.

While the title sounds alarmist, Dragon in the Tropics doesn’t take very seriously the notion that Chavez represents some kind of serious threat to US interests in the region.  Connections with Iran and Russia, while flashy and (intentionally) alarming, promise to have little real policy impact. Similarly, while the effort to build an anti-US bloc in South America has had some tactical success, it poses no meaningful strategic problem for the United States.  Of course, saying that Chavez can do little more than posture is different than saying that Americans will understand Chavez’ behavior primarily as meaningless posturing; there will always be hucksters willing to tell stories about legions of Hezbollah operatives and armadas of Bolivarian ballistic missiles, and there will be idiots willing to listen to those stories.

However, although Chavez relevance depends to great extent on his continued control of oil resources, the oil infrastructure of Venezuela has suffered greatly during his Presidency.  Infrastructure investment is down, the expertise and experience of the workforce has declined, and the ability of Venzuela to maintain current levels of production into the future is in serious question. Indeed, refining capacity has already dropped dramatically. The causes of decline are less ideological (distrust of experts) than strategic; Chavez views tight political control of the oil industry as more important than industry modernization, maintenance, and productivity. This makes sense in context of short and medium term political calculation, but obviously could open up problems if Chavez survives into the long term. Corrales and Penfold don’t argue that the likely decline of the Venezuelan oil sector will necessarily fatally damage the Chavez regime, however; the tools that Chavez has developed to manage Venezuelan politics may allow him to displace popular dissatisfaction to other targets. However, reduction of resource capacity will surely limit Venezuela’s ability to conduct Chavez’ preferred foreign policy.

Dragon in the Tropics is a good, measured account of the change that Chavez has enacted in Venezuela. It places the Chavez government within a framework that helps to illuminate the similarities to and differences with other regimes. While the book is growing slightly dated (the continued deterioration of the oil industry, Chavez health, and Chavez electoral prospects may lead to substantial changes in the next year), it’s worth a read for the non-specialist