The Perot Myth

I have to agree with Michael against Chris Clarke that I don’t see any basis for the assertion that the post-1992 Republican strategy was to “find out what the disaffected [Perot voters] wanted that the GOP failed to offer, and offer it.” If the Republicans became the party of deficit reduction and protectionism, they have certainly kept it well hidden. (Although on only one of Perot’s two key issues, Michael is right that there’s a better case that Clinton co-opted Perot voters.)

In addition, I think it’s worth nothing that the claim that Perot cost Bush the 1992 election is really not even “arguable.” Perot’s support was much more cross-cutting than Nader’s, and the only state polling data indicates may have flipped to Bush in Perot’s absence was Ohio — which would have left Clinton with a 150 electoral vote margin. There’s no serious empirical basis for the assertion that Perot plyed a decisive role in the 1992 campaign.

…In comments, Rick Perlstein points us to this book, which he says supports Chris’s claims. I admit to being skeptical about the first claim — I really find it hard to believe that Perot swung well over 100 electoral votes, but maybe they have data I haven’t seen — but it is certainly plausible that the GOP was thinking about these voters when crafting the Contract On America. (Of course, there’s also little evidence that the COA had a substantial impact on the election, but at least narrowly Chris’ point was just about what the GOP was trying to do. And evidently it also doesn’t follow that chasing 17% of the electorate isn’t more potentially profitable than chasing 3% of the electorate.) Anyway, I’ll check it out.