Naval Doctrine

Two days ago Kim Jong Il bequeathed a glorious gift on the Navy and the Air Force. Because the Army is deeply engaged in Iraq, it has been requesting additional funds to the point that the fiscal division-of-spoils between the Army, Air Force, and Navy has been threatened. As Defense Tech and Arms and Influence point out, any military confrontation with North Korea would most immediately be handled by the USAF and the USN. A couple months ago in Armed Forces Journal, Frank Hoffman critiqued naval acquisition strategy and proposed an alternative approach. Hoffman’s core point is that the Mahanian navy, built around a few powerful capital ships and intended to destroy the fleet of a peer competitor, is an increasingly anachronistic vision that is nevertheless held to by a considerable portion of the Navy. I’m not as comfortable with this argument as I once was, because the Navy has done some serious work increasing its littoral capabilities in both a doctrinal and material way, but he has a point worth engaging.

There is currently no peer competitor worth discussing in the same league as the USN. The old Soviet Navy never sought to directly challenge US dominance of the sea lanes, and the Russian Navy has been reduced to an almost token force. The Chinese have considerably capabilities for use in the Taiwan theater, but not so much in the blue water. The most advanced destroyers employed by the rest of the world are more than a generation behind the warships used by the USN. Given this, emphasizing those capabilities that would allow the USN to affect operations on land makes more sense than increasing our capacity to destroy an enemy fleet. Doctrinal publications like Forward… from the Sea have taken the littoral (60 miles from the coast in either direction) seriously, and the design and construction of the littoral combat ship (LCS) also speaks to a renewed emphasis on land operations. Some ships, like aircraft carriers, can serve in both the traditional Mahanian and the littoral roles, while others, primarily the Zumwalt class destroyer or DD(X), can’t.

Hoffman proposed that, as a cost saving measure, the AGS (Advanced Gun System) be installed on some of the new San Antonio class LPD (Landing Platform Dock). The AGS is, like, a super cool 6″ gun that can fire at very long ranges at a high rate of fire. It’s currently the centerpiece of the Zumwalt class destroyer, and indeed represents just about the only reason that anyone would consider building one of the ultra-expensive Zumwalts. If the AGS could be installed on a San Antonio, and there’s no reason to think that it couldn’t, the Zumwalt could be dispensed with in the favor of useful ships.

Hoffman uses Julian Corbett as his touchstone, arguing that Corbett had a better handle on the relationship between politics and war than Mahan. That’s a debatable point, but there’s no question that Corbett deserves more attention. Corbett was more interested in the use of the navy as a political instrument than Mahan, which may make him the theorist we need to revisit today. Of course, Mahan was an American, which may account for his enduring influence over US naval policy.

Cross-posted at Tapped.