It does me great pain. . .

when idiots misunderstand the Battle of Guadalcanal.

Wretchard, at the Belmont Club, is a moron:

Bin Laden understood and accepted that American logistics, technology and science would be superior to his own. What he was less prepared to believe was the possibility that their fighting spirit would be equal or greater than his. Sixty two years ago the Imperial Japanese Navy fought the USN for three straight days and nights in the waters surrounding Guadalcanal, from November 12-15, 1942. Both sides fought at point-blank range in some cases. Two USN Admirals, Scott and Callahan, died in a single night. Still the IJN and USN came on. Only after the USS Washington sank the battlecruiser Kirishima on November 15th did the Japanese break off. But it was not the material loss that shocked the Japanese: losses were about even on both sides; it was the realization that USN would not give up.

So much is wrong with this; Wolcott does an effective job of demolishing the hyper-masculinity of Wretchard’s argument. Let’s be frank, if Al Qaeda were given the option of fighting Americans by Marquess of Queensbury rules on an open field in the middle of Afghanistan, they’d leap at it. Winning a war, in spite of what the boys at Belmont think, is not about having a larger set of balls.

Anyway, I’d like to challenge the empirical assertion made above about the naval battles surrounding Guadalcanal. Wretchard would like us to believe that the USN and the IJN clashed without decisive result, but that the Japanese gave up after coming to understand the US “will to fight.”

Would it surprise you to discover that this is not a plausible interpretation of the empirical evidence?

First, the naval battles around Savo Island all happened at night, because US air power dominated during the daylight hours. Surprisingly, this had nothing to do with will; the US possessed more operational aircraft carriers and a local airfield. The battles in question happened between November 12 and November 15. In the first major action, a large group of US cruisers and destroyers met a Japanese task force and turned it back with heavy losses on both sides. The central achievement of the Americans was to heavily damage the Japanese battlecruiser Hiei. Without US air superiority, however, the Hiei would have escaped. American material supremacy carried the day, and the Japanese scuttled Hiei after repeated air attacks.

Two nights later, the Japanese sent another task force to bombard Henderson Field. This force included the battlecruiser Kirishima, two heavy cruisers, and a number of destroyers. The Kirishima was built in 1914, had eight 14″ guns, and was lightly armored, like most battlecruisers. To oppose this force, the United States deployed the battleships Washington and South Dakota. Both of these ships were larger than the Kirishima, carried 9 16″ guns (of a much newer vintage than the weapons on the Kirishima) and had been commissioned in 1941 and 1942, respectively.

In short, it wasn’t a fair fight. The US deployed two modern fast battleships, each of which alone should have been able to destroy the Japanese ship without difficulty. This is as it should be; only the weaker side wants a fair fight. The stronger side relies upon its technical and material superiority. In this case, the Japanese did quite well. The Kirishima scored repeated hits on the South Dakota, and heavily damaged the latter before falling victim to the guns of the Washington.

The Japanese withdrawal had nothing whatsoever to do with a realization of the manliness of the US Navy. It had everything to do with the loss, two nights apart, of half the battlecruiser strength of the IJN. It also had something to do with the realization that the USN possessed clear and insurmountable material superiority in the area.

Here’s something to remember; only fascists believe that will, courage, and testosterone win wars. Sensible people think that it requires better weapons than the other side.

UPDATE: Jackdaw in comments and Dan Nexon of Duck of Minerva point out, of course, that doctrine, training, and morale also play a critical role in victory. My error, which is particularly bizarre given that my dissertation is about military doctrine. . . Anyway, the general point still holds, which is that military success comes to quality military organizations fighting with quality weapons, not to the side most adept at chest-thumping.