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Tag: "air force"

F-22 Losses

[ 33 ] May 16, 2012 | Robert Farley

Just a couple thoughts on the 60 Minutes F-22 expose. I listened in on a conference call by Sen. Mark Warner and Rep. Adam Kinzinger yesterday, and they seem to be taking this pretty seriously, and more importantly pushing the Air Force to take it seriously. Other pilots have come forward, and the F-22 is now under geographic restriction.

Having read a biography of John Boyd earlier this year, I’m struck by the degree to which tolerance for accidents has declined. Here’s some incomplete data on USAF accident loss rates (rate is per 100000 flight hours):

F-100: 16.25/ 889 aircraft lost
F-102: 13.69 / 259 aircraft lost
F-104: 30.63 / 170 aircraft lost
F-106: 9.47 / 120 aircraft lost
A-7: 3.19 / 107 aircraft lost
F-5: 8.82 / 40 aircraft lost
F-15: 2.42 / 112 aircraft lost
F-16: 3.82 / 305 aircraft lost
F-22: ~1.5 / 2 aircraft lost (this assumes we’re around 150000 flight hours right now, which is a projection from previous usage rates because I can’t find the exact datum)

Moreover, the relationship between aircraft age and loss rate is idiosyncratic. Older aircraft tend to crash because of long-term stress on materials, but newer aircraft tend to crash because of problems that haven’t been discovered, and maintenance regimes that haven’t been optimized. The F-15 and F-16 appear to have been edging slightly upwards, but the F-100 (for example) was substantially safer to fly in later years than in early. There’s a bell curve; newer aircraft tend to crash a lot, then there’s a long period where accidents decline, then they tend to increase again near the end of the service life. However, different aircraft have different service careers (some are pressed into service in large numbers early, some are retired halfway through their projected lives, etc.), and because they undergo different maintenance regimes (Canadian F-104s crashed at a much higher rate than any other country, for some reason), the overall numbers can be difficult to interpret.

However, by the standards of advance fighter aircraft, the F-22 is relatively safe to fly. This doesn’t mean that problems shouldn’t be addressed, or that the pilots were wrong to blow the whistle, or that the USAF pursued an appropriate level of caution, etc. It just means we’re (appropriately) less tolerant of failure in extraordinarily advanced and complex military hardware than we were forty years ago.  Hell, the B-58 Hustler suffered a loss rate of 22.4% without ever seeing combat.

Abolishing the Air Force, or at Least Give this Guy a Pacifier

[ 67 ] May 14, 2012 | Robert Farley

An anonymous Air Force pilot decides to whine:

As if twelve years wasn’t enough of boring meaningless holes in the sky while our most demanding combat skills atrophied and we prematurely aged our inventory. Now, after a decade of drinking “green” tea and filling “in-lieu-of the Army doing its job” taskings and the “Cult of COIN,” I’m not sure if I’m in the Army or in the Air Force. I’m “all in”: CAS is king, and my Chief publically endorses Gate’s decision to kill the F-22 because Airpower is really just airborne artillery (who needs air dominance in Low Intensity Conflicts?). We’ve instituted two weeks of bivouacking and other mud-infested activities into our basic training so our young enlisted troops are better equipped to integrate and employ with the Army as the Army. We’re all hooah, nation building, and winning hearts and minds. Last I checked, infantry wasn’t an AFSC, and occupation wasn’t part of our 4+1.

Even AirSea Battle is a setback for the Air Force. Tell me how AirLand Battle, a linear, sequential, and attrition based doctrine in which Airpower is subordinated to Land maneuver, is a good inspiration for AirSea Battle? Tell me how the Navy has the necessary expertise to have input and a vote regarding the requirements and design of our new bomber, or anything else in our portfolio? Tell me how AirSea Battle exploits the inherent asymmetric, parallel, strategic, and effects-based advantages of Airpower, and how USAF senior leadership is championing Airpower so we can do what is needed in this pivot to the Pacific? Joint does not mean the same or subordinate, but we’ve clearly forgotten that over the last decade. We’ve bent over backwards to prove that we’re “all in,” eviscerating our unique, core capabilities in order to prove that we’re good joint team players. I have no trust that AirSea Battle will end up any different.

Awww… he’s sad because he doesn’t have any MiG-29s to shoot down. Maybe we should start a war that doesn’t involve either the Navy or the Army, just so USAF fighter jocks can feel good about themselves. Any ideas?

Warthog Contratemps

[ 54 ] February 8, 2012 | Robert Farley

Over at WPR, I have some thoughts on the USAF’s latest effort to get rid of the pesky A-10 Warthog:

For whatever reason, the A-10 has become a people’s favorite. It graces the cover of such popular texts as Charles Gross’ “American Military Aviation.” In the 1980s, it served as the inspiration for toys such as the Cobra Rattler and the Transformer Powerglide. Hollywood has also featured its anti-robot capabilities prominently, in “Transformers” and “Terminator: Salvation.”

But the Air Force comes by its contempt for the A-10 honestly, and not just for aesthetic reasons. The Air Force conceives of itself as a strategic institution dedicated to shaping the entirety of a campaign, rather than as an organization that plinks away at enemy tanks in support of ground troops. Not only does the A-10 stand outside of that self-image, it draws resources away from the Air Force’s preferred strategic mission. By contrast, the F-35 allows the Air Force to redistribute resources from what it considers the antiquated mission of close air support to the much more important, from the USAF’s point of view, strategic mission. What’s more, for the Air Force, a successful strategic campaign makes the A-10’s contribution largely irrelevant.

Airpower Days Re-Revisited

[ 7 ] August 24, 2011 | Robert Farley

My WPR column this week builds on Sunday’s Libya post:

One of the crucial military questions that emerged from the campaign involves the effectiveness of airpower. With one long ground war winding down and another in full swing, the United States and its allies are extremely reluctant to deploy ground forces. The leaders of the major intervening countries made clear that ground troops would not play a major role in the Libyan intervention, with U.S. President Barack Obama most emphatic on this point. With ground troops unavailable, the burden of military intervention falls on air and naval forces. The Libyan campaign began with a no-fly zone that quickly morphed into a large-scale campaign to support rebel efforts to destroy the Gadhafi regime. The early course of the campaign recalled the first months of the Afghanistan War, in which the United States overthrew the Taliban with airpower, special forces and Northern Alliance ground forces.

 

Does Jesus Love Nukes, or Does He Merely Tolerate Them?

[ 76 ] August 16, 2011 | Robert Farley

As a mild-mannered atheist and a harsh critic of the Air Force, you might expect me to be up in arms regarding the use of Christian just war theory in a USAF PowerPoint presentation to missile jocks.  Really, though… not so much.

If you reject the idea that the United States Air Force should prepare young men and women to fire nukes at China and Russia, then the religious versus secular content of missile training is largely irrelevant.  There are a fair number of Christians, Muslims, Jews, and atheists who hold to the position that preparing to destroy a city full of people, much less actually pushing the button, is wrong in an absolute sense.  This is an entirely reasonable belief, and is completely compatible with a wide variety of interpretation of major religious and non-religious doctrines.  However, people who hold to the belief that firing nuclear weapons is always going to be wrong, regardless of how sensible that belief may be, probably shouldn’t seek secular careers in which the firing of nuclear weapons is a significant part of the job description.  There’s an obvious parallel to pharmacists who refuse to fill prescriptions for birth control or Plan “B”; if you want to be a pharmacist licensed by the state, your secular role requires you to set aside certain religious beliefs.

Understood in these terms, I think that what the Air Force presentation is really doing is putting forth an interpretation of Christianity that makes it possible for missile jocks to set aside their religious beliefs in favor of doing their secular job.  The presentation is pretty clearly NOT arguing that there is a Christian or Jewish duty to launch nukes at the Russians or the Chinese.  Rather, it’s arguing that launching nukes is compatible with Christian religious belief.  These two claims are very different, and I don’t think that from a secular point of view the latter is objectionable.  I also think that the case for nuclear weapons in the cause of Christian just war is a good deal more complicated than is discussed here. While on the whole I’m inclined to agree that Christians should abhor nuclear weapons, the body of just war theology is immense and complex, and plausible-ish arguments for at least the preparation for defensive or retaliatory use of nukes can be made.

Another objection to the presentation is that it does focus very heavily on  Christian and Jewish moral principles, to the exclusion of Buddhists, Muslims, atheists, etc.  On this point, I’m inclined to bow to the needs of practical necessity.  If the Air Force had lots of Muslims or atheists who were sketchy on the prospect of wasting Moscow, then the PowerPoint might have a few more slides.  I’m also genuinely curious as to the content of similar presentations in Russia and China.  I don’t doubt that a certain wariness about incinerating millions of people is a problem common to nuclear armed military organizations, but I do doubt that a Soviet course on the morality of nukes focused on Russian Orthodox just war theory.

Targets! Give Me Targets!

[ 12 ] July 22, 2011 | Robert Farley

It’s important to read this:

NATO commanders requested the sophisticated surveillance aircraft after concluding that they were running out of military targets in Libya after four months of bombing and missile strikes against Kadafi’s military forces and command facilities, U.S. and NATO officials said.

….“It’s getting more difficult to find stuff to blow up,” said a senior NATO officer, noting that Kadafi’s forces are increasingly using civilian facilities to carry out military operations. “Predators really enable you study things and to develop a picture of what is going on.”

In context of this:

An air campaign starts with a target set, which might be informed by adequate intelligence and consists of targets, which are related to the casus belli and susceptible to accurate targeting. The promise of so-called surgical strikes against legitimate targets makes the use of force acceptable to policy-makers and opinion-formers on the left and the right of politics. However, as the air campaign progresses the intelligence becomes poorer and the targeting more challenging, even for precision weapons (which are only ‘precision’ in terms of means of delivery but are otherwise just as indiscriminate in such circumstances as any other munition). Therefore, inevitably there is ‘collateral’ damage. At the same time the intelligence becomes less reliable and the targets become more and more remote from the original set. Eventually the campaign ceases altogether to be intelligence-led and becomes capability-led: Rather than search out those targets which contribute to the campaign, the planners seek desperately for the targets which are susceptible to their available technology.

Whatever His Faults, Tricky Dick was Good for a Quote…

[ 12 ] July 12, 2011 | Robert Farley

I’m slowly making my way through this- there’s some fairly interesting stuff regarding disputes between Nixon and Abrams on how airpower should be used in Linebacker I- but I wanted to pass along this nugget, from a conversation between Richard Nixon and CJCS Admiral Thomas Moorer:

Moorer: The flow shifts back and forth. And it’s very difficult, almost impossible, to run that from Washington. And so far as the reports to you are concerned, let me tell you right now, that if I am directed to give the reports you will get them precisely when you ask. But I am not running this reporting business. And I am passing the information up to the Secretary of Defense and it’s being run from up there, but it’s—
Nixon: Right. I am directing you—
Moorer: If you want me to do it, I can do it—
Nixon: I am directing you, and if the Secretary of Defense raises the questions, I am directing you. I have to have them directly, and they must be unsanitized. And also when an order goes, it’s got to go from me. The Secretary of Defense is not Commander in Chief. The Secretary of Defense does not make decisions on these kinds of things—
Moorer: I understand that, Mr. President—
Nixon: He’s a procurement officer. That’s what he is and not another goddamn thing. And from now on this has got to be done this way. So under these circumstances we can go. Now, getting back to this thing, let’s see what kind of an excuse is being developed here.

There’s nothing in particular wrong with what Nixon is asking, here; he’s certainly asserting his authority as commander-in-chief, although the idea that the Secretary of Defense should essentially be ignored by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs isn’t ideal for most models of civil-military relations. I invite you to consider, however, both the extent and volume of the howls that would emerge from the Right if a similar transcript emerged from a conversation between Obama and Mullen. The Weekly Standard would likely devote between 6 and 10 issues to this single snippet, and Victor Davis Hanson would never write anything about anything else ever again.

Saudis in Idaho

[ 15 ] March 29, 2011 | Robert Farley

Interesting article on the politics of training Saudi Air Force pilots in Idaho. Long story short, politicians happy to take part in rancorous anti-Muslim diatribes on the “Ground Zero Mosque” are also happy to have Saudi pilots stationed locally if it means a cash windfall. I suspect that the course of events in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia over the next year may also have an impact on this debate.

Boeing vs. EADS II: No Mas

[ 13 ] February 24, 2011 | Robert Farley

In a little over an hour, we’ll find out whether our next generation of in-flight tanker will be a decent plane built by decent, hard-working Americans, or a somewhat better plane built on the backs of exploited, unionized Europeans (along with a few decent, hard-working Alabamans thrown in for show).  Intrade says Boeing, and that’s what my head thinks; my heart, though, says EADS.

UPDATE: Boeing wins!  Yay for the USA!!!!! USA! USA! USA!

Where are My Missiles?

[ 12 ] October 27, 2010 | Robert Farley

So, the Air Force is still having problems with its nuclear weapons:

The Air Force swears there was no panic. But for three-quarters of an hour Saturday morning, launch control officers at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming couldn’t reliably communicate or monitor the status of 50 Minuteman III nuclear missiles. Gulp.

Backup security and communications systems, located elsewhere on the base, allowed the intercontinental ballistic missiles to be continually monitored. But the outage is considered serious enough that the very highest rungs on the chain of command — including the President — are being briefed on the incident today.

A single hardware failure appears to have been the root cause of the disruption, which snarled communications on the network that links the five launch control centers and 50 silos of the 319th Missile Squadron. Multiple error codes were reported, including “launch facility down.”

Whatever the specific cause of this incident, the wider pattern speaks to an organization no longer particularly interested in this mission. ICBMs are no longer sexy; the best officers go into other fields, training and recruitment suffer, and maintenance becomes a problem. Further incidents like this are inevitable.

Moreover, I fail to see the logic of this:

The incident comes at a particularly tricky time for the Obama administration, which is struggling to get the Senate to ratify a nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. In conservative political circles, there’s a distrust of the nuclear cuts — and a demand that they be matched with investments in atomic weapon upgrades. Saturday’s shutdown will undoubtedly bolster that view.

Really? The failure of the Air Force to maintain control over 50 ICBMs will bolster the view that the United States needs to invest in a new generation of nuclear weapons? You’ll excuse me if I fail to see how we get from A to B on that one. The nuclear warheads atop the missiles did not fail; communications to the delivery systems did. Having the spiffiest RRW in the whole darned world wouldn’t have mattered a bit, and indeed would have been a profound waste of money if the missiles hadn’t fired. I wasn’t aware that we had to buy into the “This is excellent news for John McCain!” trope every time the Air Force screwed up. New START opponents may well invoke this incident, but there’s no reason that sensible people should pretend to take them seriously.

Did They Hire George Costanza to Manage the USAF Tanker Contract?

[ 6 ] August 5, 2010 | Robert Farley

This is almost surreal. The company that’s trying to put forward a Ukranian Antonov aircraft as the new USAF tanker is protesting a decision to reject its bid on account of tardiness. Here’s the story:

At issue is when USAF took control of the proposal documents submitted by U.S. Aerospace. All of the following detail was provide from an industry executive who wished to be anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issue.

The company claims its messenger, which was delivering the proposal was at the Wright-Patterson Area B gate before 1:30 p.m. July 9. The deadline was 2 p.m. that day.

According to the company, Air Force personnel at the gate “initially denied the messenger entry to the base, then gave incorrect direction to the 1755 Eleventh Street Building 570,” where the proposal was headed. The messenger apparently became lost, and Air Force personnel told him to wait while they came to him.

By the time the papers reached their destination, the Air Force stamped the proposal as being received at 2:05 p.m.

U.S. Aerospace was notified July 22 via a letter from the Aeronautical Systems Center at Wright-Patt that the company’s bid was late and would not be considered as part of the source selection.

So, one of the questions that is likely to be addressed as GAO reviews the protest is at what point the USAF had “control” over the proposal.

Was it when the messenger stepped onto the base? I’d suspect that when it comes to matters of security, the Air Force would say its personnel have control over all people on their bases. When it comes to a contracting matter, it may be different.

Apparently, Air Force officials subsequently told a company representative that delays at installation gates are common (and they are — I’ve been subject to more than a few), and that the company should have anticipated this potential snag and planned appropriately.

Two things. First, you’d wonder why the USAF would risk the potential of a protest and lawsuit based on a five minute delay. However, since the US Aerospace/Antonov bid is thought by some to be intended specifically to generate a protest, they may have thought that having a clear-cut reason for rejection would make things easier.

Airpower, Terror, and Alienation

[ 9 ] July 6, 2010 | Robert Farley

Spencer, noting the recent research indicating that civilian deaths in Afghanistan generate hostility towards the United States:

Additionally, some in the military consider a preoccupation with civilian casualties to be a media-driven phenomenon. Last December, the Air Force’s intel chief, Lieutenant General David Deptula, told Danger Room’s Noah Shachtman that “there appears to be an almost complete lack of indication to support the conventional wisdom, popularized in the media, that air attacks have been provoking deep hostility toward the U.S. and the Kabul government.” Deptula was talking specifically about the air war, and the researchers found that only about six percent of civilian casualties caused by ISAF come through air strikes. (Of course, that’s after McChrystal and his predecessor, General David McKiernan, scaled back ISAF’s use of air strikes.) But after the study, Deptula might want to reconsider his contention that “there is little reason based on the admittedly limited data available in open source to expect that drastically reducing the civilian casualty issue would produce game changing results on the political battlefield.”

Noah, tweeting on same:

I know. “Civilian Casualties Create New Enemies” seems mega-obvious. But top Air Force officers actually disputed it.

Yes, shocking. Of course, in the twentieth century much airpower doctrine has been based on the premise that bombing could terrify subject populations into complaisance; it’s hardly an exaggeration to note that Arthur Harris’ strategic bombing campaign against Germany in World War II was designed to kill German civilians until the survivors decided to give up. Lemay’s campaign against Japan was based on a similar premise. The affinity of airpower to terror stretches back a touch farther than that, even. From a British Air Ministry Memorandum of June, 1921:

As an outcome of the war, countries such as Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Persia have increased the commitments of the Army, since in these law is to an abnormal extent dependent on the presence of adequate armed forces; in these countries it may be proved that the Air Service is capable of maintaining order at a small cost as compared with military occupation. If these “policing duties” can be successfully carried out by the utilisation of air power, the enlargement of the Air Force to meet greatly increased responsibilities must follow; it is in such work that the commitments of the Royal Air Force are likely to show their greatest present increase.

For a sense of what “maintaining order at a small cost” means, and of how long the argument about the effectiveness of airpower in COIN has been going on a British Army memo of February 1921:

There is general agreement that the moral effect of continued intensive air action on the inhabitants of towns and villages is great. The inhabitants, in order to avoid casualties, are obliged to leave their houses by day and seek cover from view in palm groves and orchards, returning to their houses only after dark. All business is thus suspended and the life of the community rendered intolerable. Night raids carried out in addition to raids by day naturally increase the moral effect.

In the case of nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, or in fact any tent dwellers, such effect cannot be hoped for. The difficulty of keeping track of their movements, or identifying changing targets, and of disentangling the camps of hostile from thos of friendly tribes with which they purposely mingle, renders continued intensive air action unlikely to be either effective or confined to the guilty.

Errors both in intelligence, and in identification of targets from intelligence, must inevitably be relatively frequent, unless the alternative of extreme caution is adopted, which involves the surrender of one of the greatest factors in the moral effect of aircraft, rapidity of action.

The effect of such errors is naturally exasperation, and, even in dealing with the guilty, the opinion expressed that the initial state of terror produced by intensive air action is followed by a sense of exasperation rather than of submission. This is largely due to the fact that in many cases, women and children and the infirm are apt to suffer equally with, or more than, fighting men. Hatred and a desire for revenge are likely to be engendered thereby…..

The general consensus of opinion is that is that in their present stage of development aeroplanes cannot be replied upon as the main weapon of an administration in its task of preserving law and order… Although the moral effect of intensive air action is great, it is transient, and the indiscriminate destruction of life and property which will inevitably result must tend to alienate the sympathies of the inhabitants from the administration.

The question, then, of the relative levels of terror and alienation generated by air attacks has been going on for a very long time. For institutional reasons, the Royal Air Force had every reason to minimize the latter and emphasize the former. Although circumstances have changed (few if any USAF officers make arguments about the positive utility of terror in savage wars), that the minimization of alienation remains an important institutional consideration for the Air Force is hardly surprising.

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