From my twitter feed, it seems that all of the people who should be hating the Iran deal are hating it, and all of the people who are actually interested in some kind of accommodation seem pleased. A few very vague thoughts:
No agreement was going to remove or fundamentally change the nature of the Tehran government in the short term. Complaints along these lines amount to pissing in the wind.
Yes, Scott Walker has already said something stupid. Didn’t take long! The broader story is that any hope that the neocon grip on GOP foreign policy would loosen appears to be gone; the cranks remain firmly in control.
Iranian neocons have been as bitterly opposed to this negotiation as their American counterparts. The Iranian government will undoubtedly overspin the results in order to placate them.
Iran may cheat, but the question (as was the case with the Syrian chemical weapons agreement) is less “Does Iran comply 100%?” and more “Can we ensure a better outcome without a deal?” The answer, as was the case with Syria, is almost certainly no.
If you’re really, genuinely worried about Iranian influence in the region, the real threat is that Iran will abandon its proto-program completely and concentrate on enhancing its conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities. In my view, nukes have been more of a distraction for Tehran than a potential asset. But then Israel and Saudi Arabia already hold overwhelming conventional superiority over Iran, so projections of Iranian “hegemony” are so much nonsense in anything less than a 50 year timeframe.
Thanks in large part to your support, I have once again managed to advance in Twitter Fight Club. I’m now up against #1 seed Leslie Warner, my first real uphill fight. I could use your support again. To prep myself for this bitter conflict, I plan to spend the day watching Hell in the Pacific on repeat.
Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears. I have advanced to the Sweet 16 round of Twitter Fight Club, and need your vote. Because the evil that men do lives after them, and the good is oft interred with their bones, vote @drfarls!
JDS Izumo has entered service with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. Izumo is the largest carrier (or “helicopter-carrying destroyer”) constructed by Japan since World War II. The 27,000 ton, 31 knot flat-decked warship gives the JMSDF critical advantages in anti-submarine and amphibious capabilities, and immediately becomes one of the most effective units in the Asia-Pacific.
Izumo and her sister represent an evolutionary step beyond the Hyuga-class light carriers, which displace about 19,000 tons. With the experience gained from construction and operation of the Izumos, Japan could easily take the next step to an even larger flat-decked amphib, or potentially to a full fleet carrier.
On Thursday I gave a presentation at University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies. After the talk, we visited the Canadian War Museum, which combines one of the most effective and minimalist war memorials I’ve ever seen with an outstanding collection of tanks and other vehicles. While at the museum, I had the opportunity to visit the museum store, where I found these:
The next day, I’m making my way through security, the Arrows safely in my carry-on. As it goes through the x-ray machine, I hear an audible gasp, and a few seconds later the whatever-Canada-calls-its-TSA-people staffer came up to me and said “We approve of your choice of toy airplane.” Because, of course, they had identified the two die-cast Arrows from their silhouettes alone.
“F-22F119″ by U.S. Air Force photo – http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photodb/photos/990430-F-0000B-002.jpg. Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons.
My response to the Roose John Bolton and Joshua Muravchik’s warmongering op-eds came out earlier this week. My piece actually came out before the former, but as there’s so little that’s even faintly novel about Bolton’s argument, that doesn’t present much of a problem.
We are a few days away from the latest deadline in the Iran-U.S. nuclear talks. Much of the case on whether we need a deal depends on this question: what does the Middle East look like if Tehran and Washington don’t come to an accord? Is war between the United States and Iran inevitable? If U.S. hawks succeed in scuttling a nuclear deal, then those same hawks will shift, in short order, to insisting on war as the only remedy.
Industrial espionage is, by definition, a violation of most existing schemes of intellectual property law. In the 19th and 20th centuries, governments actively practiced industrial espionage, dispatching agents to foreign countries in order to steal secrets and bring them back to domestic producers. Despite the potential for glamour and drama, the fruits of industrial espionage, especially in the defense sector, are generally thought to have been limited.
“Sinking of HMS Hood” by J.C. Schmitz-Westerholt – Courtesy of the U.S. Army Chief of Military History. U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph. (link). Licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons.I
The Cooperative Strategy is effectively a strategy for defending the liberal international economic order. The 2015 version (and its 2007 predecessor) is at its best when it envisions the operational employment of the U.S. maritime services in pursuit of basic oceanic maintenance. Most notably, this includes fighting against people best characterized as “enemies of all mankind” (including pirates, thieves, and terrorists), and dealing with humanitarian disasters.
The document is less effective at characterizing great power conflict in the maritime space. Even when two countries both allow the possibility of positive sum cooperation at sea, conflict can arise over the precise distribution of spoils, as well as concerns over vulnerability. And some countries do not place a high value on the reliability of maritime security.
Why do we need a new strategy? Many critics of the first strategy challenged its focus on collaboration, especially with potential competitors such as China and the Russia. The first strategy hedged on competitors, implicitly suggesting that deterrence and the development of a network of professional relationships could help soften the edges of political disputes. The first CS-21notably failed to establish much guidance for procurement, fleet constitution, or force structure, which some argued left the service ill-prepared to fight budgetary wars in Washington.