Although eventually supplanted by the submarine and the aircraft carrier, the battleship took pride of place in the navies of the first half of the twentieth century. The mythology of of the battleship age often understates how active many of the ships were; both World War I and World War II saw numerous battleship engagements. These are the five most important battles of the dreadnought age.
I generally recommend that folks read the comments at the National Interest, mostly for the entertainment value. In this case, you’ll find indignation and astonishment that I did not include the Battle of Surigao Strait. People are idiots; a scrum in which six battleships participate in the execution of a single, battered dreadnought doesn’t make the cut for reasons that should be obvious if you read the Battleship Book…
What does Iran need? Pretty much everything. Thirty years of sanctions and war have left the Iranian military with an arsenal of obsolescent weapons. The Iranians have done good work in a few areas, but the country simply lacks the size, technology, and market access to successfully develop an autarkic defense industry.
In the past, Iran has acquired weapons from both Russia and China (as well as the United States and others). We can expect this behavior to continue in the future. Iran offers one of the first, and potentially most important, battlegrounds in the emerging arms export competition between Moscow and Beijing.
But also read this, which has some detail on how the accord affects the arms embargo. Long story short, we’re looking at five years for the big effects to kick in.
That is, the UN arms embargoes will be terminated along with all other, nuclear-specific embargoes. Iran gets to claim that all UN sanctions were removed on Implementation Day.
But here is the clever part. An apparent copy of the proposed UN Security Council Resolution has been leaked to the press. It will terminate the previous Iran sanctions, but also impose a new regime that will retain certain restrictions, including the arms and ballistic missile embargoes for five and eight years, respectively. These new (but really continuing) restrictions come in a separate “statement” (which the UNSC requires all states to comply with) and actually take the form of permitting trade—but only with the advance, affirmative permission of the UNSC. In effect, this amounts to a ban where the UNSC can grant exceptions in advance on a “case-by-case” basis, and the West can use its veto to block any transfers it does not like. The West gets to claim that arms and ballistic embargoes will stay in effect for years after Implementation.
This work will take some time. There will be a moment when Iran has dismantled a multibillion-dollar nuclear investment and faces a multibillion-dollar price tag to rebuild it. Exactly how long that moment will last is difficult to say. As part of the agreement, Iran will retain a considerable nuclear infrastructure and will continue to enrich uranium with its remaining centrifuges. The unfreezing of as much as $100 billion of Iranian assets worldwide will provide Iranian officials with new resources. Still, for some period of months, the prospect of the nuclear deal failing will be very frightening for the country’s rulers. Much of their old nuclear program will be gone, their new program won’t yet have been built, and their cash infusion will only have just begun.
During that period, a new president may be able to press Iran to renegotiate the Obama deal’s worst terms, especially its weak inspection provisions.
So to sum up, Frum proposes waiting until Iran has made credible commitments to holding to the agreement, then taking advantage of Iran’s vulnerability to change the terms of the deal to the advantage of the United States. Iran, facing a even worse status quo, will then become more pliable with respect to issues beyond its nuclear program.
There’s a hard headed realism to the idea! And from Frum’s point of view, it has the advantage of enraging Iran for the next several generations, and consequently poisoning any attempted rapprochement. Hardliners in Iran will love it, as it would confirm every prediction they’ve made about American perfidy.
But then sadly, the United States and Iran are not the only parties to the agreement. That the US has managed to hold together a negotiating coalition that includes China and Russia for this long is nothing short of a miracle. China and Russia are on board because they value keeping the nuclear club small, as long as they’re part of that club. But the P5+1 had held together because Moscow and Beijing believe that the United States is negotiating in good faith. If the US extravagantly demonstrates that it is negotiating in bad faith, the coalition will not hold together, the sanctions will not “snap back,” and both Russia and China will resume arms exports to Iran in zero time flat. In short, the notional President Walker/Bush/Rubio/Trump that Frum seems to be envisioning will not actually have the power of Darth Vader; he cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the deal, then simply tell the Iranians to “pray that I don’t alter it further.”
Another point: Along with a few others, I’ve made a lot of fun over the years of the “credibility fairy,” the idea that if the United States just demonstrated sufficient toughness, it could resolve most world problems by frightening the rogues into line. “Credibility” is the last refuge of the neocon who can’t figure out how to solve a problem, or why a particular policy is failing. What’s interesting here is the clarity that Frum is providing with respect to how he understands the definition of “credibility.” It does not mean “a commitment to following through on the agreements that the United States has made,” which we might understand to be a conventional understanding of the term. It does mean “a willingness to blast the hell out of anyone, at any time.” For my own part I’m somewhat skeptical of the importance of credibility defined in either way, but I find it much easier to believe that the first matters more for the long-term foreign policy success of the United States than the second.
Brazil could use a pair of Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. Fortuitously, a pair just came on the market.
As has become well known, Russia contracted with France in 2009 to build a pair of Mistral-class amphibious assault ships in French yards. The French would then assist in the construction of two additional Mistrals in Russian yards, giving the Russians a chance to redevelop their skills at building large surface warships.
The Mistrals displace 21,000 tons, can make almost 19 knots, and can carry two-to-three dozen helicopters, in addition to small boats and a contingent of marines. They have advanced communication systems necessary for managing complex amphibious operations (the sophistication of this system was one of the sticking points in the export deal with Russia).
And I’m not the first person to think this way. I spoke with a Brazilian naval analyst this evening, and he suggested that there are some legal difficulties (the contracting with Russia makes it very difficult to resell this ships, as does the presence of Russian military equipment on board), but that one of the options under consideration might be to sell the older Mistrals (France has three), and convert the Russian ships to French service. But there are also obvious concerns about where the money would come from.
Chinese industry can still learn much from Russia, but in many areas it has caught up with its model. The vibrancy of China’s tech sector suggests that Chinese military technology will leap ahead of Russian tech in the next decade. Historically, China’s military exports have occupied a different, lesser tier than Russian. Within the next decade, however, we should expect that Russia and China will fight hard for market share in the following five areas…
As usual, the comments themselves are worth the price of admission.
As we begin to delve through the details of the Iran deal, let’s have a toast for the lying douchebags who’ve been jabbering away for the past twenty years that Iran was 18 months away from a bomb. It’s almost as if all that bullshit made people think that a deal with a ten year sunset (followed by a resumption of normal IAEA monitoring procedures) might be a good idea.
The panel successfully highlighted several problems that have recently become central to U.S. naval thought. The United States operates ten nuclear aircraft carriers, but only three of these are on post at any given time; the rest are in some stage of repair, refurbishment, and refit. Under surge conditions, the USN can restore most to service, but this can have severe consequences for the ships and their crews. What’s true of carriers is also true for the rest of the fleet, which is suffering from the same kind of over-employment problems.
“Carrier demand has exceeded supply for many years,” said retired VADM Peter Daly, chief executive officer of the U.S. Naval Institute, speaking to an audience at a Washington seminar sponsored by the Navy League’s America’s Strength campaign and moderated by Bryan McGrath of the Hudson Institute. Also speaking were retired ADM Mark Fitzgerald, and Dr. Robert Farley of the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.
The Navy, obligated by law to field a force of 11 CVNs, is authorized by Congress to operate only 10 carriers until the next CVN, Gerald Ford, is commissioned in 2016.