Al-Awlaki
I lack strong opinions about the Al-Awlaki hit, but here are some links:
- Glenn is in good form.
- Spencer lays out the politico-military considerations.
- Robert Chesney on the pro-assassination side.
This amounted to the assassination of a US citizen on secret evidence, even if there were understandable reasons for keeping the evidence of his operational involvement in Al Qaeda activities secret. In this Ben Wittes post, you can see just how much weight “is believed” is supposed to carry. I don’t find the argument that al-Awlaki could never have been apprehended particularly compelling; if drones can operate in Yemen, then potentially special forces can operate in Yemen. I also very much doubt that granting an American citizen a certain degree of immunity from assassination-by-drone would do much to hamstring US operations, even if were were to allow for the sake of argument that the drone war is sensible and legal.
All that said, my “lack strong opinions” reflects a belief that the killing of al-Awaki is not the most troubling state sanctioned killing of the last two weeks; the process that killed Troy Davis is to my mind more likely to be replicated and more likely to kill innocent people than the process that led to the death of al-Awaki. The state is the state; it kills when it makes road policy, when it makes health policy, and when it rolls out of bed in the morning. The killing of al-Awaki doesn’t represent the crossing of some sort of Rubicon, rather an assessment of the cost of legal inconvenience, and this is obviously nothing new. But then this simply represents an assessment of the gravity of the killing, not of its justice.
In this Ben Wittes post, you can see just how much weight “is believed” is supposed to carry.
Jeebus, that’s…less than compelling. And this:
rigorous internal review of targeting decisions within the executive branch provides all of the process that is due
Right. “Trust us.” Er, not anymore.
Yeah. BS like this would be a lot easier to take if people like the poster just admitted:
“Hey, you know what? Reality sucks. I’m just going to pretend that everything works out in the end!”
Because that’s what’s the subtext of this entire argument.
And, or course, no comments allowed at Lawfare, apparently.
Here’s the rules on killing US citizens:
White person in brown country-detain indefinitely.
Brown person in brown country-kill with flying killer robots.
Brown person in white country-detain indefinitely.
White person in white country-detain for awhile before accepting they have some rights.
I’m sure this is in the Constitution somewhere.
Well, the state is the state. Therefore there is no difference between (1) the execution of a citizen after a public trial before a jury of his peers wherein he is found guilty and (2) the execution of a citizen after a secret order by the head of state. See, it’s a trivial distinction! No reason to have a strong opinion on this or anything.
An execution is something you do to a helpless prisoner who is in your custody and control.
I’m glad that someone has raised the point that while a case may be made that US citizens shouldn’t be treated in this extra-judicial manner, that’s not so relevant for the other 93% of the world.
I find the targetted killing of a US citizen on a President’s say-so significantly more troubling even than the barbarity of our system of capital punishment, even in the Troy Davis kind of worst-case scenario.
A head of state claiming the right to unilaterally order the killing of a citizen is pretty much the definition of tyranny.
I find your faith in the notion that this doesn’t go on all the time touching.
I find your apologia masquerading as cynicism disgusting.
It’s troubling, but I’ve never understood how the Courts are supposed to intervene. I can’t imagine the Supreme Court saying Roosevelt couldn’t order an assassination attempt against one of the Tokyo Roses who were allegedly sapping our will to fight. IMO, tal-alwaki is awful because we have a combination of the unending and undefined war on terror combined with unrestricted presidential power, but I don’t know how it’s limited. Might just be my ignorance.
One way it’s limited is that this administration
has rejected the concept of Bush’s “unending and undefined war on terror,” and put forward a much more closely-defined concept of a war against al Qaeda – an actual enemy, specifically defined in such a way as to not apply to just anyone who can be called a “terrorist,” not a metaphor, not a tactic, that can be directly engaged and defeated.
I’m old enough to remember when the distinction between fighting “Terror” and fighting “al Qaeda” was a central plank in the left’s case against the government’s response to 9/11.
And what is to stop the Administration from labeling anyone al Qaeda? I really don’t see this as a practical limitation. Does anyone actually know what the evidence was against Al-Awlaki? And if we can never know, and the accused can never have a day in Court, then I fail to see any practical limitation on the power to order the execution of an American citizen.
Put your faith in men, and you’ll never be disappointed. Laws are cold, pale useless things, without the gutfeel for justice that men, good men, strong men have.
What’s to stop any administration from labeling anyone as a German/Japanese/Vietnamese spy?
What’s to stop the DA from manufacturing evidence?
I guess as long as “what if somebody in the government labels his daughter’s boyfriend al Qaeda” is the only consideration that’s relevant, and there’s absolutely no reason why we’d want the government to go after al Qaeda, then yours is a powerful argument.
So, just so I’m not misunderstanding you: the fact that an American citizen who is known to have gone to Yemen, joined al Qaeda, made numerous videos announcing the fact that he’s gone to Yemen and joined al Qaeda, was added to Treasury’s list of people who can’t receive funds, and was placed on the UN’s list of international terrorists, was later placed on the CIA’s kill-or-capture list, adds up in your mind to “no practical limitation” on the President’s power to, say, put the guy who cut him off in traffic on that list.
I’m not misrepresenting you? You’re actually saying there would be no practical impediment to the President doing that, because he so designated Anwar al-Awlaki?
Let me know if I’ve got something wrong.
There is a reasonable point in here about the virtue of having a systemic, redundant process within the executive for making these targeting decisions in this war, since there are more complications than in the targeting decisions in previous wars. If only to head off kooky conspiracy theories.
But stretching that to mean that there are no practical impediments whatsoever to the administration indiscriminately declaring American citizens to be al Qaeda and ordering the CIA to go after them stretches this point beyond reason.
OK, now I understand. If it is done by the Obama administration, it must be alright. Good lord. Justify much?
Did you feel a whooshing sensation on your scalp as you read my comment?
Because trusting any particular people has absolutely nothing to do with what I wrote.
I pity your inability to understand any political discussion except in terms of pro-vs. anti-Obama.
Perhaps when you’re a little older, your conception of politics will expand.
While I am pretty sure he is a bad guy, on constitutional grounds alone, I do not think we can or should be executing American citizens without a fair, legal trial. For that matter, as a matter of principle, I do not think we should be executing anyone without a trial in this manner (deaths in combat/conflict situations are a different situation).
I feel the same way. I’d add that if we can find bin Laden in Pakistan, we can find this guy in Yemen. Admittedly, it’s likely easier to just kill him from a secure, remote location, and it doesn’t place any Americans in harm’s way. But that’s hardly an excuse. That the guy was militating, perhaps substantially, against the US doesn’t excuse the decision to ignore Constitutional protections. In the end, you have to ask yourself one question: is this a power you want the political opposition to have?
An execution is something you do to someone you have in your custody and power.
Obviously, we shouldn’t be executing anyone without trial.
That is just what was done here. He was executed he was not killed in any combat. Or for that matter even trying to set something up as far as we know.
Um, no.
You are entitled to your own opinion. You are not entitled to you own facts.
But that’s the central argument isn’t it. He was an “enemy combatant” in the GWOT, therefore he is a casualty of war. His foreign born body guards were also “assassinated”. Non-citizens are also entitled to Due Process aren’t they?
Statements like “The POTUS can now order a hit on any American citizen whenever he feels like it” are just argumentum ad absurdum.
How do you figure that? The US executed 46 people in 2010. We’re currently killing several hundred people a year in drone strikes, with waaaaaaay less oversight than gets applied in death penalty cases. And it’s not going to end any time soon.
At issue here is the question of American citizens being killed by drone strikes.
Well, I actually don’t think al-Awlaki’s citizenship is the crucial issue here. If an American citizen is fighting for the enemy on an established battlefield, then you kill them, just like any other enemy soldier. Likewise, if a Yemeni citizen commits murder in down town Chicago, you don’t get get to summarily execute them just because they aren’t American. The real “process that led to the death of al-Awlaki” was us saying that we get to use the logic of war any time it’s convenient.
So in a sense, I guess I agree – if you’re already having a worldwide drone war, then extending it to Americans is another step down the path you’re already on.
I’m not convinced by this, but it’s an interesting take. I’m not sure how one defines “battlefield” in this situation, though.
Legally and historically, combatants have always been allowed to conduct operations within territory the enemy controls, not just on the actual front. The ball-bearing plants, air ministries, and air fields we’ve bombed in various wars weren’t battlefields until we bombed them.
I feel the same way, the citizenship angle is a red herring. If he was in the United States or anywhere with a functional government to extradite someone, citizen or not, that is how it would happen. I assume if the CIA was blowing someone up walking down the street in Detroit, no one would be trying to figure out if he was a citizen or not, it would just be an outrage.
There is no sensible way to deal with an American in Yemen who has joined an armed organization that has declared war on the United States as a law enforcement matter. For that matter, if you even tried, Glenn Greenwald would still scream that it was illegal under international law for any agency of the government to go snatch people out of foreign countries (he would more or less be right).
Armed organizations cannot declare war. They aren’t states. They lack that power.
Al-Awlaki joined a criminal conspiracy. We deal with criminal conspiracies as law enforcement matters.
Moreover, we let criminals who have placed themselves beyond our reach go free ALL THE TIME without saying ‘fuck it’ and killing them. Someone who commits a crime in the U.S and flees to a non-extradition country where they continue to commit acts that are crimes against the U.S but not crimes where they reside gets off scot free unless we’re willing to declare war and invade to get to them. That’s how it works. That’s the only way it can work in a world that still recognizes sovereignty as meaningful.
Sure they can; they just can’t do it legally. They can certainly go ahead with both a legally-invalid declaration and a wholly-illegal execution of a war, though.
A criminal conspiracy to commit illegal acts of war – just like the criminal conspiracy Goering, Himmler, and Keitel joined.
Pointing out that someone fighting a war is a criminal doesn’t eliminate the war; it makes him a war criminal. The two categories are not mutually exclusive.
Anyway, I think you’re a little fuzzy on Awlaki’s status in Yemen. The Yemeni government indicted him for his crimes, and tried and convicted him in abesentia. They aren’t refusing to extradite him; he was beyond their reach, in an area where they could not arrest him, despite their desire to.
“Abesentia” is a coastal town in Yemen, btw. Nice beaches.
That’s where they tried him. In Abesentia.
Sure beats Sanaa in the summer.
Uh… no, they can’t.
I could declare myself Emperor of North America and ‘wage war’ against the United States government. That wouldn’t make me a war criminal. It would just make me a criminal, because I don’t have the power, legally or practically, to declare wars, illegal or otherwise.
I’m not actually sure that’s relevant. Most of those guys were tried ex post facto, yes? Under the principle ‘what you did was perfectly legal under the laws you created to make it so, but was so monstrous we’re going to retroactively hold you culpable for it because you ought to have known better.’
.
You know, I can absolutely see where you’d get that impression, but I’m not. My extradition comparison was not meant to be 100% analogous. I worded it poorly.
I’m not sure it undercuts my larger point; that just because a criminal is somewhere beyond our power to arrest him, it doesn’t follow that its right, either legally or morally, to simply kill him. Nor does it absolve state agents of the responsibility to actually prove he’s a criminal to his fellow citizens.
Sometimes facts belie principles. (On in this case, illuminate them.) There were factual reasons enough demonstrated on 9/11/01 o conclude this organization, practically, was capable of waging war. That leaves the only branch of your argument the question of legality, which is already stipulated – they can’t legally declare war. If that’s your argument, that no country can treat an organizatio that can’t legally wage war against it as if they are at war against it. But that has nothing to do with their practical ability to do so. There was legitimate reason to be concerned that this organization was intent on and no way to ensure they were unable to gain access to the ultimate means of war when this attack occurred. That was an internationally recognized concern on the part of all major (and many minor) powers at that time… No, sorry, the practical means to wage war simply were not in doubt after 9/11 (granted, one can argue things have changed since then).
The question was and is a legal one. So you can argue that the organization’s inability to declare legal war against a state makes it so that a state cannot deal with it legally as if they are at war with it. But that is what you have to argue. And i think you’ll run into any number of counterexamples to this claim, namely the states of non-international armed conflict that have existed between non-state organizations like the PKK, ETA, and IRA and the various states against which they have had grievances.
…a “then fine, that can certainly be your argument” was meant to be in there somewhere, specifically where being clear from context I believe.
No.
No, there were not.
Anymore than Timothy McVeigh’s actions demonstrated that he was, practically, capable of ‘waging war.’
If there was any credible intelligence that AQ had any remote ability to gain access to a WMD, I’ve not seen it.
I’m sure they’d like to have one. And I’d like a magical pony. I might have a greater chance of achieving THAT goal than they have of theirs.
That should be ‘should not.’ An organizations inability to declare legal war against a state makes it so that a state SHOULD NOT deal with it legally as if they are at war with it. We weren’t at war with Al Capone. We weren’t at war with the Gotti family.
I make that comparison deliberately. Al-Qaeda is in many ways LESS POWERFUL than an organized crime family. They are thugs and criminals. They do not have a secret island somewhere. If they DID, they’d be a state actor.
The proper comparison is not between Al-Awlaki and Tokyo Rose. It’s between Al-Awlaki and a drug kingpin in a compound somewhere. And not even the kingpin; the dude who writes speeches for the kingpin.
Oh, very clear. I think you’re wrong on a bunch of points both factual and philosophical, but you made your point cogently.
Nice gravatar, by the way. Is that the lion of England or of Lannister? It’s hard to tell.
Yes.
Yes there were.
Oh my goodness gracious, we’re at an impasse.
In any case, my basic point stands. The practical demonstration is beside the point, you fully concede here. You say that the question is only whether there is a territorial base from which the force can operate – indeed, you call it an island – which you say must be a state in order for another state to legally act as in a state of armed conflict with that force. You literally say that if AQ were in control of an island, then they could be dealt with as a state, having attempted a version of a war declaration, and demonstrated a nontrivial ability to use force in furtherance of said declaration (whether their total potential for doing so exceeds or is exceeded by that of, say, the Gambino family). So for you, the unique determinant of whether a state of armed conflict exists (the relevant international legal standard for whether “war” is being waged) is whether both of the actors have state sovereignty over a piece of land. Meaning, it does not depend on the “practical” ability to wage war, only the technical, solipsistic legal distinction that only two states can be in war, ergo no two states, no war. The only problem is, international law recognizes states of armed conflict can exist between states and non-state actors. If your concern is that I used the term war rather than NIAC, I can easily revise my statement to that effect, and my argument is not altered. There was ample demonstration on 9/11 that a party undertook actions that created a state of NIAC between itself and another party – a state (the former party also to having happened to attempt a declaration of war on the latter party previously, however legally ineffectually). A state of NIAC persisted for a time afterward.
The Gravatar is perhaps coat used by someone who shared my surname at some point – Drew – or else it’s just a concoction. i got it off of some website for “People With The Last Name Drew.” For some reason when I loaded it in, it cut off the “Drew” moniker that was at the bottom.
On your can/should distinction – it’s not a should, it;s a can, I just left out one word – legally. No statae can legally treat a non-state actor (which can’t legally declare war on themO as if they are at war. And that is false – IHL recognizes that a state can be a legitimate belligerent (i.e. treat as if at war with) a non-state actor which cannot legally declare war on them. “Should” has no force in international law – international actors are presumed to act in their interests consistent with international law, just war theory notwithstanding. Just war theory does not speak to what you are speaking to here. The modern laws of the international space do, and they recognize the potential for legitimate states of armed conflict between states and non-state actors.
Last thing – we can just differ on whether 9/11 constituted a level of violence that rose to the level of a NIAC. I may even be wrong (I am to some extent just conducting an intellectual exercise here). But you are objectively wrong that a state cannot be at war (a NIAC) with a non-state actor. The fundamental point you tried for is one that is actually an abstract question that is expressed with abstract terms that have precise definition, and it has a correct answer in theory, however muddy the reality we try to apply it to is.
I wrote,
“There was ample demonstration on 9/11 that a party undertook actions that created a state of NIAC between itself and another party”
This is in error. The issue was their practical ability. The party took an action that amply demonstrated their ability to, and justified their being treated as an an entity with, and the stated desire to, create a state of NIAC with another party (a state).
Sorry to keep on, but if you still want to focus on the “practical” ability to engage in armed conflict, and you deny that 9/11 was a demonstration of such, what would have been such a demonstration? If it’s a practical matter, then it must have a practical answer, so what must it have pulled off? Two 9/11s? three? Or is your contention that this group, by definition, cannot in your view engage in armed conflict (war for international legal purposes)? Because that is a definitional, legal claim, not a practical claim. And it’s a valid one; it may even be a correct one (I believe a non-state belligerent still must be an organized military force, which AQ is certainly arguably not). But for practical purposes, what would they have had to do do demonstrate the ability to wage what the U.S. could rightly react to as war? My contention is that they did enough on 9/11 to demonstrate that, and my contention is further that you don’t actually have a practical to that point at all; you only have a definitional-legal one relating to their definitional ability to engage in armed conflict owing to the nature of their formation as an organization.
You’re simply wrong on the facts. Al Qaeda has, in fact, declared war on us. That declaration doesn’t provide them with any legal status, but they still did it.
Conducting acts of war illegally, on the other hand, would make you a war criminal. Have you ever read the Geneva Conventions? People who have no right to declare war or engage in acts of war, but who do so anyway, are defined as illegal combatants. As are those – regardless of their legal standing – who fight a war in a manner that violates the laws of war.
It’s relevant because it refutes your central premise: that one cannot be both a criminal and a war fighter. It’s relevant because it provides examples that falsify this claim.
Now that’s irrelevant.
I haven’t claimed that being a criminal beyond our power to arrest him justifies killing someone. Rather, I’ve claimed that fighting for the enemy in a war justifies killing him. The correction I made to your description of Awlaki’s legal history doesn’t really go to the justification for this military strike.
Also: Timothy McVeigh wasn’t running the armed forces of a sovereign state, churning out thousands of trained war fighters every few months.
Bin Laden was.
Timothy McVeigh didn’t have any kind of global reach.
Bin Laden did.
Have you forgotten the existence of the Afghan Civil War? Bin Laden had become the de facto head of the Taliban armed forces, and was, on 9/11, actually in the process of waging a war.
I can see both sides here, and I have some mixed opinions.
I don’t like this for obvious reasons – he’s a US citizen, and a non-combatant who mainly was doing proselytizing and propaganda work, from what I understand.
And this action was approved by the WH and CiC, and was aimed at this specific individual, one who was not directly involved in acts of terrorism or war – now, or before.
If he was actively fighting for the enemy on the “battlefield” and had died in the course of some other action, I wouldn’t have much of a problem with this – those are the risks Al-Alwaki’s taking.
There were US citizens who actively fought against the US in both WWI and WWII. Not many, and not all willingly, but there were.
Should we NOT have fought battles, trying to kill the enemy, if we knew there was a US citizen(s) on the other side?
The only comparison I can think of here is Tokyo Rose.
There was at least one US citizen, and one Canadian citizen, who did porpaganda broadcasts for the Japanese (Tokyo Rose was a generic name given to English speaking women who broadcast Japanese propaganda, and not ONE or TWO specific individuals, necessarily).
In that time, I think if either was killed in a general air attack, no one would have had any problem with it.
I might have a problem if FDR or Truman could send a drone to specifically kill this individual.
What was she doing? Yapping propaganda on the radio.
As for trying to capture Al-Awlaki, I don’t think wasting lives trying to get him would have been a wise or productive move.
In the Middle East, we’ve already wasted too much (more) good blood on the stupid idea that we can’t let the good blood already spent there go to waste.
I think losing more good blood trying to kill bad blood is an equally huge waste.
And we’ve had enough of that already.
I suppose if I had to chose, I’ll say I’m against this.
I think a reasonable rule is that if Little Boots would do something enthusiastically, you should avoid doing it, especially if you’re doing it reluctantly.
Them’s my $0.02, in case anyone gives a crap.
This is not the government’s explanation, fwiw. Given the attention and resources focused on this guy, I find it more likely than not that he was more than that. I’ve certainly seen nothing beyond a “Tsk, you’re so naive” pose put forth as a reason to think that the State Department/CIA/White House/DoD description of his activities is false.
There is some difference between killing an internet preacher and killing someone in the al Qaeda chain of command.
Me neither.
And I don’t accept the notion that someone who is regularly and successfully encouraging people to harm Americans is somehow less blameworthy than the people who do the actual harming. Abraham Lincoln:
Successfully recruiting people to to X is just as legally and morally culpable as actually doing X.
So whether he was an operational leader in plans to hurt Americans, or just a person who recruited others to kill Americans, either way his killing was a justified act of war.
Ii don’t know if I agree entirely that just doing propaganda makes one a legitimate military target. But even stipulating that it does, I’d put a caveat on your point: the people “encouraging” need to have an actual connection to the people who do the actual harming.
Some self-selected kook in Belarus with an internet connection who isn’t in touch with anyone when he makes his jihadi videos would be quite a bit different from an actual al Qaeda operative assigned to propaganda.
But Brett,
I understand you point, and I don’t mean to quibble, but let me ask, what “War?”
Are we at war with Yemen?
Are we at war with al Qaeda?
They are a terrorist organization, and terror is a tactic.
‘The Global War on Terror” was a marketing and sales term drummed up to get support from people in this country.
We’ve had other things described as “Wars” before:
War on Poverty.
War on Drugs.
etc.
Were they actually wars? They weren’t even ‘Police Actions.’
Like I said, I get your point. I just have a problem with calling this a “War.”
Calling it a “War” is exactly why there’s justification for this, and other horrors, that would be unacceptable under a different title.
After all, ‘ALL’S fair in love and war.’
And since I know this ain’t love, and I’m not convinced it’s war, I’m not sure that killing Al-Awlaki the way we did is fair.
Like I said in my first comment, I have some mixed emotions and opinions on this.
Are we at war with al Qaeda?Yes, Congress invoked its war powers against al Qaeda on September 18, 2001.
We’re at war with the organization, not the tactic.
Joe,
Ok, then I have a philosophical and semantical difference with that Congress.
sorry brett, but your argument falls way short of convincing me, or anyone else who hasn’t been brainwashed by the bush administration.
last i checked, congress never declared war against afghanistan, iraq or al queda, so pretty much everyone we’ve killed in those places is actually a homocide. state sanctioned, but murder nonetheless.
this doesn’t just “amount” to an assassination, it is an assassination, pure and simple. the executive branch has unilaterally given itself the authority to murder anyone it so desires, with no due process or oversight of any kind.
we should be chilled by that arrogation of life & death power by the nation’s CEO.
Check harder.
And AUMF – like the ones passed against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and that passed against Iraq – is legally indistinguishable under both domestic and international law from a declaration of war.
The AUMF says
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/sjres23.enr.html
al-Awlaki was interviewed by the FBI after 9-11 but while some investigators years later now claim he was a big player in the 9-11 attacks, the FBI at the time does not appear to have thought so, otherwise why would have been able to meet with the Secretary of the Army’s General Counsel and the preach in the US Capitol to the Congressional Staffers Muslim Association.
Thus, tying al-Awlaki to the al Qaeda of 9-11 and hence to the ability to justify the use of the AUMF is not at all obvious
Following the same logic, if we killed an Imperial Japanese sailor or airman in WW2, and that sailor or airman had no personal involvement with Pearl Harbor, was the killing wrongful?
The AUMF effectively declares war against al-Qaeda. Anyone who works for al-Qaeda is legitimate target, even if they had no actual personal involvement with 9-11.
Al-Awlaki was at least an important and successful recruiter for al-Qaeda, and maybe an actual operational leader. I don’t see how he falls outside the AUMF.
the relevant section of the AUMF is: “or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”
A close reading of the entire clause reveals that is a disjunction (i.e. or) as opposed to a conjunction (i.e. and), which means the above cited stands independent of any other clause.
The language allows for action to prevent future acts of “international terrorism” such as 9/11, then the use of military force is authorized.
And though this statutory language must be read in accordance with the Constitution, we have been admonished that “the constitution is not a suicide pact.” Arguably, allowing Awalaki to continue operating would be tantamount to allowing these notions of due process to become the death of us all. Because, that’s what he wanted to effectuate of course.
Are people who joined the Wehrmacht in 1942-1945 not covered by the December 1941 declaration of war?
You are wrong as a legal matter.
If I walk around saying ‘Someone should murder X’ and someone mulls it over, decides I’m right, and goes and murders X, I have zero legal culpability. First Amendment caselaw is pretty clear on that.
On the other hand, if you and some other people entered into a plot to kill the members of Group X, and your role was to publicly justify those killings and get more people to join the plot, while the other guys you conspired with carried it out, the First Amendment wouldn’t protect you.
The legal question is whether the advocacy was an integral part of a larger crime of murder, or of the operations of a group that existed to commit those murders, and whether your speech contributed to the crimes.
Also true. Just so’s we’re clear.
Agreed that if you just say that someone ought to kill X, that’s not the equivalent of killing X yourself.
But actually recruiting someone to kill X is a lot more than just saying X ought to be killed. Hiring a hit man is not much different from committing the murder yourself.
So the question is, is al-Alawki more like case 1 or case 2? He made a pretty prolonged, serious effort to recruit for al-Qaeda. He didn’t just say, someone ought to take down the Americans; he made a serious effort to convince Muslims that they had a *religious duty* to take down Americans. In my mind, that makes him more like case 2.
Ah, you know, I should have read a little bit more closely.
In Al-Awlakis case yeah, I would say (assuming what is accepted as general knowledge about him is true) its more like case 2, from a legal standpoint. Actively recruiting people into a criminal conspiracy you are part of is definitely a crime.
Thanks Joe. And you’re right, I don’t know everything about this guy.
And I agree that there’s a difference between a propaganizing preacher and someone actively involved in planning and execution as a memeber of the chain of command in a terrorist organization.
Slightly OT, but still germane to the conversation:
Unfortunately, when Darth Cheney had Little Boots open up that “Unitary President” bottle, and the genii escaped, legal, human, and civil rights went out the window – and that genii’s gone, probably forever.
And, to expect a Democratic President, whose party has long been accused of being weak on national defence, and an African-American one at that, to reverse all of those policies is an acid-induced pipe dream.
Whatever furies were unleashed by Cheney and Bush will take a long time to be corralled, maybe not in my lifetime – and maybe not at all.
There have been fundamental changes over the last 10+ years (30+ if you want to go back to Reagan – 40+ if you want to go to the modern source, Richard Nixon). And I have little hope that we’ll ever go back to what we once were – a beacon for democracy. An imperfect one, to be sure, but not the fearful, corrupted, corporatist monster, where legal, human and civil rights are malliable, that we are becoming.
Having said all of this, I’m not naive enough to think that no US President in history ever arranged or directed the killing of a US citizen abroad.
That is no excuse, though.
Yes, but do you find it interesting that there appears to be no desire to put out any evidence that he was more than a mouthpiece? Oh no you don’t.
Do I find it interesting that, in the midst of a war, the government doesn’t want to publicize what it knows about the enemy’s operations.
Um, no. Not even slightly. I find it completely unremarkable.
Repeating the misleading, emotionally-laden term “assassination” to describe shooting someone in a war doesn’t actually change its legal or constitutional status. The only meaning that that word choice adds is to suggest that shooting this guy is particularly fraught because the means chosen were very accurate and left a light footprint.
And those special forces can attack compounds and convoys full of armed gunman. This wasn’t like the bin Laden raid, where he was living like a civilian in a city neighborhood, and the raid could be carried out like a SWAT raid. They would have had to fight their way in and out, and probably take significant casualties.
Sorry, but this was emphatically not “an act of war.” It was a targeted assassination of someone we think (but have not proven) was involved in illegal acts against the United States. We are not legally “at war” with Al Qaeda (and this did not occur in a formal combat zone), any more than we are with drugs/drug dealers and smugglers. The participants should be treated the same way in both cases.
Sorry, but you’re wrong.
Congress declared war on the organization he was fighting for back in September 2001, and the executive was acting in accordance with that war-making authority. There was never a situation in Congress invoked its war-making authority against drug dealers or smugglers.
You’re entitled to your opinion about what the smarter policy would be here, but it doesn’t change the legal situation. A legal state of war exists between us and al Qaeda whether you think that’s a good idea or not.
Anyway, your argument here isn’t really about the legal status anyway. You’d be against blowing this guy up even you thought it was 100% legal. I disagree, but I recognize that an argument can be made for this that isn’t, unlike the above legal assertions, based on flat-out incorrect propositions.
Major improvement.
Kindly deposit your commentary on my choice of language where heroin balloons are commonly stowed.
Now, and in the future.
Thanks.
advice you should use yourself more often
STFU.
How’s that?
Nobody cares about your advice. Nobody wants to read comments about how I write my comments.
It’s been a nice little run where the threads have actually been about the subject of the threads.
Kindly work up some self-discipline and keep them that way.
You can justify this with the 2001 AUMF, but it is still an assassination.
Anytime someone kills a target that cannot in any way defend him/herself, that’s an assassination.
Al-Awlaki couldn’t have shot back against the drone, even if he’d been a soldier rather than a propagandist.
If you support the assassination, then at least don’t play word games about it.
Agreed.
Congress passed a law in the 1970s defining assassinations, and the killing of enemy commanders in wartime is explicitly exempted from the ban.
You and the other Doc can make up all the definitions you want, but only the legal one has any relevance to the legal question.
“The state is the state; it kills when it makes road policy, when it makes health policy, and when it rolls out of bed in the morning.” — Robert Farley
Well said.
This is just amoral cynicism posing as sophistication.
You could say the exact same thing as a defense of the Holocaust.
Quietism: calm acceptance of things as they are without attempts to resist or change them.
Is it possible to no longer be an American citizen?
Or, in other words, are there any possible actions an individual can take that negates their citizenship?
As of now, naturalization can be revoked under certain circumstances; birthright citizenship can’t be (except voluntarily and explicitly, by the citizen).
Are you sure? I’m pretty sure citizenship can be revoked by defecting. If al Qaeda were a state, I’m fairly certain it could be argued al Awlaki expatriated.
Not entirely true. The law allows for revocation of citizenship by committing acts of treason, trying to overthrow, and taking up arms against the US govt as part of a foreign states armed forces, among other things. It’s notable that fighting as part of the Taliban doesn’t apply to this rule.
In addition, citizenship can be renounced by taking a high-level cabinet position in a foreign state and no intent to revoke is needed.
Finally, by serving as an OFFICER in a foreign military, citizenship can be revoked, also without a finding of intent(this is to distinguish from being a low-level soldier, including a conscript).
But to your main point, renouncing US citizenship is surprisingly difficult. A US citizen overseas has to make a voluntary, explicit renunciation of his citizenship to be effective (aforementioned exceptions notwithstanding). However, this is not a sufficient condition. When attempting to renounce, the US citizen must also sign a statement and the govt must APPROVE the renunciation for it to be legally binding. (aside: even after renunciation, the person is still subj to US tax law for 10 years afterward).
So if media reports are to be believed, Awalaki actually renounced his citizenship. However, as we know, this is not enough to effectuate the desired outcome because it is a formal process involving documents. But if Awalaki believed his oral renunciation was sufficient to renounce, this presents a novel legal argument.
In other words, if he intended to renounce and he did so willingly, but his mistake as to the legal requirements prevented him from actually doing so, the court may allow his intended renunciation to be effective. The idea being that he made a good faith effort to renounce and completed acts consistent with that (AQ propaganda artist, abandoning US domicile, etc.), so we should honor his renunciation.
Alternatively, let’s say he knew of the signing requirement, but knew he couldn’t present himself at the embassy in Sanna because he would be arrested if he did so. This too, may argue for allowing his renunciation to be effective because of practical impossibility.
Moreover, the government must review renunciation requests under the preponderance of the evidence standard. Given the extent of Awalaki’s activities public and presumably private, the govt would have no difficulty demonstrating that he intended to effectuate a renunciation of his citizenship. In other words, he solidified his creed by nature of his deeds.
Under this theory, Awalaki’s renunciation of his US citizenship was effectuated by his verbal oath and acts consistent with such, all viewed in the light of the preponderance of the evidence.
Thus, taking him out by drone would be wholly consistent with the strictures of the Constitution because he was no longer a US citizen entitled to due process of law.
Finally, by serving as an OFFICER in a foreign military, citizenship can be revoked, also without a finding of intent(this is to distinguish from being a low-level soldier, including a conscript).
Entertainingly, one L.H. “Mike” Williams served as a major in the Rhodesian military (Grey’s Scouts) and, upon return to the US, ran for Congress in Florida and hooked up with the whole Soldier of Fortune crew.
Prohibitions against serving in foreign militaries are observed somewhat…spottily, it seems.
I don’t see what special rights Al-Awlaki’s citizenship confers that someone like bin Laden did not have. Can someone explain this part?
I wonder about this too. It’s been awhile since I was in law school, but the constitution doesn’t make this distinction, does it? And I’m not aware of any case law suggesting that US Citizens have additional first, fourth, or fifth amendment rights vis a vis non-citizens. It’s always been my understanding that the bill of rights limits the government’s ability to act regardless of who is being acted upon.
Similarly, if this was an assassination, citizenship would be irrelevant. The law banning assassinations of political leaders was actually written with non-citizens in mind.
If there is anyone reading this who would reverse their opinion about this operation’s legality, constitutionality, morality, or wisdom if al-Awlaki was a Saudi citizen, I’d love to hear your reasoning.
Me! Me!
I think that the US government has a special moral responsibility to US citizens that it doesn’t have to the citizens of other countries. I don’t believe that this changes the legal status of the assassination (and that term has been used in similar strikes, such as the attack on Admiral Isoruku Yammamoto), which is why I don’t claim that the attack on al-Awlaki was illegal. But on the wisdom and morality scales, yes; the targeted assassination of American citizens should be considered a more weighty affair than the assassination of a Saudi national, because the US government has different responsibilities to the two notional individuals.
I would add that it goes both ways; a US citizen fighting under a foreign flag places herself/himself under more serious legal jeopardy than a non-US citizen, and in general his/her actions are considered less morally defensible.
I don’t dispute that there are more moral considerations in a government killing a citizen than a non-citizen. There clearly are.
I dispute that those considerations change the wisdom or morality of this strike, under these circumstances.
I’m not sure I believe you, Robert. Are you saying you would consider it to have been moral and wise to blow up this convoy if Awlaki was a Saudi citizen, reversing your current position that it was immoral and unwise? I don’t recall you saying that about any of the targeted strikes against al Qaeda figures that have been carried out.
The moral responsibility you speak of evaporates when the American citizen goes off to fight for a wartime enemy, just like the criminal-law due process requirement.
Let’s put some flesh on what this additional weight means in terms of judging this strike. Legality and constitutionality aside, we have moral responsibility and a common-sense duty to make sure that the target has actually committed acts that makes it right and good to launch a drone strike against him – it is as you say, a weighty matter – and I don’t think the bar for establishing this should be any lower when we’re contemplating a strike against a Saudi than against an American. Not in the realm of meeting a factual burden of proof, nor in the realm of judging whether someone is dangerous enough to warrant such attention.
“Are you saying you would consider it to have been moral and wise to blow up this convoy if Awlaki was a Saudi citizen, reversing your current position that it was immoral and unwise? I don’t recall you saying that about any of the targeted strikes against al Qaeda figures that have been carried out.”
I certainly would consider it much less problematic. My own problems on the drone war fall much less on the moral or legal issues than on the wisdom; that is, do drone strikes create more terrorists than they kill, etc. Perhaps I haven’t made as clear as I should have, but it certainly would reverse my moral appraisal of the strike.
“I don’t think the bar for establishing this should be any lower when we’re contemplating a strike against a Saudi than against an American.”
And here is where we differ. I do think that the bar should be higher for American citizens, even if a higher bar is not required by the constitution. I think that there are both moral and practical (wisdom) reasons for asking for this higher bar.
The problems I so have with how the drone war is being carried out – which aren’t as broad as yours, but do exist – stem from the same source. Sometimes, I think the focus on the use of drones obscures more important matters, and ignores the very different uses to which they’ve been put in Pakistan vs. Yemen vs. Libya.
What does that mean, in concrete? You’d support a drone strike against Awlaki’s Saudi twin for less significant actions or threats than for Awlaki? You’d authorize a strike based on a lower burden of proof?
Flesh this out for me: what would happen differently based on the nationality of the al Qaeda commander, owing to the greater moral weight you’re talking about?
“You’d support a drone strike against Awlaki’s Saudi twin for less significant actions or threats than for Awlaki? You’d authorize a strike based on a lower burden of proof?
Flesh this out for me: what would happen differently based on the nationality of the al Qaeda commander, owing to the greater moral weight you’re talking about?”
Yes, and yes; I would also request that the evidence used to determine the culpability of the individual be opened to greater public scrutiny in case of an American citizen. The US should also be more willing to take risks (special forces with a capture mission vs. drone attack) in cases where American citizens are the target.
But (and I hasten to add this again) I feel that these are political (in the sense that they bind up moral/practical concerns) rather than legal questions.
See, I wouldn’t support a strike like this against a Saudi national unless the evidence reached the same high standard as that necessary to order a strike against an American.
I guess this just strikes me as extending an unwarranted privilege based on nationality. If they’ve got the right guy, I don’t see how being an American should save an al Qaeda terrorist’s life, and I don’t see how the suspected terrorist’s nationality is relevant to whether or not he’s the right guy.
And I think that the United States government has a special responsibility to US citizens. But I really think that we’ve gotten this down to the point of quibbling over details.
Perhaps its your orientation as a theorist, then, but I think it’s the actual application of a principle, not merely expressing the thought, that makes it real and meaningful.
In terms of this blowback dynamic, wouldn’t it actually be worse to strike the headquarters of a local terrorist leader, than that of an American who moved in and set up shop in another country?
You’re looking at it backwards. Noncitizens have the right to have the bar for killing them be just as high as the bar for killing US citizens.
Interesting Bloggingheads, when Bob Wright lets the other guy talk, from a few weeks ago. Al-Awlaki part starts around 20:55.
I’m not exactly sure where the line gets drawn, but there is a difference between killing an unarmed person on the streets of of a peaceful city (Orlando Letelier), and killing someone who is armed and on the battlefield (Stonewall Jackson). The exact circumstances of this drone attack are not yet clear, but it seems likely that he was with an armed group of insurgents against a friendly government. That, to my mind, would make this a licit military action, and not murder.
Stonewall was shot accidentally by his own army’s pickets while returning to camp.
.
It’s a decent marker. However, since the President is a Democratic one, and specifically Obama….oh, well, never mind.
Okay, a hypothetical Stonewall Jackson who is shot by a member of Howard’s Corps rather than a member of AP Hill’s corps. Or, maybe a better example, Albert Sidney Johnston.
Shorter Farley:
Police work is too hard so Obama said ‘fuck it’ and incinerated a US citizen with a flying killer robot.
No doubt al-Awlaki was plotting in his lair 24 hours a day.
[...] citizenship, there’s a hue and cry al-Awlaki and Khan had their rights violated. They were assassinated rather than brought to justice, denied due process. [...]
Robert Chesney on the pro-assassination side.
No, on the pro-legal side.
Tossing around the word “assassination” is like saying the death penalty is “murder” — emotionally satisfying, perhaps, but if you are going to use a legal word, it has a legal meaning. This isn’t it.
BTW, Ron Paul voted for the 2001 AUMF. There is not American citizen exception, see Hamdi. So, given his recent comments, did he change his mind on it, or what?
Assassination is a killing of a prominent person for political or ideological reasons.
That’s as close to a “legal meaning” as I was able to find in a few legal dictionaries. Perhaps you have another offering–one which explains why a remote-control killing of a noncombatant isn’t an assassination.
This is rather pointless. If you want to define “assassination” this way that doesn’t seem unfair to me, but in that case there’s no question that an assassination of this type would be completely legal under the banner of sanctioned military action.
Then embrace the word. Joe, above, has tried to dodge it. If you support the act, then don’t quibble about the wording.
Well, fair enough I guess. It seems as though this is more of a quibble over how you’re defining “assassination” though.
Actually, it’s pretty straightforward. JfL and Joe above take issue with the use of the word “assassination” as inaccurate and emotionally loaded.
The word is accuurate.
If there is a negative connotation to the word, then maybe we need to look at what the fuck our government is busy doing. Otherwise, embrace the word as you embrace the deed.
You quote me definitions that don’t apply, so I’m not sure what I’m “dodging” here. I’m writing a longer reply now at my blog, but the argument is that this is a legal killing, so it wouldn’t be “murder.” He is not a “political” or “ideological” target but a military one. The Wikipedia entry itself has a discussion on the difference between legal “targeted killings” like this and “assassinations,” which can be used colloquially like the word “murder,” but legally has a meaning and it is not “legitimate hit.”
How do these definitions not apply? The target is not a soldier; he is a propagandist. The “battlefield” is in a country with whom we are not at war. The specific al-Qaeda organization that al-Awlaki claims membership in may or may not be the one that the AUMF was directed against; al-Qaeda’s got more splinters than the PLO, and they’re all pretty autonomous.
Embrace the word, as you embrace the deed. If you advocate assassination, at least have the courage and honesty to admit it, rather than constructing fanciful webs of legalisms to cover it all up.
Says who? Absolutely no one in any position to know is saying so. The justification for this attack was explicitly tied to his role on the operational side, meaning he was killed for being a soldier. A commander, actually.
So was every battlefield in Belgium and the Netherlands. And?
The AUMF targets the people who carried out the attacks, as well as their affiliates.
No matter how superior it makes you feel to write this, your legal argument is still baseless. That’s probably because it isn’t actually a legal argument, but an attempt to push emotional buttons, with some sloppy legal pretexts lathered on for form’s sake.
As usual, you offer quibles and debate-team tactics in place of actually addressing the point.
“Wartime” is a neat trick: the AUMF did not put us into a state of war, with all of the requisite liberties of action. You could, as they say, look it up; please let us know what you find. Likewise, please come up with a definition of “assassination” that somehow excludes killing an unarmed noncombatant from concealment.
“Absolutely no one in any position to know” is actually quite wrong. There’s quite a bit of media attention on this subject; lots of people who have researched al-Awlaki thoroughly debunk the claim that he’s a commander. But heck, no need to try to prove a negative; if he’s a commander, there’s sure to be some evidence. Show us some. Any. We’ll wait.
You speak of legal arguments, but you fail to make or engage any. Give us something other than “the generals are smarter than we are” as an argument and let’s see how that flies.
I addressed every single point you made. That I do so effectively is your problem, not mine.
Good night, Gracie. I apologize for over-estimating your level of knowledge about the subject, and I won’t bother you again.
Among the many legal realities you don’t know: a commander has the same legal status as a trigger-puller.
Another legal fact you don’t know: “We,” meaning you, Mr. Internet Comment Guy, aren’t required to sign off on target selection in a war in order for that selection to be legal.
Is this a joke? You do know that everyone reading this statement of yours can still read everything I’ve written.
I fail to make or engage any legal arguments?
You’re just flailing now.
Actually, I take that back. This is more an attempt to hand waive the definition to argue that a) this was an assassination b) assassinations are illegal therefore c)this was illegal. So in that sense, Joe is right.
If we use your definition, on the other hand, b) doesn’t apply, since obviously all assassinations wouldn’t be illegal.
“My definition” came off of an online law dictionary.
Feel free to supply your own.
Perhaps it will remove the scent from the action.
From http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Assassination :
Murder committed by a perpetrator without the personal provocation of the victim, who is usually a government official.
From http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/assassination/ :
Assassination is a killing of a prominent person for political or ideological reasons.
From Wikipedia:
An assassination is “to murder (a usually prominent person) by a sudden and/or secret attack, often for political reasons.”[1][2] An additional definition is “the act of deliberately killing someone, especially a public figure, usually for hire or for political reasons.”
Again, if you have another definition, please feel free to append it.
I’m not particularly sure why. I don’t necessarily quibble with your definition, all I said was that if we use it, it’s obviously the case that all assassinations aren’t illegal, provided they take place in a sanctioned military engagement.
Unless you think it would be illegal for declared combatants to perpetrate targeted killings against leaders of the opponent for some reason.
Again, as Doc A says, it is about those who favor this action to embrace the fact that it was an assassination by any reasonable definition. It was a targeted killing of a political leader for political reasons, not in a combat situation or war zone, and he was not armed that we know of. While I have issues with this case, I can see legal and moral justifications for assassinations in wartime, but you need to call it what it is and not pretend it is something else.
Honestly, I’m not even going to bother with these silly gymnastics. There was no combat in Bavaria in 1943, but it clearly would have been just fine to kill Hitler there and then. The question remains whether or not al-Awlaki was an al Qaeda leader supporting violence by the organization. The attempts to narrowly define what is and is not a “battlefield” is just obfuscation.
I’m not even going to bother with these silly gymnastics. There was no combat in Bavaria in 1943, but it clearly would have been just fine to kill Hitler there and then.
What part of “I can see legal and moral justifications for assassinations in wartime” did you not understand?
The question remains whether or not al-Awlaki was an al Qaeda leader supporting violence by the organization.
We are in complete agreement on that issue and, if there were compelling proof to the affirmative, I might eve agree with you (I have no problem with the assassination of bin Laden) about Al Alawki. The problem is that, even though the government had the opportunity to prove such ties, it failed to do so while he was in this country. All we have is assertions by the US government that he was an active official with clear ties to Al Qaeda (rather than some imitation like the 9 million Al Qaedas in somewhere else).
And let me add, that even if I thought it was justified, it would still be assassination and should be called that, which was my point in the first place.
Enough bullshit.
You support assassinations under certain circumstances.
Have the courage of your convictions, and say so.
I didn’t think that was unclear at all.
In fact, I think it would be more interesting if you were willing to state that you oppose all assassinations that fall under your definition of the term.
How about I state that I oppose lying and obfuscation, and that if we’re going to torture (we do) and violate due process (we do) and violate the Geneva Accords (we do) and assassinate (guess we cleared that up) that we go ahead and say so, and throw out all of this Shining City On A Hill bullshit and cop to our tough-minded fuck-’em-if-they’re-too-weak-to-force-us-to-comply-with-laws realpolitik?
How ’bout we stop pretending to justification and high-mindedness and admit that we’re not really that different from The Bad Guys?
Jesus, at least we’d be spared all of the Sunday-school maunderings about the Constitution and democracy and the community of nations.
“cop to our tough-minded fuck-’em-if-they’re-too-weak-to-force-us-to-comply-with-laws realpolitik?”
Yep, called that one.
Look harder. We passed a ban on assassinations in the 1970s, and the definition explicitly excludes killing people in the chain of command of wartime enemies.
Except that there is no evidence that al-Awlaki is in anyone’s chain of command, and the al-Qaeda group he’s part of maight or might not be covered under the AUMF. Additionally, he was not killed “hot”–during any kind of fighting or under any kind of tactical pressure–so there’s no excuse for not going through all relevant procedures on him.
If there’s evidence of his being chain of command, let’s see it. If there’s evidence of his being active in anything but propaganda, let’s see it. Otherwise, there was nothing lawful about this assassination, and we’ve now abandoned the pretense that this administration is law-abiding.
Says who? Some internet commenter?
The people who have both the legal authority to make targeting decisions in this war, and have access to the relevant information, say exactly the opposite.
Read the AUMF; it’s quite broad. It uses the term “their affiliates.” There is really no question that it applies to AQAP.
Being “hot” has never been an element of the relevant procedures for striking a military target. Do you have any idea how many planes we’ve blown up on the ground?
It is not only false, but laughably so, to claim that the military has to show you, Doc Amazing, the intelligence used to make a targeting decision during wartime. You are using the word “legal” in a way that has absolutely no connection to any body of law.
So your argument remains “the military need not follow any sort of due process apart from that which they themselves have said that they have followed”. Nice. Good to know that the “national security trumps democracy and due process” argument still has a home in the Democratic Party.
By the logic you’ve set up, there is not limit on the actions that the military may take. By your interpretation of the AUMF, “their affilitates” could be the Syrian Army or the Elks Lodge. Of course, “the people who have the legal authority to make targeting decisions in this war” are all quite honorable and would never overstep their bounds.
This action would have been criminal under Bush. It’s criminal now. Hiding behind the GWOT and the “national security” umbrella is as disgusting as it was during the bombing of Cambodia, during the CIA wars in Central America, and during Bush’s prosecution of the GWOT.
You forgot to add “…in the conduct of operations while prosecuting a war.”
It’s not my argument; it’s the legal and constitutional fact of the matter. There has never, ever, at any point in American history, been any legal requirement whatsoever that the military get anyone else’s sign-off when selecting a target.
This is not a question on which reasonable people can disagree. You either understand the law here, or you don’t.
This is a bit silly. Even George Bush realized that he needed another AUMF to invade Iraq – and there were those who argued that he did not.
Of course they might. This has nothing to do with the legal question, though.
Thank you for your assertion about the law. I will give it all due consideration.
This doesn’t make the slightest sense, unless you think that the affiliations between the Elks lodge and al Qaeda are the same as the affiliations between the AQAP guys who were in the car, and the core al Qaeda guy who was also in the car, when it was blown up.
Send the guy a form allowing him to renounce his citizenship, have him send it back or submit via YouTube.
The most annoying aspect of this discussion is the number of people who resort to the Chomsky Theory of International Law, that is, substituting their personal preference for fact.
As far as I can tell, the only relevant question here is whether he was in fact a member of al Qaeda involved in planning and executing attacks against the U.S. or allied states. If he was, then there’s absolutely no question that the government has the authority to kill him. None. At. All.
Now I suppose we might have an obligation to grab him in the event it was possible to do so without the expectation of casualties, but that didn’t exist here as I understand it. And personally I would have liked to see some sort of judicial oversight here that involved presenting some evidence against al-Awlaki, and someone there representing his interests, but I don’t see any such requirement in the law.
It’s perfectly okay to oppose this action on moral grounds, but as far as I can tell anyone calling it illegal is just blowing smoke out of their ass.
As far as I can tell, the only relevant question here is whether he was in fact a member of al Qaeda involved in planning and executing attacks against the U.S. or allied states. If he was, then there’s absolutely no question that the government has the authority to kill him. None. At. All.
Of course, no one has bothered to attempt to answer that question. We have allegations, but no evidence.
What we have on faith from the Administration: bad guy, plotter.
What we know of a certainty: propagandist, no US convictions, no evidence presented in the open in US courts, invited to the Pentagon following the 9/11 attacks, no evidence of having taken up arms against the US.
But hey, Our Guy Did It, so it’s all cool.
That’s not an unfair point, and like I said I wouldn’t mind a more rigorous process here. Still, I can’t be the only person who finds the idea that the government is expending this many resources to get this guy just for the hell of it a bit dubious. Do you have a theory as to why the government would want to fabricate evidence here?
I don’t need one: the government failed to produce any evidence. No need to fabricate what you don’t show.
Well to rephrase, why would they be lying about his involvement just for the sake of killing him?
Well, to reiterate the point of the whole thing, why not follow some semblance of due process and why not come clean with what they actually know?
There is no need here to prove the administration’s state of mind. The act speaks for itself. The failure even to attempt to show evidence also speaks for itself.
Because as I said, I don’t see any current standard that says this was a violation of due process or other rights. The process probably should be more thorough, but that’s not the same as saying it is.
I’d be interested in your definition of “due process.” Or for that matter “rights.”
Due process is a matter of circumstances. There’s no singular set of due process rights that apply no matter the situation. This was a person who was alleged to be an important operational agent in an organization the U.S. government has duly authroized military action against, hiding in an area with forifications that made logisitcally unfeasible to extract him, and he made no effort or overtures to surrender himself. I don’t see any good argument that his due process rights were violated given the circumstances.
And if we’re just going to assume ill intent absent any compelling to do so, what’s the point of bothering with anything. Who’s to say the administration wouldn’t fabricate evidence?
Given that we’re talking about killing a guy, I fail to see why anyone should be given the benefit of the doubt.
Well if you can’t supply any semblance of a motive, even a bad one, I’d say we’re going beyond benefit of the doubt. But again, I would like for there do be more process involved here. The difference is I’m not using my personal preferences as a stand in for what the law actually is.
Who’s to say the administration wouldn’t fabricate evidence?
Or, indeed to refuse to provide any?
But we’ve accomplished the important thing: we talked shit about Noam Chomsky. That’s far more important than questions of due process.
That would be a large part of my problems with this case. The government actually had the opportunity to present evidence against him in court and could not or would not present any.
How do you imagine that is true? Part of due process is that you have to be there for a trial. The problem was that the man was in Yemen. It’s a geographical problem.
The man was in the US for a great many years before he was in Yemen, and was in countries other than Yemen as well. The idea that al-Awlaki was holed up in some desert fastness for his whole career as a propagandist is not true. He was very accessible for a long time.
For the time he was in the US, he wasn’t working for al Qaeda – at least, not that anyone knew.
So much so that the FBI gave him a pass to the Pentagon.
Yet he’s now the Patton of the Palatine.
Donald Rumsfeld, ladies and gentlemen! Let’s all give him a big hand!
Heckuva a job, Rummy.
He took off when they started questioning him after the Ft. Hood shooting.
In the immortal words of Lesley Gore: You would cry too, if it happened to you. Do you blame the guy for figuring he was going to decorate a cell at Camp Delta?
No, I’d get a lawyer. That’s what he did the first time they investigated him. I don’t know what the difference was, but if I was innocent I sure as hell wouldn’t run to Yemen and start producing internet videos for AQ.
Yeah, ’cause there was no difference between the observation of due process in questioning Muslims between 2001 and 2006.
You might have gotten a lawyer, but you’re kinda in a different demographic.
No, I know plenty of Muslims, *none* of them would have reacted to the FBI questioning them by tearing off to Yemen and calling on Muslims to kill Americans. It’s actually a slur on them to imagine that what he did was some rational reaction.
Oh, silly Ed. Clearly surrendering himself to U.S. authorities and standing trial wasn’t an option because something something something.
The FBI, and everyone else, was actually being a hell of a lot more careful in 2006 than in late 2001.
Who is this “we?” You, personally? The general public?
Do you think your “we” knew what was happening in any of the industrial buildings we bombed in Germany? Do you think they even knew they existed?
Yup, in wartime, targeting decisions are made by people in the military chain of command who know more than you do. And?
And in Germany the ball-bearing factories were part of the industrial war effort, actively pumping out weapons, not propagandists many miles away from a microphone.
And in Germany we did commit war crimes with our choice of targets–see Dresden, as though anyone had to bring that up.
You have a frightening faith in the bona fides of the security state and in the infallibility of the military. If you figure that assassination is a good thing, just say so.
And Awlaki was an operational commander. Your disagreement with this fact is utterly irrelevant to the legal question; the only people whose conclusion about his activities are relevant to the legal question are those in the military chain of command.
And in this case, we didn’t. We didn’t target any civilians, just a high-up in the enemy’s organization. This is exactly the type of sloppy thinking that I’ve come to expect: the US once did something bad, so this must be bad, too.
Nope, I’m just a lot more familiar with the law that you are, and I understand the “Who decides?” questions about target selection better.
No matter how good it makes you feel to write this over and over – always your primary goal in anything you write – it will not make this military strike an assassination under the law.
Clearly you are uninterested in “the law”, as you continue to hew to Nixon/Frost logic–”if the (insert authority here) does it, then it is not illegal”. It isn’t merely a matter of how disgusting it is that the Obama Administration claims to be empowered to send out hit squads against nonmilitary targets (and the lack of evidence presented speaks for itself, protestations of national security not), it’s the abandonment of restraint. Al-Awlaki was today’s target. By your reading of the AUMF, there is nothing to prevent turning the guns on another “al-Qaeda affiliate” using embargoed evidence and military authority.
As the Administration has batallions of lawyers to argue that this is all legal, and as the Roberts court has shown that the national security apparatus is not to be interfered with, you can declare victory–no one can challenge the Administration on this point; they can now target people as they see fit.
The only one I see that’s uninterested in what international law really says, as opposed to what you want it to say, is you. As I said earlier, you keep oscillating between a broad “assassination is illegal” standard and a broad, general definition of what an assassination is. But you can’t argue that assassination is inherently illegal AND define the term far beyond the scope of international law. But it just doesn’t work that way, and there’s nothing illegal about a targeted killing of an official in a state/organization you are waging sanctioned military action against. To think there would be is just patently absurd.
Blah, maybe we need to reconsider the sacrosanct nature of the Westphalian state system.
I guess my quibble comes down to the citizenship aspect-would Al-Awlaki have still considered himself an American citizen? There has to be a point where one’s actions as an adult override where you were born. American citizenship isn’t some indelible part of you that can never be erased.
Sure, there are (that I’m aware of) only a small number of ways you can legally renounce your citizenship, but come on, I seriously doubt he still considered himself an American citizen, and one’s place of birth doesn’t (or shouldn’t) have these kind of long lasting stains upon yourself.
Read up on Paul of Tarsus and the uses of citizenship under fire.
I’m not sure it even matters. People are trying to generalize this far too much to make it into something it’s clearly not. Does this mean we’re going to start killing people in Indianapolis with drone attacks? Of course not. Does it mean we’re going to start killing people in Germany or France with drone strikes? Of course not. In both cases, a target would be arrested (or there’d be an attempt to arrest them anyway), the person would be held in custody and tried.
In this case, however, you had a target who was holed up in an area where capturing them was apparently not logistically feasible, so a targeted strike against them was authorized. Now, if you’re really worried that at some future point some innocent person might be holed up with al Qaeda in an area in which the military won’t risk heavy casualties in order to arrest them and therefore the decision is made to kill them for no particular reason at all…well I don’t actually have any snappy remark to say about that. It kind of speaks for itself.
Honestly, can anyone provide any sort of coherent theory as to why the military would want to expend resources, and the administration take flack from part of its political coalition, just in order to kill this guy for no particular reason?
They made a mistake?
Three mistakes, apparently. See below.
Anwar’s really a good boy. He just fell in with a bad crowd. Just because he was in the car with the chief bomb maker and a close associate of the leadership of core al Qaeda doesn’t mean he was a terrorist or anything.
Maybe he was just hitch hiking. Or maybe they told him they sold urinal cakes. Did you ever think of that?
Dude asked for a coherent theory.
Should have gone with the urinal cakes.
The question I waa answering was “why would they ever do that if he was the wrong guy.” If you want to ask a different question, ask it and we’ll see what happens. The fact that my answer doesn’t satisfy a question you haven’t asked is, as they say, your misfortune and none of my own.
Well that’s not the question I meant to ask. And yes, it is my fault if I was unclear.
I’ve been missing some context here, so it may not be all your fault.
Well that’s possible, I guess, but for practical purposes I’m not sure it has any application going forward.
It’s one of the pragmatic justifications for things like “due process” and “showing your work” and “accountability.”
I get what you’re saying, but I don’t see how it has much in the way of useful application under the circumstances. It’s certainly a reason you want to be thorough in a legal setting, but when the target is considered military in nature and is hiding in an area where extraction isn’t feasible, I don’t know that “maybe we’re wrong” really gets anywhere.
More to the point, I was assuming there needed to be some sort of nefarious intentions. “We were wrong” isn’t quite the same as “for no particular reason.”
I’m not going to go back over the thread, but I believe “for no particular reason” was your paraphrase of a position, not the formulation used by any actual holder of the position. I could be mistaken about that. It happens.
Well yeah, but I was asking for a hypothetical motive. It seems to me that no one has really come up with a non-convincing argument for why the administration would target al-Awlaki if they didn’t think he was engaged in aiding al Qaeda.
BTW, not just “this particular guy.” Also killed in the strike were the publisher of al Qaeda’s propaganda magazine – not just the Arabian Peninsula franchise, but the umbrella organization (so much for “AQAP isn’t al Qaeda”) – as well as the chief bomb maker for AQAP (so much for “Awlaki wasn’t involved in terrorist operations.”)