Well, 2007 has been…interesting. Here’s hoping that all of you send the year out in style, have a happy and healthy new year, and continue to join us daily at LGM throughout 2008.
Archive for December, 2007
Given that 7% of incarcerated women in the United States were pregnant at the time of their sentencing, it’s surprising that the conditions of confinement for pregnant and birthing women and the subsequent treatment of their children doesn’t get more play in the media, or at least in alternative media outlets (ahem). So it was interesting (encouraging?) to see an article in the Times today about a women’s prison in Mexico in which children born to inmates stay with their mothers until they turn 6 years old:
While a prison may seem an unhealthy place for a child, in the early 1990s the Mexico City government decided it was better for children born in prison to stay with their mothers until they were 6 rather than to be turned over to relatives or foster parents. The children are allowed to leave on weekends and holidays to visit relatives.
A debate continues among Mexican academics over whether spending one’s early years in a jail causes mental problems later in life, but for the moment the law says babies must stay with their mothers. So the prison has a school with three teachers.
The warden, Margarita Malo, said the children had a calming effect on the rest of the inmates. The presence of children also inspires the mothers to learn skills or, in many cases, to kick drug habits that landed them in trouble in the first place.
And even though the prison is full of women capable of violence, the children usually walk safely among them, as if protected by an invisible shield. It is as though they tap the collective maternal instinct of the 1,680 women locked up here.
Leaving aside for a moment the “maternal instinct” remark, this is an intriguing idea. In the U.S., only four states even have prison nurseries, nevermind provisions for the rearing of children. Bedford Hills, New York’s maximum security women’s prison, allows children to stay with their mothers until the children are 1 year old, unless the mother will be released within six months. To me, programs and facilities allowing babies to remain with their incarcerated mothers for the first months or years of life seem like no-brainers. Necessities, even.
It’s when the children are older that the question gets trickier, as is clear in the Times article.
Elsa Romero Martínez, a psychologist who runs the school, said the children showed no signs of overly aggressive behavior. There have been few reports of abuse, though one child, suffering bruises, was taken away from a cocaine-addicted mother two years ago.
The thorniest problem she and the teachers face is preparing the children and mothers for separations once the children reach 6. “We have to teach them to say goodbye to the mothers,” she said.
To show them that a wider world exists, the teachers try to take the children on field trips as often as possible. Their budget is limited and they rely on charity for the outings. They have managed only three this year — to a museum, an amusement park and a children’s theater.
How does one explain to a school-age child that they are living in a prison and that they will have to leave their mother soon, and will no longer be able to live with her, despite the fact that this is all the child has known? The Mexico City prison allows children to stay with their mothers regardless of the length or indeterminate nature of the mother’s sentence (many of the mothers in the prison have yet to face trial though they have been incarcerated for years – a problem that would be obviated because of speedy trial requirements in the U.S.). One possible fix to the problem of separating a mother from his or her child at an age when the child is sentient would be to only allow women with short enough sentences to keep their children past age 1 (or some other young age). But should a woman’s right to keep her child with her be so dependent on the length of her conviction? Given the range of sentences for similar crimes and the amount of sentencing discretion afforded to judges, the results would be discomfortingly arbitrary.
So what are we to do? Ultimately, a workable and humane solution remains unclear. But at this point, to even acknowledge that such a problem exists in the U.S. would be a step in the right direction.
Mssrs. Yglesias, Greenwald, Black and Krugman say most of what needs to be said about the Unity 08/Bloomberg/Broder Axis of Vacuous Wankery. To put on my Sanford Levinson hat for a minute, it seems to me one reason why unspecific claims that “something needs to be done” about important issues take such risible forms is that it’s highly impolitic to point out structural defects in the Constitution, which generally has to be taken as unassailable. But the chief obstacle to getting things done isn’t the character of the current political leadership but Madisonian institutional roadblocks. Toning down “partisan rhetoric” would do nothing to change the facts 1)that as long as you control 40 seats in the Senate and/or the White House you can prevent Congressional majorities from accomplishing anything, and 2)the gross malapportionment of the Senate will usually make its membership considerably more reactionary than the median voter. But because we’re meant to understand that the Constitution was handed down in tablet form on Mount Sinai, rather than accepting this fact we’re treated to this farce of adults claiming that all we need is “specific ideas about how to pull the country together.”
It’s worth noting as well that for this reason talk of a mythical “postpartisan” future is beside the point even if the underlying political conflicts that partisan divisions reflect could float away on the wings of unicorns. Even in the Broder Golden Age of Parties when pro-apartheid Democrats made partisan coalitions jumbled, a shockingly high percentage of the core legislation of the New Deal/Great Society state was passed in two small windows not because public officials suddenly decided to be nice to each other but because 1)a very partisan political genius in the White House was supported by 2)overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress. (And even in stage one of the New Deal, the pro-apartheid minority was able to substantially alter the content of the legislative solutions in ways that also made them worse.) Aside from the fact that it’s bizarre to see the status quo ante as preferable, more ideologically incoherent parties would do nothing to change the fact that it’s difficult to for governing parties to find solutions to problems because the Constitution doesn’t give them a fair chance to enact their agendas.
How could this have slipped past the wingnutty?
This Christmas, Santa Claus is leaving his reindeer behind and hitching a ride on… a French warship! The Jeanne d’Arc, a helicopter carrier which serves as a training ship for French navy midshipmen, will dock into New York Harbor on Friday December 28 carrying over 10,000 books destined for disadvantaged American students, giving new meaning to the expression “turning swords into ploughshares.” The French books, including dictionaries and textbooks, but also novels and comic books, will be offered to the children participating in New York’s newly launched French-English dual-language programs, as well as to New Orleans schools devastated by hurricane Katrina.
A delegation of students from the Jordan L. Mott Middle School (CIS 22) in the Bronx, one of the three schools that have launched a French-English dual-language program this year (the other two are PS 125 in Harlem and PS 58 in Brooklyn), will be welcomed on-board the ship at 2pm on the 28 th. Following a performance by their school band and a tour of the two French ships (the Jeanne d’Arc will be accompanied by the antisubmarine warfare destroyer Georges Leygues), they will take delivery of the books on behalf of all the schools involved. Sixty of the eighty crates will remain in New York, while the rest will be shipped overland to New Orleans.
In addition to the general threat posed by French collaboration with the potentially revolutionary American underclass, we would be foolish to discount French territorial revanchism; as we know, French foreign policy has long been animated by a burning desire to restore les couleurs over New Orleans…
Over the break I finished Vincent O’Hara’s U.S. Navy Against the Axis. I strongly recommend it to anyone with an interest in the Pacific War, and in surface naval combat in the 20th century in general.
O’Hara makes the argument that surface combat in the Pacific is tremendously understudied, and that it contributed far more to the eventual decision that is commonly given credit. Carrier battles were consequential but rare; especially in the Solomons, surface combat made the difference between victory and defeat. As a strategy for emphasizing the relevance of the subject matter this makes sense, and I’m willing to go along with it up to a point. Certainly the surface battles of the second half of 1942 helped determine the fate of the Solomons; had the early Japanese advantage been more pronounced, or if they had made better operational decisions and accepted some additional risk, the IJN might well have driven the USN from the Solomon Islands simply with surface units. However, I’m not sure just how far that goes. To consider the relative impact of surface and carrier engagements, imagine an alternative scenario in which the Japanese win a resounding victory at Midway. Such a victory would, in all likelihood, have “decided” the Solomons campaign such that no campaign would have taken place. The larger point is that the carrier battles in 1942 and 1944 may have been rare, but their outcome set the strategic and operational terms under which surface combat would be conducted. I don’t think that O’Hara would disagree with any of this, but it’s nevertheless important to emphasize that carrier combat set the terms for the rest of the war.
For academic purposes the book is a godsend. That is, it’s a godsend for anyone who’s ever thought about putting together a research project based on an analysis of Pacific theater naval battles, a population which probably amounts to me and a small handful of other academically inclined naval enthusiasts. The battles are divided into campaigns, and each battle is accompanied by a table listing the launch date, major armament, speed, and fate of every major combatant. As the book is about all USN surface combat, not just that which took place in the Pacific, he includes a chapter on the action against the French fleet at Casablanca during Operation Torch. The carrier battles aren’t included, although they are briefly summarized in the campaign histories. I found this a trifle jarring, but it made sense in context of what he was trying to do with the book.
The book gives a good overview of Japanese and American surface doctrine throughout the war. Early in the war, of course, the 24″ Long Lance torpedo proved a great advantage for the Japanese, although not as much of one as is commonly supposed. American surface effectiveness increased considerably when a) effective torpedoes became available, and b) when commanders developed an effective torpedo attack doctrine. Both of these developments were critical, and helped turn the tide in the Solomons campaign. American gunfire, especially as provided by the 5″/38 gun, also eventually proved to be a great asset. Japanese tactical and operational doctrine, although advanced at the beginning of the war, was less flexible than that of the USN. In particular, O’Hara notes that the Japanese successfully conserved their major surface units (battleships and heavy cruisers) through 1942 and 1943 to no great effect; the units that might have been decisive in 1942 were overwhelmed in 1944. Also, in spite of what has become their historical reputation, Japanese commanders demonstrated considerable tentativeness in battle, and in many cases pursued risk-averse tactics that precluded them from following up major opportunities. The USN officer corps proved far more flexible, aggressive, and capable than its IJN counterpart.
O’Hara has only a minimal discussion of the role of the older US battleships, apart from the action in Surigao Strait and the strategic situation following Pearl Harbor. Earlier this year, an LGM correspondent forwarded me this article, in which David Fuquea argues that the older battleships were underutilized in the Pacific campaign, particularly towards the latter part of the Solomons campaign. Fuquea suggests that the older ships had enough speed to intercept Japanese ships in the Slot, and enough firepower to tip the balance strongly in the US favor. The major objections to using the battleships seem to have regarded fuel efficiency and vulnerability. The former makes sense, but apparently does not apply by the late 1942 portion of the campaign. The latter does not make sense; it seems that the older battleships were simultaneously considered too valuable to risk, yet to useless to use. Given that the USN (and the Allied navies in general) was lousy with old slow battleships by 1943, it seems to me that the use of the older ships would have been worth the risk. Had the Second Battle of Gualdalcanal gone differently, and had USS Washington been sunk or seriously damaged, the use of the older ships in the Slot may have been forced in any case.
O’Hara also briefly discusses some tantalizing missed engagements. In his review of the battles of Leyte Gulf, he mentions three; Hyuga, Ise, and the surviving surface elements of Ozawa’s force against American cruisers in a night action, three of Oldendorf’s battleships (California, Tennessee, and Pennsylvania) against Kurita off Samar, and the Iowa, New Jersey, and attendant cruisers and destroyers against Kurita following the latter’s retreat towards San Bernadino Strait. It is of course beyond the scope of O’Hara’s work to discuss battles that never happened, but it’s nevertheless interesting to think about how the engagements would have played out, especially the latter two. I’m inclined to think that in both cases the American ships would have prevailed against Kurita’s battered, disorganized, and demoralized force, but either would probably have been tight in spots. Evan Thomas recently published a book on Kurita, Halsey, and Leyte Gulf which I’ll review at some point; it’s more readable than the O’Hara for a non-specialist, but isn’t as strong overall.
I was extremely happy with the book, and heartily recommend it. Here and there I could quibble with various points (was the USS Washington really the most powerful battleship in the world in November 1942? Advocates of the Duke of York, the Yamato, and the South Dakota class might have cause for complaint…), but overall it’s an outstanding piece of work.
Admittedly, despite the lack of overarching historical significance yesterday where exciting comebacks are concerned I was more emotionally invested in the Flames’ later one against what in terms of its current personnel and management has to be far and away the most loathsome team in professional sports. But the game on every network in the country yesterday turned out to be an excellent one. And while I would in general have been rooting for the underdog, I’m actually happy the Patriots did it. The underdog thing is less compelling because the teams that could stop the Patriots from winning a championship are as bad or worse — any decent person has to hope they’ll pummel the Cowboys senseless if it comes to that. And I’m especially glad they went undefeated and hope they’ll now win because I’ve never seen any players less gracious about having a record broken than the ’72 Dolphins (who are also the Dolphins, and are based in Florida, so they’re already hateful before their specific odious actions.) In some way it’s understandable because had they not exploited an extremely weak schedule to go undefeated they wouldn’t even be in the discussion of the greatest team ever, but that’s all the more reason to be happy that the regular season record is now shared by a genuinely great team.
Plus, it makes Gregg Easterbrook cry.
In happier Slate-related affairs, Dahlia Lithwick’s compilation of the Bush administration’s “dumbest legal arguments of the year” is well worth the time. In answer to the obvious question — “only ten?” — Lithwick points out that such a list is only possible if Abu Gonzales receives an entry entirely to himself.
God, what a crappy year it’s been.
Of course Bill Kristol has been hired by the Times; why should having seemingly endless access to other media outlets despite having no discernible expertise about anything and being consistently wrong about everything stop him from getting a prestigious gig on an allegedly liberal op-ed page? And, of course, the response to this latest reactionary affirmative action hire will be that they need even more conservatives…