Stability Operations and Network-Centric Warfare

The discussion here at Wilton Park has not made me any more optimistic about the commitment of the US Army to stability operations. The US continues to seem more committed to pursuing high tech transformation, embodied by Future Combat Systems, than to developing a serious low intensity capability.

I should say that there isn’t an inherent contradiction between network centric warfare and low intensity operations. Network centric warfare is about rendering the battlefield intelligible and therefore plastic. Commanders receive a tremendous amount of data about the battlefield in short order, and communications technology allows the interpretation and transmission of that data such that fire and force can be allocated in a very fast and efficient manner. The digital transformation holds great promise for high-intensity warfare, where knowing about the battlefield, communicating vertically and horizontally, and being able to direct firepower efficiently can lead to and extremely effective force. While the necessity to efficiently direct fire isn’t as important in low intensity operations (firepower isn’t as important), knowing more about the situation, and being able to communicate vertically and horizontally in an efficient way, are always good things.

However, network centric military units have drawbacks in low intensity situations. The sort of intelligence required to execute peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations differs from the intelligence needed in high intensity warfare. The primary difficulty in low intensity operations is differentiating the enemy from the environment, including, most notably, the local population. Technology is only of limited assisstance in this project. It is also thought that highly digitized military units will be easier for commanders to manipulate. In high intensity warfare this is a good thing; central commanders should know where there units are, what they can do, and where they’re going. In low intensity warfare, lower level officer initiative seems to be more critical to success, as only a limited amount of the sort of information critical to success (local morale and mood, for example) can be transmitted to high level commanders.

There are also some basic tradeoffs that may make digitized warfare unsuitable for low intensity operations. We only have soldiers for a limited amount of time, and they can only engage in so much training. High intensity, network centric operations require a great deal of specialized training, and its unclear where other types of training will fit in. Finally, digital units are expensive, which means that they can be deployed in lower numbers. This may be the biggest problem of all, given that there seems to be a consensus regarding the importance of numbers in stability operations.

Without going into too much detail (Chatham House Rule), it looks as if the major military organizations of the West are approaching the question of network centric warfare in low-intensity operations in different ways. The French seem fully aware that there is a contradiction, but are pushing forward with digitization in any case. The Germans are very interested in network centric warfare, but seem to believe that it enhance their low intensity capabilities. Indeed, at least some of them see digitization as the means of moving away from high intensity operations. I find this odd. The Americans remain committed to network-centric warfare, and appear to hope that it will work out well in low-intensity operations, although I didn’t see much to convince me that this would be the case.