Operation Spider’s Web
By 
We’re now a few days out and have some perspective on Ukraine’s successful attacks against several Russian airfields. To briefly get this out of the way, the attacks were perfectly legal under any conception of the laws of war. The targets selected were military in nature and were directly tied to the current conflict. I could see some objections if Ukraine was attacking military assets that weren’t associated with the capabilities that Russia is using to fight the war in Ukraine, which would include parts of the nuclear enterprise, including the nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet and the ICBM force. But generally speaking proportionality only applies to attacks that damage both military and civilian targets, and in any case it’s irrelevant here because the bombers that Ukraine struck are an integral part of Russia’s war effort.
So the question becomes whether the attacks were wise, rather than whether they were legal. I see six possible lines of thought, depending mostly on how and whether Russia escalates. These aren’t necessarily exclusive.
- Russia escalates horizontally by attacking targets in Europe: This one seems very unlikely, as the Ukrainians evidently were careful to keep both the Americans and Europeans far away from the planning and execution of the attack. This would be a huge win for the Ukrainians and I’m pretty sure the Russians aren’t stupid enough to do it.
- Trump uses this attack as an excuse to step back: We’re not seeing this so far. There’s chatter in Trumpland about how the attacks were reckless and showed that Ukraine is uninterested in peace, but since Kyiv has been pretty cooperative thus far with Trump’s peace initiative it’s not obvious that those positions are going to stick. It’s very easy to sell this attack as part of ongoing military operations, especially given that Trump has complained publicly and directly about the Russians using these very military assets to hit Ukrainian civilian targets. But you never know.
- Europe gets spooked by the attack: As I argued previously, attacking any part of the nuclear enterprise is a really big deal, and it wouldn’t be all that surprising if some European governments got spooked by the implications. I’ve done some searching but it doesn’t look like we’re seeing that so far. Obviously anything that gives Europe cold feet about continuing to support Ukraine is bad; at the same time, reaffirming that Ukraine can and will hurt Russia helps to indicate that support for Kyiv isn’t wasted.
- Russia hardens its negotiating position: This one is rough because I tend to resist arguments in any political context that the enemy is already at maximum effort and therefore we shouldn’t be worried about escalation. These arguments are often applied in both domestic and international contexts and they’re almost always wrong. In this case, however… eh. The Russian negotiating position hasn’t really changed at all in quite a long time and I think the burden of evidence is pretty heavy for folks arguing that Russia will moderate if Ukraine stops fighting. The fact that Ukrainian negotiating flexibility hasn’t budged the Russians an inch so far also makes me doubt that the Russian negotiation position is all that sensitive to gestures of goodwill.
- Nothing happens: Russia makes a conventional response that does not differ substantially in degree or method from the attacks that Russia regularly launches against Ukraine. This seems most likely to me, and it’s a big Ukrainian win. Russia has been hurt militarily by these attacks and has lost long-term military assets that are difficult to replace. Ukraine has also created a sense of vulnerability, because Moscow has to wonder whether Ukraine has the capabilities in position to launch additional attacks, attacks which could be directed against other parts of the nuclear enterprise or against Russian political leadership.
- Russia escalates vertically by using one or more nuclear weapons. Ukraine loses in this scenario. Russia also loses in this scenario, albeit in a different way. We’re already deep in “nuclear taboo” territory because Russia is paying immense costs to wage a conventional war that it could rapidly win through the extensive use of nuclear weapons. Moscow has assessed that the costs (both diplomatic and environmental) of nuclear use outweigh the benefits, but that assessment could change.
And so… we will see. Putin has promised to respond, and much depends on the nature of that response.
Here are some links:
- Franz Stefan-Gady on the military implications of Operation Spiderweb.
- The Economist on how the op was conducted.
- Max Boot on the implications for future air force operations.
- Loss assessments from open source data.
Photo Credit: By Ssu.gov.ua, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=166583071