Deterring the PRC

Some thoughts on an exceedingly dangerous policy idea…

Deterrence is a difficult and complex thing; often we don’t know if a competitor has been deterred, or simply did not intend to do the thing that we don’t like. Sometimes a word of caution is sufficient to deter.  Sometimes a promise of support is enough; sometimes a brigade and a squadron of interceptors is necessary. We have seen this dynamic play out in NATO, as the United States has steadily increased its commitments to the Baltic states as concerns over Russian aggression have grown.

The shifting stance of the Biden administration on Taiwan almost inevitably spurs the question of whether the United States eventually needs to pre-position equipment and personnel on Taiwan in order to deter a Chinese attack?

In other news I’ve been chewing this argument over, which essentially boils down to the case that there are real trade-offs between underwriting the Ukrainian war effort and maintaining readiness for a China contingency. I think that the concerns are real, but are outweighed by four factors:

1. The time horizons don’t match; there’s no indication that China is about to invade Taiwan, and so most Ukraine-related shortfalls can be remedied before a conflict with China is likely.
2. There are some systems which would be necessary in both theaters, but generally speaking the weapons needed to deter China are not the same as those needed to help Ukraine fight Russia.
3. China and Russia are linked tightly enough at the moment that inflicting damage on Russia tends to hurt China. This one I’ll grant is speculative and requires building out a few assumptions, but in the end I don’t think a weak Russia helps China.
4. We are learning many lessons about modern high-intensity war from the experience in Ukraine, and given the tight interaction between US and Ukrainian forces it’s likely we’re learning more than the Chinese.