Texas is about to execute someone for a murder he did not commit and was only peripherally involved with. During every discussion of the death penalty around here, at least one commenter will recount an anecdote of an especially horrible crime committed by someone who was executed, which would be relevant if the states systematically limited the death penalty to very worst crimes, but of course it does no such thing. Foster deserves some jail time, and carries some measure of moral and legal responsibility for the killing he didn’t commit, plan, or intend, but he obviously doesn’t deserve to be executed even if you support the death penalty.
On the other hand, I’m sure getting Fredo Gonzales involved in state death penalty prosecutions will make the system much more fair. In case you had any illusions that reducing the habeas power of federal courts was about “states’ rights…”
Jane and BT note Dr. Helen’s bizarre claims in her Pajamas Media advice column that “manliness” means that you should “get The Dangerous Book for Boys [wow, Insta or Mrs. Pundit plugging that book, what a surprise!] and build a treehouse, make a go-cart…” One strain that runs through both Reynolds and Smith is they apparently have never even considered that not every single person in the country lives in a massive house in a dreary exurb somewhere, and hence everyone has plenty of space to build go-karts. Anyway, given that I’m not sure where I’d put a treehouse in my apartment or who would use it, and that her hubby’s “manliness” seems to be instantiated primarily by advocating killing lots of foreigners in ways that also undermine American security interests, I think I’ll take a pass on having them evaluate my masculinity.
OK, Chris Matthews is is a creepy sexual harasser. And his show contains virtually no useful content (well, unless Ezra is on.) But on the other hand, he has to stay on the air because he gets such incredibly high ratings! Er, maybe not. (Maybe Glenn Beck stays on the air to make every crappy, low-rated reactionary talk show host look better by comparison.)
Phil Rizutto has passed away; in an ironic twist of sabermetric fate, cutting edge defensive statistics suggested that his election to the HOF wasn’t the pressure-politics travesty it always seemed to be. He was certainly an NYC icon if nothing else. And he did contribute some subtle single-entendres to some classic pop cheese:
He was glowin’ like the metal at the edge of a knife! R.I.P.
No matter what else happens in this world, it’s oddly reassuring to know that you can always count on Fred Barnes to be the most abject administration lickspittle imaginable. (In its own perverse way, it shows more intergrity than people who acted like him for 5 years and are now deserting the ship because it’s crashed through the bottom of the ocean.) Perhaps my favorite part is, after Barnes has lavishly praised Rove for pulling of the miraculous feat of getting a wartime incumbent a narrow victory over a less-than-compelling opponent by mobilizing the conservative base, he says that “And it was Bush’s dip in popularity, not anything Rove did or didn’t do, that wiped out any White House influence on immigration.” Um, since when is the president’s popularity somehow entirely independent of his chief political consultant? What exactly is Rove’s job? Just kinda sitting there being the “greatest political mind of any generation” while unpopular policy initiative drag down the president’s popularity entirely independent of his influence, I guess…
I do wonder why the greatest political mind in world history thought it was a good idea to expend tons of resources in an expensive, unwinnable state during a razor-thin campaign, though…
I think Andrew J. Bacevich sums it up well: “The cult of Petraeus exists not because the general has figured out the war but because hiding behind the general allows the Bush administration to postpone the day when it must reckon with the consequences of its abject failure in Iraq.” The rest of the article is worth reading too.
Although this isn’t quite the Atrios link he’s craving (to put it mildly), Yglesias has a good point about the frequent indisinguishability of the arguments of “hawks” and (at least American) “liberal hawks” here:
This business, in short, short, about how maintaining security in an Iraq-sized country requires 450,000-550,000 troops, while it was something you could tell from the historical evidence, was ignored not just by Don Rumsfeld, Doug Feith, and George W. Bush, but by essentially all war proponents across the political spectrum. The reason is pretty clear — there would have been no war had its advocates made accurate forecasts about the levels of resources required. Among other things, someone might have noted that the US Army doesn’t have enough soldiers to deploy several hundred thousands troops to Iraq on anything resembling a sustained basis.
Similarly, we also wouldn’t have had a war if Iraq wasn’t portrayed as a grave security that had to be invaded right now, before the inspections which would prove Saddam had nothing at all were completed. While democracy was mentioned as a side benefit by most supporters and perhaps emphaszied more by liberal hawks, there’s no chance that a “Iraq poses no threat to American security argument but is a despotism almost as repressive as his American-allied neighbor so we need to invade now” argument was going to fly.
To add on brief point to Ezra’s follow-up to his merciless demonstration of how many ways liberal hawks erred, wasn’t Pollack’s original case based primarily on the alleged threat Saddam posed to the United States, rather than democratization? It seems to me that Packer’s characterization of the relevant argument as “Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction and has never stopped trying to develop them” is a little disingenuous; a more accurate rendering, it seems to me, would be “Saddam poses a major threat to the United States because he has WMDs and will inevitably acquire more fairly quickly.” I don’t recall a lot of liberal hawks claiming that Hussein didn’t have WMDs, even as the inspections were turning up bupkis, but maybe someone has some examples. A lot of liberal hawks, like hawks in general, claimed after the fact that Saddam’s lack of WMDs wasn’t a big deal, but I don’t think that argument was made contemporaneously very much.
The fundamental problem I had with the classic “girlfriend in Canada” excuse is that it’s much less effective when you actually, ah, went to college in Canada. I am reminded of a friend who had a mythical girlfriend in Port Hope, or “Port of No Hope” as it was thereafter known on my dorm floor…
…Tracy Clark-Flory has more. Matt is right, of course, that the emphasis on (still almost certainly inaccurate) medians is to make reinforcing the virgin/whore complex easier. My favorite example remains Leon Kass’s assertion that “[m]any, perhaps even most, men in earlier times avidly sought sexual pleasure prior to and outside of marriage.But they usually distinguished, as did the culture generally, between women one fooled around with and women one married, between a woman of easy virtue and a woman of virtue simply. Only respectable women were respected; one no more wanted a loose woman for one’s partner than for one’s mother.” See, although logically men having premarital sex with women would logicially seem to have to be having sex with women, women who have sex before marriage aren’t really women at all, so why question the numbers? And call me crazy, but the existence of these norms (albeit usually in subtle form than when expressed by Bush’s favorite bioethicist) may just make self-reporting in surveys unreliable.
Shorter Treason-In-Defense-of-Slavery Yankee: Those idiots in the MSM can’t even fact-check transparently obvious one-liners to establish their empirical validity! How can anybody take anything they say seriously? LOL!
Next week: Beauchamp writes that Iraq in the summer is “hotter than a blast furnace.” TIDOSY conducts an extensive investigation and finds, in fact, that a blast furnace is hotter than Iraq, further embarassing the illiterate editors at TNR.
. . . addendum from d: Bob Owens’ update is a true classic in the genre:
The first experience most of us had with Beauchamp was with his last article first, and his allegation that he verbally assaulted a burn victim. It doesn’t seem much of a stretch from abuser of the burned to robber of the dead, so I took his comments at face value as a real claim.
I completely understand. My first experience with Bob Owens was when he claimed that Google was deliberately pushing “Baby Jesus Buttplugs” on Christmas. From there, it didn’t seem like much of a stretch to conclude that he’s an idiot.
One of the key grafs from the Atlantic article about Rove is this one, which contains the explanation for why Rove’s ambitions to create a McKinley-like realignment were always doomed (leaving aside Mayhew’s entirely correct point that realignments are longer-term and more complex processes than are usually assumed):
One of the big what-ifs of his presidency is how things might have turned out had he stuck with it (education remains the one element of Rove’s realignment project that was successfully enacted). What did become clear is that Rove’s tendency, like Bush’s, is always to choose the most ambitious option in a list and then pursue it by the most aggressive means possible—an approach that generally works better in campaigns than in governing. Instead of modest bipartisanship, the administration’s preferred style of governing became something much closer to the way Rove runs campaigns: Steamroll the opposition whenever possible, and reach across the aisle only in the rare cases, like No Child Left Behind, when it is absolutely necessary. The large tax cut that Bush pursued and won on an almost party-line vote just afterward is a model of this confrontational style. Its limitations would become apparent.
It should be noted that, for the first term, the “50%+1″strategy was, in fact a very effective governing tool. Bush was very successful at getting his agenda through Congress despite his narrow “victory” precisely because he ignored vacuous invocations of “mandates” and realized that your power in domestic policy is about how many votes you can get in Congress, and simply getting the minimum necessary coalition allowed for the maximum policy gains. But this strategy is entirely incompatible with a long-term realignment, which requires adding allies rather than simply paying off existing ones. Social Security, among some other New Deal policies, worked for FDR precisely because they created the large coalition of supporters (although this meant not getting some things he wanted and making some horrible compromises with Southern Democrats.) And because of this existing constituency, privatizing social Security was never going to be broadly popular or an effective coalition-building device. Seeking the minimum possible winning coalition is never going to be compatible with engineering a major realignment, and Bush’s historically narrow victory as a wartime president with a decent economy makes clear. And even worse for Rove, 50%+1 becomes a lot less effective as the President becomes less popular, and hopeless on domestic policy when you’ve lost Congress.