Author Page for Robert Farley

Scoundrels

As you may have noted with horror, we have added a tip jar to the sidebar. Our only compensation for LGM thus far has been the promise (not yet fulfilled) of a pitcher of beer from Erik Loomis. So, if you like what we do enough to contribute a buck, then contribute a buck.

Of course, bloody difficult to sell what we can barely give away for free. . .

Thanks very much.

Baseball Play by Play

This morning, the Yankees have sent out Tanyon Sturtze to face Bruce Chen of the Baltimore Orioles. Although both Chen and Sturtze are having decent seasons, neither have the reputation of being the second coming of Lefty Grove.

Thus, my mild surprise when, following a Derek Jeter single to lead off the first inning, the announcer asks “Do you think they’ll have Cano bunt?”

Fortunately (or unfortunately, as the case may be), Joe Torre is not actually a moron. Rather than pissing away an out to get Jeter to second, he let Cano take a walk, which was quickly followed by a colossal Gary Sheffield home run.

Little ball. Either that, or three run home runs.

Adios

The Mariners designated Bret Boone for assignment this afternoon, calling up Jose Lopez and Chris “Doyle” Snelling.

During his first stint with the Mariners, Bret Boone looked like a championship caliber player in the making. After the 1993 season, the Mariners traded Boone for Bobby Ayala and Dan Wilson. Wilson remained the starting catcher for 11 years, and of Ayala, the less said the better. Boone had an excellent 1994, then descended into several years of mediocrity for the Reds, Braves, and Padres.

The Mariners signed Boone to a 1 year, $3 million contract in 2001, just after letting A-Rod go. Boone proceeded to have one of the best seasons ever by a second baseman, and along with Ichiro, Freddy Garcia, and Mike Cameron helped lead the 2001 team to 116 wins. The Mariners signed Boone to a $24, 3 year extension, and he responded by having an good 2002, an outstanding 2003, and a very mediocre 2004. He won a Gold Glove in 2004 at second base, but clearly didn’t deserve it, as his defense seemed to collapse after 2003. He’s been poor both at the plate and in the field in 2005.

I won’t miss Bret Boone as much as I miss Mike Cameron or Carlos Guillen. It’s time for him to leave, and he really has a talent for coming off as an asshole (although I’m told that Carlos Guillen also has that characteristic). His blond highlights are entertaining enough when he’s hitting, and just stupid looking when he’s not. Still, it is kind of sad to see another member of the 2001 team leave. The only regulars left from that team are Ichiro, Jamie Moyer, Ryan Franklin, and Joel Pinero, and only Ichiro is likely to be around next year.

Adios, Bret. Hope you find a job in Minnesota or San Diego.

Filing Rob

Stupid test. Via Lindsay.

The things I am mildly surprised at are:

I’m a little bit farther toward the libertarian on the liberty/authority divide than I expected.

I’m more of an asshole than I had previously believed (Altruism 1, Co-operation 5). Moreover, those numbers are in comparison to other adult men, rather than to the population as a whole, and that demographic has no shortage of assholes.

I have never thought of myself as neurotic (69).

I didn’t realize how achievment averse I was (0), although it does seem to explain a lot.

Survey
Age: 31
Gender: Male
Location: Seattle, Washington
Religion: None
Occupation: Academic
Began blogging (dd/mm/yy): 05/31/04

Political Compass Results
Economic Left/Right: -4.25
Social Libertarian/Authoritarian: -6.00

EXTRAVERSION: 55 (Average)
Friendliness: 53
Gregariousness: 93
Assertiveness: 70
Activity Level: 14
Excitement-Seeking: 20
Cheerfulness: 58

AGREEABLENESS: 11 (Low)
Trust: 74
Morality: 13
Altruism: 1
Co-operation: 2
Modesty: 5
Sympathy: 59

CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: 24 (Low)
Self-Efficacy: 27
Orderliness: 72
Dutifulness: 22
Achievement-Striving: 0
Self-Discipline: 6
Cautiousness: 76

NEUROTICISM: 69 (High)
Anxiety: 51
Anger: 92
Depression: 58
Self-Consciousness: 50
Immoderation: 91
Vulnerability: 32

OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE: 49 (Average)
Imagination: 75
Artistic Interests: 15
Emotionality: 14
Adventurousness: 12
Intellect: 71
Liberalism: 96

Track List:
1. Philosophy, et cetera – pixnaps.blogspot.com – pixnaps97a2
2. Lawyers, Guns and Money

Friday Cat Blogging. . . Stromboli

More German Electoral Analysis

You can never have too much. . .

Detroit

I love Detroit.

I have roots in Detroit on both sides of my family. My old man spent many of his formative years (the 18+ formative years) in Detroit during the 1960s and 1970s. My aunt still lives there.

Much of my affection for Detroit, I must admit, comes from my fondness for post-apocalyptic films. Driving through Detroit is not unlike spending some time in The Road Warrior or Escape From New York. Detroit serves as America’s relic of the industrial age. Land prices are so low that it doesn’t even make sense to tear down old buildings. Go to Detroit now and you’ll still find Tiger Stadium, even though it’s been abandoned for six years.

Many of the oldest buildings are being torn down, including the massive Packard plant. Although I can understand why people would feel that advertising urban decay isn’t the best strategy for renewal, I think that city is making a mistake by attempting to destroy many of the old, abandoned buildings. Marketed cleverly, the Fabulous Ruins of Detroit might attract tourism rather than dissuade investment.

In any case, take the tour, and try to make it to Detroit before the next old building is torn down.

Chinook in Afghanistan

I hope these people aren’t dead, but I also hope they’re not in the possession of the Taliban. Afghani treatment of captured Soviet prisoners during the 1980s was brutal.

UPDATE: 13 dead, 7 unaccounted for. This report from Afghanistan is neither reassuring nor surprising.

UPDATE: All appear to be accounted for.

Raise a Glass to Lord Nelson

Today is the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.

Admiral Horatio Nelson was the Royal Navy commander at Trafalgar. Without going into too much detail, the British victory at Trafalgar accomplished very nearly the complete annihalation of a larger French and Spanish naval fleet. As much as or more than any other major military victory (with the possible exception of some of Robert E. Lee’s victories in the Civil War, or Hannibal’s victories at Cannae or Lake Trasimene), the outcome of the Battle of Trafalgar can be attributed to the genius of the commander, rather than to the material and doctrinal assets at his disposal. An ordinary commander might have won a victory at Trafalgar, but Nelson employed unorthodox and, really, shocking tactics designed to achieve a battle of annihilation. Nelson paid for his victory with his life, as he took a bullet to the spine and died soon after the battle.

The anniversary was marked by the first royal fleet review since 1977, and only the fourth since 1944. The French and Royal Navies participated in a mock re-enactment of Trafalgar, without mention of the name of the battle and with designation only as “blue” and “red” teams. Trafalgar has taken on a significance well beyond its importance in the Napoleonic wars, and navies from around the world participated.

The Battle of Trafalgar cemented in the British and American mind, at least, the importance of naval power. This is odd, because the battle failed to transform the balance of power in Europe at the time. The power of France was on land, and the Battle of Austerlitz a few weeks after Trafalgar would prove far more conseqential. Indeed, while France could not defeat Great Britain without destroying the Royal Navy, Britain could make only limited forays onto the continent to harass the Napoleonic empire. Only the power of the Russian Army, combined with Prussian and British forces, was able to bring the war to a close.

Nevertheless, Trafalgar fueled the theory that naval power would provide the key to world domination. To some extent this was true, as Great Britain came to control colonies all over the world. It missed, however, the crucial importance of land power, something Bismarck, for example, understood. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan popularized these theories in The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. The example of Nelson probably made the Royal Navy admirals of World War I more willing to accept unnecessary risks, a tendency which the Germans were unable to take advantage of but might have used to devastating effect. Lord Nelson himself posthumously received a square in the center of London, which is really pretty cool. The Victory, Nelson’s flagship, remains in drydock, available to tourists.

The Trafalgar fleet review evokes a couple of thoughts about the current state of Europe. If we needed another example of the lack of importance of military force in modern Europe, the Trafalgar review would prove quite useful. The Royal Navy is now, for the first time in a VERY long time, smaller and less powerful than the French Navy. This doesn’t seem to bother anyone, although both countries have fought wars about it in the past. Second, the need to generalize the naval re-enactment suggests that questions of identity remain crucial in Europe, although they no longer manifest themselves in violence. This is interesting, as it tends to confirm arguments identity conflict is malleable, rather than a given.

In any case, please raise a glass to the good admiral, Lord Horatio Nelson.

UPDATE: I am, of course, an idiot. As Jeff points out in comments, the actual anniversary is October 21. However, the observance and re-enactment happened yesterday. My response to this error? Two glasses to Lord Nelson.

Worse than Brooks?

Erik drops a much needed rock on John Tierney’s head:

Here’s the real point of Tierney’s argument. The expansive federal government has squeezed the economic life out of Native Americans and they are trying to do the same to the rest of us with their regulations, bureaucracy, and anti-growth policies. And maybe you can make this argument if you base your entire understanding of Indian history on a couple of right-wing economists and you don’t read ANY of the massive amount of history, anthropology, sociology, and Native American oral tradition that has been produced on this subject.

Read the whole thing.

China, Part II: In Defense of Ambiguity

Part I: Foreign Policy Conflict

I argued in the first part of this series that the United States and China have relatively few direct foreign policy disputes, and even fewer that might conceivably lead to some form of military conflict. Taiwan is the big exception to this general rule. While I don’t believe that China is likely to launch an unprovoked attack on Taiwan anytime soon, I do think that the PRC will fight a war to prevent Taiwanese independence, even if that means fighting the United States. Moreover, I think that any clarification of the policy of ambiguity will serve to either make Taiwan more likely to declare independence or to make the PRC more likely to attack. In this part of the series, I discuss the diplomatic and political elements of the Taiwan problem. In the next section, I’ll discuss the military aspects of the cross-straight dispute.

A realist would not expect the United States and China to come to blows over Taiwan. Why? While realists expect irrational outcomes in the international system (security dilemma, for example), they don’t really expect irrational behavior. If you start from the premise that the three principles are unitary rational actors, each with a careful understanding of the costs and benefits of action, then no conflict occurs. The material gains for Taiwan following a declaration of independence are minimal compared to the losses China could inflict. The economic and material losses that the PRC might suffer in a war to regain Taiwan are similarly out of line with any potential gains. Finally, the value of Taiwan to the United States is probably exceeded by the blood and treasure that would be lost in any conflict with China.

This is a dangerous way to think about the conflict. As Budding Sinologist points out, we shouldn’t think of Taiwan, the PRC, or the United States as unitary actors who make decisions based on national cost-benefit calculations. The decision process in all three states will inevitably involve domestic considerations, the most notable of which is the need to hold on to power. So, rather than thinking about whether it is in the interests of the PRC to invade Taiwan, we should think about whether it is in the interests of the CCP to attack. Similarly, we can’t really expect any US President to make a cost-benefit analysis of a Taiwan intervention without considering the domestic consequences of a failure to intervene. In the parlance of international relations theory, we need to pay attention to the second level of analysis. This is why I find arguments suggesting that economic interdependence will prevent cross-straights conflict uncompelling.

On the question of whether or when Taiwan will declare independence I have no contribution. Even the DPP seems reluctant to press for formal independence in the short term, and the Guomindang seems to have no interest whatsoever in pursuing independence. Given that elections between the Guomindang and the DPP have tended to be very close, I would be quite surprised if Taiwan declared independence anytime soon. A US security guarantee, however, might change that. The electoral landscape might shift in response to PRC intimidation, or for some other cause.

What will happen if Taiwan does declare independence? I argued earlier that the legitimacy of the CCP depends on economic prosperity and national greatness. The holding of Taiwan is critical to the second of these pillars. I think that the CCP would be willing to spend an enormous amount of blood and treasure to prevent Taiwanese independence, because the loss of Taiwan would strike at the core of the CCP’s legitimacy. If the CCP fails to act decisively in the event of a Taiwanese declaration of independence, I think that its grip on power will be severely weakened. As we have seen recently with anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, nationalism is a double-edged sword, and can cause real problems for those in power. Nationalism is about support for the “nation” as an abstract concept, rather than for the state that holds power at any given time. When the state acts in “national” interests, it can gain the benefit of nationalist feeling. When it doesn’t, state legitimacy suffers. There are a number of examples of states that were severely constrained by nationalist attitudes on the part of the general population and of particular interest groups. Japan in the 1930s is probably the best example of a state whose foreign policy was severely constrained by nationalist feeling.

Could the CCP survive a decision not to fight Taiwanese independence? I don’t know. I suspect that the position of the CCP, at least in the short term, would be stronger if it fought and lost than if it didn’t fight at all. Long term, the economic suffering brought about by the conflict might do damage to the first pillar of CCP legitimacy, but survival is, after all, an arena in which short term concerns trump long term. Although there isn’t much in the way of really good data about Chinese national attitudes on the recovery of Taiwan, all the anecdotal evidence I have seen suggests that the idea of military intervention is extremely popular. A decision not to go to war would almost certainly spark nationwide protests, and these protests would soon serve as a vehicle for other discontent about CCP rule. In short, I believe that the CCP would commit itself to war even if it believed that the war was unwinnable. Demonstrating nationalist credentials would be more important than actually recovering Taiwan.

If China decides to go to war to conquer (or recover) Taiwan, the United States will face a difficult set of choices. The precise nature of these choices depends on the form which the conflict takes, as I’ll discuss in the next section. As I have argued previously, the debate over whether or not to intervene should focus on Taiwan’s intrinsic value to the United States, rather than on strategic considerations. Taiwan is in a unique situation, and I don’t believe that a failure to defend Taiwan would create a reputation for weakness or irresolution that might affect the behavior of other allies (and this is even if we take reputation seriously, which I don’t). The recovery of Taiwan would not open new strategic vistas for China, and indeed would probably have the effect of pushing other East Asian states into balancing postures, as well as making US defense commitments in East Asia more manageable. The PRC is not an ideologically evangelical state, and thus a victory for China could not be understood as a victory for Communism, Confucian civilization, or any other nebulous ideational threat. I doubt very much that the fate of democracy in Taiwan will have much of an effect on democratic movements anywhere else, again because of the uniqueness of the situation. Again, I deal with this question at considerably more length here.

This means that we have to consider whether Taiwan is worth defending by referring to Taiwan’s intrinsic value, rather than to its strategic importance. Even with this constraint, there are still good reasons for the United States to intervene. Taiwan under PRC occupation will not be democratic. Its people will not enjoy the political and social rights they have grown accustomed to. This is a relevant consideration, and the freedom of the Taiwanese people is, to me, worth the lives of American soldiers and sailors. That said, there is a limit to how much American blood and treasure I would spend on Taiwan. For example, Taiwan is not worth a nuclear exchange.

This all may seem a bit clinical. Fortunately, I’m not a policy maker, and I don’t have to make decisions about who lives and who dies. The obvious problem with the argument I have laid out is that any conflict may escalate beyond the parameters we set for it. On the one hand, I hope that cooler heads prevail in the case of actual conflict, and that the leaders of both the PRC and the US manage to limit the escalation. On the other hand, I hope that we can pursue policies that limit the chance that any war will take place.

A while ago, I called for a genuine and honest debate about the value the United States should place on Taiwanese independence. This was misunderstood in some quarters as a call for the end of the US policy of ambiguity towards the defense of Taiwan. In fact, I am a firm supporter of the policy of ambiguity, and think that it’s the best chance of avoiding war between the United States and China. The problem is that the United States must send different messages to Taiwan and to the PRC. The PRC must believe that the United States will intervene, and thus be dissuaded from unwarranted military adventurism. Taiwan must believe that US intervention is uncertain, and thus be dissuaded from a declaration of independence or from the development of nuclear weapons. A security guarantee to Taiwan might well convince the Taiwanese that independence was worth pursuing. A hands-off policy might convince the PRC that an invasion was worth pursuing. I believe that a more complex policy, guaranteeing the security of Taiwan except in the case of independence, would lead to Taiwanese efforts to “push the envelope” by taking, then consolidating, small steps toward independence. I suspect that Taiwan would creep towards independence, and that our limited security guarantee would creep toward being an absolute security guarantee. Incidentally, I also believe that any such guarantee would remove Taiwanese incentive to spend in their own defense, which remains crucial to deterring a PRC attack.

The issue of Taiwan is just about the only international security question that keeps me up at night and makes me fear for my physical safety. I think that the threat of war is very real, and that the policy of ambiguity is the best way to prevent the war. The question of Taiwanese independence will not actually be solved by a declaration of independence, because such a declaration will be meaningless until it is recognized by whatever regime controls the mainland recognize it. The Taiwan question is best answered by indefinite delay, with the hope that a friendly, reasonable, democratic regime will eventually emerge on the mainland.

Part III: China’s Growing Military Power
Part IV: China and the Republican Party
Part V: A New Cold War?
Part VI: Chinese Democracy