What Exactly is the US Doing to Protect its Afghan Partners?
By 
I spent the last ten days seeking answers from the Department of Defense.
Major Christopher Perrine, who specializes in strategic communication for the US military, was eager enough to reiterate DOD’s position about the Wikileaks documents over the phone – that Wikileaks never contacted DOD “directly,” didn’t keep its phone appointments, and that at any rate DOD would not be negotiating with individuals who specialize in leaking classified documents.
But most of my questions were about the US’ broader efforts to protect civilian informants against retaliation – efforts that, I would have liked to assume, surely pre-dated the Wikileaks affair. On this, Perrine referred me to the Pentagon Spokeswoman on Afghanistan Elizabeth Robbins, and warned me that she might refer me to someone with ISAF – only they, he said, would know precisely what was going on on the ground.
Not so unexpectedly, Major Robbins never got back to me.
I did get a more thoughtful response from the brand new DOD Office for the Rule of Law and International Humanitarian Policy, headed by Rosa Brooks. As Spencer Ackerman reported last May, the new entity’s mandate is to “entrench respect for the rule of law and human rights as a core focus within the Defense Department.”
While I have generally interpreted this as an example of the Obama Administration’s commitment to mainstream human security concerns into our defense apparatus, what it means in practice remains unclear. As I was told by an earnest but apologetic aide in an interim response by email, the office is still getting up and running in terms of personnel, budgeting and figuring out its agenda. He promised me a longer response after he’d had time to contact the proper authorities throughout the DOD, and I will pass along what I learn.
Meantime, below the fold is a breakdown of my preliminary questions to Pentagon officials – questions I’d like to see much more front and center in the debate over our strategies in Afghanistan. Public debate over these issues would be especially useful now as the DOD figures out what precisely Brooks’ new office should be focused on – and what kinds of resources it needs to do its job effectively. And just maybe if the mainstream media and informed citizens continue to press DOD on these types of questions, public affairs officers like Major Perrine will eventually be briefed on some of the answers.
1) In general (prior to the release of the Afghan War Diaries), what sort of mechanisms were in place to protect Afghani sources or informants and their families from potential Taliban reprisals? (Were informants offered physical protection in their neighborhoods? Relocation assistance? Other measures?)
These are not naive questions. Military officials in stability operations – and even unarmed humanitarian workers – have often engaged in such “practical protection” measures to keep vulnerable civilians alive in conflict zones. A fundamental question is the extent to which efforts to actually protect civilians have been a casualty of the focus in Afghanistan on hunting insurgents, versus maintaining security in population centers – and how this has affected our overall strategy in the region.
2) What additional protection measures, if any, did the US government take in the aftermath of the Wikileaks affair in order to protect additional informants whose names had been identified? Setting aside the question of whether DOD should have helped redact the extra 15,000 documents, what about the individuals whose names had already been exposed?
I would like to imagine the US military immediately seeking to identify and protect these families. Without any evidence that this is the case, the public is reasonably left wondering whether the Administration is actually hoping for civilian deaths they can then pin on Assange. Assange has a moral culpability here (I disagree with Sean Paul Kelley that DOD behavior absolves him of this), but the ethically correct policy on the USG’s part was obviously to immediately mop up his mess. I continue to hope I’ll find evidence that this is actually what we’re doing; so far the DOD is not helping its cause by remaining quiet on this.
3) The US government has been criticized in the past for not proactively granting asylum or permanent residency to Iraqis or Afghans who have helped coalition forces and thus put their lives or families’ lives at risk. To what extent can Afghans seek relocation to the US or US assistance in relocating elsewhere if they are in danger? If this is not possible, can you explain why and what other measures have been taken instead to ensure that they and their families are out of harm’s way?
Silence from the Pentagon so far. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, an NGO with significant field experience in Afghanistan and connections in both the humanitarian community and the military, told me she wonders whether Afghans would accept relocation offers if made. She stressed the differences between the Afghan and Iraqi expatriate communities in the US and family structures in Afghanistan, where extended family members might be targeted even if individuals flee.
Still, Holewinski believes that the US should be at a minimum making such offers, as well as determining meaningful measures to protect those Afghans who assist in our efforts to stabilize the region: “What I want to see are institutional policies in place to handle protection, including Afghans who work as intelligence gatherers, translators, cooks, fixers. If we’re going to ask the population to get behind us, support us, get involved, we’re going to need some way of ensuring they don’t get killed for it. A plan for taking care of our friends should be in place as soon as the first shot is fired in any war we wage.”
Perhaps Rosa Brooks‘s new office can focus on that one as it works out ways to engage the issues of civilian protection in conflict zones.
Readers: what other questions can we add to this list?