Constitutional Folly

UPDATE: Somewhat reassuringly, apparently I didn’t notice the problem below because this isn’t, in fact, a feature of the constitution; a simple majority is all that is required for most things. That makes more sense. As the now obselete analysis below reflects, I think MY is right that large alliances should be avoided. Being able to govern is, far and away, the most important thing if any kind of stable regime is going to emerge.
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I somehow missed this aspect of the new Iraqi constitution before Matt Yglesias mentioned it:

One interesting issue concerns the viability of the de facto requirement that the cabinet have the confidence of a two thirds supermajority in the National Assembly. That’s a pretty unusual (possibly unique) procedural rule.

To go even further than Matt, this is a bafflingly stupid thing to have done. The potential for a vote of non-confidence is, obviously, the highest-stake veto point there can be. For this reason, the most stable countries with the Westminster have developed institutional rules that largely neutralize it as an issue. The non-confidence rule isn’t a source of major instability in the U.K. or Canada because of a combination of first-past-the-post elections (which skew the vote heavily toward large brokerage parties) and rigorous party discipline. (Which isn’t to say it’s entirely irrelevant; ask master Parliamentary strategist Joe Clark, who generously gave Pierre Trudeau his last term.) These kinds of institutional rules make the cycling emphasized by rational choice theorists less important (hopefully David will at some point contribute a review of Gerry Mackie’s superb Democracy Defended, which I’m in the middle of now). But even in these countries, the government would be exceptionally unstable if you needed a 2/3 majority for every major vote.

And, of course, Great Britain and Australia and Canada are the relatively easy cases, and that kind of party structure isn’t entirely likely to be replicated in Iraq in the short term. You know the problems of instability that have frequently plagued the Kenneset? Now imagine that you needed a 2/3 supermajority. It’s completely unworkable.

Who could have come up with this idea? Well, you can see the logic; the unique ethnic divisions in Iraq require institutional rules that require consensus. But this is a disastrously bad way to accomplish this. All democratic states need some countermajoritarian institutional rules, but this is obviously the wrong way to go about it. More than anything, successful states need to be able to govern. This is likely to just make things worse. (And provides another reason to believe that choosing Iraq as a showcase for democratization was a poorly conceived idea.)

By the way, in addition to Tsebelis for anyone interested in the subject I strongly recommend Steinmo, Thelen et al.’s Structuring Politics. While you’re cursing Clinton for the failure of health care reform despite having majorities in both houses of Congress, make sure to save some ire for James Madison.