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Tag: "china"

Who for 2012? Hu for 2012!

[ 0 ] March 5, 2009 | Robert Farley

Heh. Perhaps Hu Jintao should consider forming an exploratory committee for the 2012 Republican primary…

According to Gallup, Communist, melamine exporting, beating us in the Olympics China is now more popular than Congressional Republicans:
USA Today/Gallup Poll. Feb. 20-22, 2009. N=1,013 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3.

“Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Republicans in Congress are handling their job?”

Approve 36%–56% Disapprove

Gallup Poll. Feb. 9-12, 2009. N=1,022 adults nationwide. MoE ± 3.

“Next, I’d like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. Is your overall opinion of [see below] very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable?”

China: Favorable 41%–51% Unfavorable

Maritime Bloggingheads

[ 0 ] February 10, 2009 | Robert Farley

Galrahn and I sat down last week and diavlogged about all things maritime. He’s our discussion of the “rise” of Chinese naval power:

We also talk about piracy, Robert Gates, and public relations. Check it out.

India and China Play the Submarine Game

[ 0 ] February 4, 2009 | Robert Farley

Via Galrahn, a PLAN anti-piracy force was stalked by an Indian submarine:

An Indian Kilo class submarine spooked Chinese warships that were sent to patrol pirate infested waters in the Gulf of Aden and the two navies engaged in an hour long game of ‘hide and seek’ in international waters last month, Chinese media reports have said.

In the first such incident involving Indian and Chinese warships that has come to light, media reports from China said that its warships ‘forced’ the Indian submarine to surface after over an hour of manoeuvres during which anti submarine choppers were scrambled from the Chinese destroyers.

As Galrahn notes, the “forced” claim doesn’t make much sense; unless the Chinese were firing live ordnance, why would the Indian submarine ever surface. Still, it does suggest a PLAN with potentially better anti-submarine chops than has previously been understood.

Anti-Piracy Patrol=Learning Experience

[ 0 ] December 30, 2008 | Robert Farley

The PLAN is using its anti-piracy mission as an opportunity to learn:

Stratfor, a private intelligence agency based in the United States, said in a report that a Chinese antipiracy patrol would afford its navy “some very real opportunities for on-the-job training, covering everything from logistics far from home and combat against seaborne opponents to communications and joint operations with other, more experienced navies.”

The analysis also said the Chinese would probably monitor the way NATO warships, especially those of the United States, “communicate with each other and with their ship-borne helicopters.” The navy will acquire new skills, it said, “under the banner of internationalism.”

Duh-duh-DUH! Right; it would be a tragedy if the PLAN learned how to fight pirates by fighting pirates. Mild alarmism aside, it’s a genuine positive that the PLAN will have the opportunity to learn how to conduct joint operations.

New Cold War

[ 0 ] December 2, 2008 | Robert Farley

I have a piece at Guardian: Comment is Free on the International Security Advisory Board report on China. Long story short, it’s Team B revisited.

Chinese Aircraft Carrier, Take 42

[ 0 ] November 17, 2008 | Robert Farley

NYT:

A high-ranking Chinese military official has hinted that China’s fast-growing navy is seeking to acquire an aircraft carrier, a move that would surely stoke tensions with the United States military and its allies in Asia.

China has been floating rumours of aircraft carrier construction for at least the last ten years. As such, it’s not as if these particular rumours represent anything new. That said, now would not be a bad time for China to build a carrier. They’ve had plenty of time to study Varyag and the other two rustbuckets that they purchased from Russia. As far as I can tell the largest warships China has ever constructed are 6500 ton destroyers, but nevertheless I’d say that China is probably about as prepared to build a carrier as any country that’s never built an aircraft carrier.

Perhaps as important, China is looking for ways to stimulate its economy. Defense spending isn’t as productive as other forms of investment, but if the CCP feels that it’s oversaturating with further infrastructure investment, a general military buildup makes some sense. USS Yorktown and USS Enterprise, after all, began life as part of the general economic stimulus pursued by FDR in his first term.

Some Details on Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Program

[ 0 ] September 17, 2008 | Robert Farley

Defense News (unfortunately, no link) has an article providing some additional detail on Chinese efforts to develop an anti-ship ballistic missile. The platform appears to be a DF-21 MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) which has a range of about 2500 km. The article confirms that terminal guidance of the missile remains the sticking point. A modern ballistic missile with GPS guidance is easily accurate enough to hit an aircraft carrier, but one of the advantages of aircraft carriers over islands is that they move; in the time that it would take to identify the carrier, give the order to launch the missile, and wait for the missile to arrive, the radius of action of a carrier at top speed makes a hit quite unlikely. Thus, the ballistic missile needs some kind of guidance system that will allow it to re-target the aircraft carrier once it re-enters the atmosphere.

The article indicates that the Chinese are aiming at having this capability by 2015. Whether that’s technologically feasible is unclear. Some comments at a previous post on this subject also make the point that China may lack the surveillance and satellite capacity to find carriers at sea in time to actually hit them with missiles; the Defense News article concurs, and notes that China is also making a big investment in such assets, although to date it’s capabilities are still insufficient.

The point of all of this is to increase China’s capability for deterring US intervention in a China-Taiwan dispute, intervention which would rely heavily on aircraft carriers. Anti-ship ballistic missiles are only one part of an arsenal (including air-to-ship missiles, ship-to-ship missiles, and submarines) intended to make the USN nervous about using its carriers anywhere near Taiwan, and consequently to make the US political leadership nervous about intervening. This doesn’t mean that the Chinese intend to seize Taiwan at any specific time in the future, but it does mean that the Chinese leadership believes that such a seizure may at some point be necessary.

Rules of the Game

[ 0 ] August 29, 2008 | Robert Farley

China isn’t comfortable with the rules Russia wants to play with.

A summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a seven- nation security alliance that includes China and four former Soviet republics, yesterday declined to back its recognition of two breakaway Georgian regions. China expressed “concern,” said Qin Gang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman.

As Doug suggests, territorial integrity is a value that Russia really shouldn’t have expected China to have a sense of humor about. In every international forum worth the name, China has fought for the supremacy of territorial sovereignty over the right of self-determination, and Russia is invoking the latter in defending its actions in South Ossetia.

I also think it would be correct to say that China and Russia don’t share the same approach to international society as it exists in 2008. Part of Russia’s point in using excessive force against Georgia was to thumb its nose at the West; it wanted to indicate that the rules that purport to govern relations between sovereign states in the rest of the world don’t apply to the Russian near abroad. Rather, a different set of rules, closer to a nineteenth century realist understanding of spheres of influence, should (and will) dictate how Russia relates to its neighbors. While China has certainly engaged in belligerence toward some of its neighbors, there is no pattern of coercion similar to Russia’s neighborhood behavior. Trade relations are conducted pretty much above board, and territorial disputes a)typically have some good cause, and b)don’t seem to poison the rest of the relationship. China even manages to have dense and intricate trade ties with Taiwan. Moreover, I think that China has determined that it can better pursue its national interest (which amounts to the survival of the CCP) within the current international normative framework than outside it. Being within that framework also allows China to manipulate the normative structure to some degree, such that the norms of internal sovereignty and territorial integrity supercede certain other norms that the West might want to pursue.

Finally, Matt is correct to point out that there is no emerging “League of Autocracies”. Russia and China are quite distinct in governance structure, economy, and security interest. They both have some cause to resist certain initiative of the US, but we shouldn’t expect that they will present a unified front against United States. China is now far more deeply integrated in the international economy than Russia, and one consequence of that integration is that China has little interest in rocking the boat for its own sake.

Olympic Prognostication

[ 9 ] August 18, 2008 | Robert Farley

Even if the US manages to beat out China for the most medals this year, I expect that China pretty much has a lock on the medal count for the next eight or so Olympiads.

Indeed, I’m so confident of that prediction that I’ve taken advantage of Blogger’s future post function to crow about it. Let’s just hope the monkey-cyborgs don’t take over the planet before September 1, 2040.

Did Ballistic Missiles Kill the DDG-1000?

[ 7 ] August 12, 2008 | Robert Farley

Defense News has a good article on the Navy’s decision to end pursuit of the DDG-1000, although much will be familiar to readers of Information Dissemination. The story notes the inability of the DDG-1000 to use the SM-2 and SM-2 Standard missiles, which it apparently could launch but not control. This meant that the DDG-1000 would never have the capacity to carry out area air defense, and thus could not protect a carrier group from cruise missile or ballistic missile attacks. The latter, it appears, loomed as a particularly large concern:

Although a “secret, classified” threat was discussed during the hearing, neither Navy officials nor lawmakers would reveal any details.

One source familiar with the classified briefing said that while anti-ship cruise missiles and other threats were known to exist, “those aren’t the worst.” The new threat, which “didn’t exist a couple years ago,” is a “land-launched ballistic missile that converts to a cruise missile.”

Other sources confirmed that a new, classified missile threat is being briefed at very high levels. One admiral, said another source, was told his ships should simply “stay away. There are no options.”

Information on the new threat remains closely held.

Ballistic missiles are, potentially, very bad news for a carrier battle group. With modern GPS guidance, Chinese ballistic missiles can have a CEP (circular error probability) of 15 meters or less. That means that half of the missiles fired at a particular target will land within 15 meters. A aircraft carrier is roughly 300m by 50m, meaning that any missile fired at a stationary carrier will have a high likelihood of hitting. But of course carriers don’t sit still; they travel at about 30 knots, and can cover a lot of ground in the 15-20 minutes (at least) it would take between location of the carrier and the landing of the missile. This means that, even with high accuracy, ballistic missiles are going to have a very difficult time hitting carriers.

However, the problem is a lot easier to solve if the missile warheads in question have terminal guidance. Terminal guidance would mean that they could alter their flight path upon re-entering the atmosphere, and target the carrier in its new location. And that causes a very serious problem indeed, because while a modern supercarrier might well survive a hit from a conventional ballistic missile, it probably won’t be able to carry out flight operations. The Defense News article indicates that concerns about terminally guided ballistic missiles may have been key in making the DDG-1000 an unattractive bet for the Navy.

If the Chinese have hyper-accurate terminally guided ballistic missiles, then the Navy has a much larger problem than the DDG-1000. Tactical ballistic missile defense is in general a better bet than strategic, because the number of hits actually matters; the system doesn’t have to be perfect to be useful. But as I suggested above, even one hit is likely to make an aircraft carrier useless for combat operations. I am not optimistic that, even with a relatively successful BMD program, a carrier battle group could immunize itself from a dedicated attack with lots of ballistic missiles.

In a 2006 article republished in a recent Naval War College Review, Wang Wei goes into some additional detail regarding ballistic missile attacks on ships at sea.

Great Power Confrontation for its Own Sake

[ 0 ] August 4, 2008 | Robert Farley

I know that most people don’t have time, but this diavlog between Francis Fukuyama and Bob Kagan is really worth watching in its entirety. I think Fukuyama goes a bit easy on Kagan, but then many of Kagan’s arguments are self-refuting; in particular, his claim that if China were actually a status quo power, then it would maintain a much smaller military than its economic and geographic positions indicate is laughable both from a realist theoretical point of view and in the context of the massive military buildup that the US has pursued over the last eight years.

Sunday Book Review: The Sino-Soviet Split

[ 22 ] July 20, 2008 | Robert Farley

Why did the two Communist giants part ways in the early 1960s? Realist explanations have concentrated on the problems associated with two powerful states sharing a long border. Other explanations have focused on the efforts of the United States to drive a wedge between Russia and China. Lorenz Luthi, in The Sino-Soviet Split, makes an argument that isn’t exactly counter-intuitive, but that has probably received less attention than it should; the Sino-Russian alliance split because of genuine ideological disagreements over the past, present, and future of communism. To be sure, this isn’t the whole story, but Luthi makes a compelling case that it’s most of the story.

Perhaps the biggest problem that Luthi encounters in making his case is the person of Mao Zedong. This is a methodological problem as much as anything else; if we assert that ideology caused the split, yet acknowledge that on the Chinese side the problematic ideology was centered in the Chairman and contingent upon his battles against domestic opponents, are we really saying that ideology, instead of Mao or the always popular “domestic considerations” caused the split? Luthi doesn’t fully resolve this question, in part because resolution is impossible; the best we can do is try to convey as much as possible of the tapestry of decision. In this case, Luthi makes a compelling argument that Mao had significant ideological difference both with the Soviets (under both Khruschev and Stalin, but especially the former) and with “rightist” elements of the Chinese Communist Party led by Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and, to a lesser extent, Zhou Enlai. In 1958 and 1959, as the disaster of the Great Leap Forward (which the Soviets had bitterly opposed) became clear, Mao began to use ideological tension with the Soviets to highlight his disagreements with Liu and Deng. Eventually, Mao would intentionally exacerbate the split with the Russians in order to forge an ideological weapon against his enemies in the CCP. The two prongs of this ideological offensive were the battle against “revisionism”, in this case the idea that the through the adoption of a centralized bureaucratic economy the Soviet Union had ceased to be a revolutionary state, and the fight against peaceful coexistence; Mao believed (in public, although his private behavior didn’t match) that the socialist world had the advantage over the capitalist, and that nuclear weapons didn’t transform this calculation. The eventual result of this was the collapse of the alliance on the international side, and the Cultural Revolution on the domestic side.

The Soviets, it seems, were largely confused witnesses to this process. Luthi, who had access to Soviet and Eastern European archives, conveys genuine puzzlement on the part of the Soviets towards the Chinese. The Russians had their own internal political problems (Khruschev’s 1956 speech wasn’t the end of internal conflict against the Stalinists), but these conflicts don’t seem to have engaged in the same kind of synergy with the Sino-Soviet relationship as was present on the Chinese side. This is to say that the various combatants in intra-CPSU disputes didn’t use the relationship with China as a cudgel to beat the other side. Rather, the Soviet appraisal of the behavior of the Chinese Communist Party had two rather stable elements; first, the Russians believed that the Chinese were embarking on a series of economically disastrous policies, and second the Russians believed that the Chinese were far too risk-acceptant in relations with the United States. It could be argued that these are both pragmatic rather than ideological concerns, but I think in particular that the Soviet pursuit of “peaceful coexistence” was driven as much by ideology as by convenience. The Soviet response to Chinese aggressiveness and unorthodoxy was a steadily increasing limitation of military and economic aid, combined with occasional bellicosity in ideological organs (although the Soviet anger never came close to matching the Chinese). The big problem was that the Soviet Union was unable or unwilling to bend on either point, and that the Chinese were completely unapologetic in their attack. In spite of the abject disaster that the Great Leap Forward represented, the Chinese attacked the Soviets as “revisionists” for being unwilling to engage in a similar project, yet no one in the Soviet Union was interested in turning the Soviet economy into a bigger basket case than it already was. Similarly, the Soviet leadership was (generally) reluctant to take a more aggressive tack regarding the United States because it was the USSR, after all, that had to pay the greatest costs of superpower hostility. Finally, the Soviets had to keep the Eastern European parties (generally not sympathetic to the Chinese, with the exception of Albania and the partial exception of Romania) in line, which further limited their ideological flexibility.

Personalities often matter, of course, and both Mao and Khruschev possessed enormous personalities that exacerbated the conflict. Khruschev’s theatricality and general unpredictability was unsettling to the Chinese, who had great difficulty determining whether a particular statement or policy was the result of one of Khruschev’s quirks, or was intentional action of the Soviet state. Of Mao there is little more of use to be said; he was a megalomaniac who was happy to destroy not only the PRC’s most important international alliance, but also its economy and the lives of many of its citizens in pursuit of victory in intra-CCP disputes. The CCP bought this problem for itself, of course, by the decision to promote the Maoist cult of personality, which left the party in a very serious situation when Mao really went off the rails from the late 1950s on. Luthi deals with a few counter-factuals, the most interesting of which is (more or less) “What if Mao had died in 1957?”; it’s hard to conclude from his evidence that both relations between China and Russia, and Chinese domestic policy more generally, would have been much, much different.

Luthi details a couple incidents of near-hilarity that the increasingly tense relationship produced. At a 1964 cocktail party, the drunken Soviet minister of defense Rodion Malinovskii joked to the Chinese delegation “I do not want any Mao and Khruschev to hamper us… we already did away with Khruschev, now you should do away with Mao.” The joke, it is fair to say, didn’t go over well. In 1969, frantic efforts by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin to reach Zhou Enlai in the midst of a border scrum were frustrated when a Chinese phone operator refused to connect the call, instead preferring to yell at the Prime Minister and accuse him of “revisionism”. And of course I also highly recommend the propaganda pamphlets assembled between 1959 and 1963 by the Soviets, the Chinese, and their proxies; on the Chinese side these include such classics as The Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us, Long Live Leninism!, and More on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us. I plowed through most of these for a senior thesis back in 1997, and the best by far is a slow, patient explanation by the Soviets to the Chinese of how nuclear bombs cannot, when dropped on capitalist cities, distinguish between workers and capitalists.

Although it’s tangential to the question at hand, Luthi also reminds us that the Munich analogy isn’t just for George W. Bush:

It was only after the sudden end of the Cuban Missile Crisis that Chinese propaganda went into full swing. a media campaign denounced the withdrawal as “Munich” and blasted Soviet revisionism for “show[ing] vacillation in a struggle and dar[ing]not to win a victory that can be won.” The Chinese leadership staged mass rallies supporting Cuba’s struggle and accusing the USSR of “adventurism” for sending the missiles and of “capitualationism” for withdrawing them.

The lesson is that every country has its neocons, and that they always, no matter what country they’re from, say the same thing: The enemy only understands force; Negotiation is defeat; Compromise is capitulation; The prestige of our nation/people/movement depends on standing fast. The song remains the same, whether it’s being sung by Bill Kristol, Mao Zedong, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

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