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Angry Old Man Outlives Soviet Union

[ 39 ] August 4, 2008 |

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, fair to say one of the most important voices of the 20th century, has passed.

…Trend:

I was a little bothered by the obit’s line that read “[his books] inspired millions, perhaps, with the knowledge that one person’s courage and integrity could, in the end, defeat the totalitarian machinery of an empire.” For those keeping count, the “one person” in media accounts and obituaries who brought down communism has now been Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II, Boris Yeltsin, and now Solzhenitsyn. Maybe after the fifth “one man” dies, they’ll get the picture that the Soviet Union and Communism “fell” for a wide range of reasons.

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Um… what?

[ 24 ] August 3, 2008 |

Vice Admiral Barry McCullough:

However, in the current program of record, the DDG-1000 cannot perform area air defense; specifically, it cannot successfully employ the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-3 or SM-6, and is incapable of conducting Ballistic Missile Defense. Although superior in littoral ASW, the DDG-1000 lower power sonar design is less effective in the blue water than DDG-51 capability. DDG-1000’s Advanced Gun System (AGS) design provides enhanced Naval Fires Support capability in the littorals with increased survivability. However, with the accelerated advancement of precision munitions and targeting, excess fires capacity already exists from tactical aviation and organic USMC fires. Unfortunately, the DDG-1000 design sacrifices capacity for increased capability in an area where the Navy already has, and is projected to have sufficient capacity and capability.

Say again? We’re spending untold billions on a destroyer that has, apparently, no air defense capability, and that is less capable than its immediate predecessor of hunting submarines? That the DDG-1000 cannot employ the Standard air defense missile is simply shocking, and runs counter to the claims that the Navy has been making about the destroyer’s capabilities for the past several years.

Galrahn is beside himself:

Who would possibly confuse the 6 small combatants with 500 missiles that is dependent upon escorts for defense from air attack as outlined in the arsenal ship program, with 7 enormous independently capable stealth combatants with 2 big guns and 750 shells? After all, as long as the enormous stealth combatants had SM-2s they were completely different ship profiles. Without the SM-2, what is the difference between the Arsenal Ship and the DDG-1000? Different primary weapon, the DDG-1000 is bigger, and the DDG-1000 costs more. That’s about it.

The distance between a DDG-1000 cited with SM-2s on every public website on the internet, and a ship that cannot support SM-2s is the same distance in the Navy’s credibility gap when it comes time to discuss surface combatant requirements. Keep in mind, the existence of the SM-2 has driven every assumption in the public domain about the DDG-1000 for the last three years. How is it possible the DDG-1000 is a “ship which meets the requirements for which it was designed” and the whole time Congress and the American people have been told the cost of the DDG-1000 is justified because the DDG-1000 has all kinds of multi-mission capabilities that it really doesn’t have? Allison Stiller testified the Navy has already spent $13 billion in both R&D and SCN budget funding to build the first two DD-1000 Arsenal Ships, and apparently Congress didn’t even know what they were really doing. Is the DDG-1000 really a “ship which meets the requirements for which it was designed?”

This is absurd. Whereas we thought we were getting a warship intended to destroy the Iraqi Army as it invaded Kuwait but also capable of a number of other missions, it turns out that we basically get nothing. I’m wondering now whether we’ll see a housecleaning in the Navy similar to the one that Robert Gates has performed on the Air Force…

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Book Review: Enemies of Intelligence

[ 0 ] August 3, 2008 |

This is the fourth in a seven part series on the Patterson School Summer Reading List.

  1. In Spite of the Gods, Edward Luce
  2. The Utility of Force, Rupert Smith
  3. Negotiating Change, Jeremy Jones
  4. Enemies of Intelligence, Richard Betts

Over the years, Richard Betts has written extensively on intelligence issues. Enemies of Intelligence is a restructuring and amalgamation of many of the arguments that he’s made over the years in a variety of different outlets. While some collections of this sort prove disjointed and repetitive, collecting Betts’ various argument together and refining them makes a lot of sense; the book is, on the whole, coherent and readable.

Betts’ central argument is that the TANSTAFL principle applies to intelligence. The Intelligence Community will catch some threats to the United States, and miss others; intelligence reorganization is as much about which threats will be caught as about the final batting average. Every effort to solve one intelligence problem creates a problem somewhere else. For example, there is no a priori reason to prefer a regional to a functional division of intelligence responsibilities within an organization; both approaches do some things well and leave gaps. Adding coordinative layers can help, but can also substantially slow down analysis. Demanding clear statements of probability can lead to mistakes, while overfocusing on mistakes can produce mushy intelligence estimates. Similarly, the politicization of intelligence is bad, but intelligence product must be politically savvy in order to be of relevance to policymakers. This may all seem obvious, but in the wake of a public failure of the intelligence community, almost everyone seems to forget these lessons; every failure produces calls for a reorganization (without an evaluation of what that reorganization will do), calls for an elimination of red tape (without a recognition that red tape exists for a reason), and calls for more resources (without much attention paid to just how much added value such resources will produce). This is a particularly serious problem in intelligence, because while failures are public, successes are not; if Atta and his comrades had been identified and arrested months before 9/11, a few people would have noted it as an intelligence victory, while most wouldn’t have noted it at all.

Betts does sometimes allow a bit too much “on the one hand, on the other handism” to creep into his analysis. Given his focus, this isn’t surprising; when you argue that intelligence reorganization is a zero-sum, or possibly low positive sum game, then it’s critical to recognize that different approaches inevitably have different pluses and minuses. Similarly, Betts is not a strong partisan; although he strongly opposed the Iraq War, he’s best characterized, I think, as a Cold War Democrat most comfortable with the idea that a broad consensus on foreign security policy is both possible and desirable. As such, he’s not interested in battering the Republican party and the way that its partisans think about intelligence. This leads him to be a bit too kind to ventures like Team B, which in my view (and in the view of a lot of other people) were enormously destructive endeavours without notable redeeming qualities. Then again, he does point out that the WMD fiasco was, above all, a policy failure rather than an intelligence failure; it would have been irresponsible of the intelligence community to conclude that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, and the real problem was that the presence of such weapons should not, in fact, have justified intervention. A better report would have added caveats about the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the weakness of the case, but could not have concluded that the weapons were absent, and likely would not have stopped the war.

Enemies of Intelligence doesn’t include a tremendous amount of detail about the workings of the Intelligence Community, and Betts could have illustrated his argument with more examples. The book amounts to an abstract case for an abstract caution, with some detail in order to make specific points. Nevertheless, it’s a compelling case, and a useful antidote to the entertaining-but-non-analytical arguments made in a book like See No Evil, or even Legacy of Ashes.

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Brad Ziegler

[ 16 ] August 3, 2008 |

This is a pretty nice stat line. Ziegler’s story has Billy Beane’s and thus Bill James’s fingerprints all over it. A 20th-round draft pick out of college who spent a few years struggling in the low minors, the A’s converted him to a submarine-style pitching motion last year (James has always been a big believer in the theory that submarine pitching motions aren’t used enough, mainly because of old-time baseball men’s prejudice against throwing under-handed. Hmmm, does the use of the term under-handed to mean devious encode this semantically?).

Well now the guy has given up one earned run in 56 innings of AAA and MLB pitching. His major league career is 32 innings long and no one has gotten an extra base hit on him.

An odd footnote to all this is that his skull has been fractured twice in the last four years — once by a line drive in a game, and then this past January in a freak accident at a baseball camp by a stray baseball.

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Dilemma…

[ 40 ] August 3, 2008 |

While messing around with my computer this morning, I accidentally uninstalled Civilization IV, and I’m not sure where I put the installation disks.

So now I’m wondering; should I panic, or embrace this development as my last, best chance to pursue tenure?

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Comity!

[ 34 ] August 3, 2008 |

On this, I agree with Michael Totten:

If you’re using Internet Explorer 7, do yourself and me a favor. Stop it. Seriously. It’s crap. Use Firefox. It’s free and vastly superior.

Even if the Sitemeter problem has been cleared up, the general point remains entirely correct.

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Subtraction by Addition…

[ 18 ] August 2, 2008 |

Given that the White Sox appear to have been historically terrible in terms of center field defense this year, I suppose that the Griffey acquisition makes sense, even allowing for his demand to return to center. I’m kind of glad, though, that I didn’t take time out of my precious DC visit to go and see the Nationals and my beloved Reds last night, although I suppose that attending while wearing my Griffey t-shirt (which bears Griffey’s 2005 number, to boot) would have had some anachronistic value. In any case, dumping any of Griffey’s salary for anyone who might contribute in any way to a future Cincinnati playoff team is a good move for the Reds…

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Send in the Clowns

[ 0 ] August 2, 2008 |

In other news, TIDOS Yankee shows the world once again why he’s The Champ.

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Highly Unconvincing Suggestion From Political Opponent of the Day

[ 0 ] August 1, 2008 |

Michael Gerson.

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"Separation of Powers" And Immunity

[ 13 ] August 1, 2008 |

I generally agree with Mark Tushnet that Robert Jackson’s much-cited and lauded concurrence in Youngstown is overrated, in the sense that it effectively describes the puzzles of evaluating the constitutionality of presidential action without providing any useful way of resolving the most interesting and important questions. Still, his descriptions can sometimes be useful, and I think this is the case with the passage cited in yesterday’s opinion rejecting Bush administration assertions of “absolute immunity”:

While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.

In this sense, the “checks and balances” metaphor is a more useful one than the “separation of powers” metaphor the Bush administration’s claims essentially rest on. In Richard Neustadt’s language, the American system is really “one of shared, not separated, powers.” The oversight function of Congress is crucial to the logic of the system, and the kinds of broad immunity being claimed by Bush would unacceptably frustrate it, as Judge Bates correctly recognized.

In addition, Josh Patashnik wonders why the Bush administration would make these farcical claims, when even if more plausible and narrow claims of immunity were rejected it is “very easy to send aides before Congress and simply have them spew nonsensical garbage, avoid answering tough questions, claim to not remember anything, and be generally unhelpful.” The answer, I think, is just contempt of Congress in every sense. It’s not that Bush thinks that Miers or Bolten will say anything that’s directly incriminating; they just want to send a message that they think that their potentially illegal practices should be beyond the scrutiny of mere legislators.

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How to Be a Lazy Journalist

[ 14 ] August 1, 2008 |

Steve M. has a nice catch on the cavernously stupid notion that Barack Obama might not have enough body fat — acquired from gobbling seals and rummaging the ice pack for carrion — to survive those long, fasting Presidential winters. Aside from the fact that Amy Chozick actually launched the Yahoo discussion thread from which the entire project sprouted, but she also cribbed talking points from the McCain campaign.

McCain campaign manager Rick Davis a couple of days ago:

“…Only celebrities like Barack Obama go to the gym three times a day, demand ‘MET-RX chocolate roasted-peanut protein bars and bottles of a hard-to-find organic brew — ‘Black Forest Berry Honest Tea’ and worry about the price of arugula.”

Chozick today:

These days he stays away from junk food and instead snacks on MET-Rx chocolate roasted-peanut protein bars and drinks Black Forest Berry Honest Tea, a healthy organic brew.

Unreal. Internet traditions require that I make a joke about Ben Domenech here, but that might — might — be unfair to Ben Domenech.

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Brazil’s Nuclear Agenda

[ 0 ] August 1, 2008 |

Mr. Trend talks a bit about the resumption of the Brazilian (civilian) nuclear power program:

The power plant was originally decreed in the 1970s as part of the military dictatorship’s demonstration of how Brazil was finally attaining the levels of “development” it required to assume it’s rightful place in the world (in what I would call Brazil’s historical “order and progress” complex). The idea of the power plant was borne equally out of the fact that many members of the military brass saw nuclear power as the next necessary step to achieve progress in Brazil, as well as being influenced by broader geopolitical factors, including Argentina gaining nuclear power. Interestingly, the public met such plans with an at-best lukewarm response in Brazil when they first came up, but after Jimmy Carter heavily pushed Brazil not to turn to nuclear power, it attained a level of popular nationalism the military government itself could never have achieved on its own, thereby giving the project far greater popular legitimacy as well. Brazil ultimately gained its nuclear technology and capabilities via help from West Germany, and began working on two reactors. The third, begun in 1986, was quickly abandoned as Brazil entered inflation rates in the hundreds and even thousands in the late-1980s and 1990s. Now, with a booming economy and a growing need for energy, Lula has authorized resuming construction of the third reactor.

There are a few interesting things going on here. One is the prestige component of even peaceful nuclear energy; the program was apparently seen by the military dictatorship as having national pride benefits completely apart from the economic value of the reactors. This, I think, is one of the most serious problems with the kind of non-proliferation policies that neoconservatives like to pursue. In building non-proliferation strategy around the idea that the United States (or Israel, or whoever else) will prevent proliferation simply by threatening to bomb the target country, we overlook the fact that the pursuit of national prestige is often the driving force behind a nuclear program, and that the threat of airstrikes is a uniquely poor way to allow a target to maintain its prestige. In the Brazilian case the program was civil, and the US threats non-military, but the outcome predictable; the coercive effort ended up making the program radically more popular.

I have to say that I’m a bit curious about what this resumption portends for Brazil’s nuclear military ambitions. While Brazil hasn’t really made noises about developing its own nuclear weapons, there’s been a lot of talk about Brazil building a nuclear submarine force. This also seems driven almost purely by prestige considerations, as the tasks that Brazil envisions for the nuclear submarine (protecting offshore oil installations) can be handled just as capably by conventional submarines.

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