I contributed to and organized this report for Wikistrat:
The East and South China Seas territorial disputes, including but not limited to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal, have not only increased in complexity but are an area of concern for the United States. The lands in question hold historical and strategic significance and highly sought-after potential energy reserves. As China has grown in power and asserted its regional influence, it has looked to increase its claim to these territories, causing concern among neighboring states with similar claims. Under these circumstances, the current international order in East Asia, maintained by the United States, comes into question.
First, a negative but thoughtful review of Grounded from Tony Carr:
Is there a chance that independent airpower could fall prey to budget austerity and departmental defense reform? While the idea seems far-fetched, the Air Force was nervous enough about it a few years ago to mobilize authors and affiliates to raise a pre-emptive defense. This anxiety reflects recognition that the country is in uncharted budgetary and defense territory, and that the Air Force — an agency without a Constitutional mandate — could be stripped of independent status with comparative ease.
Cue scholar Robert Farley, who recently rendered the Air Force a service with his book “Grounded: The Case For Abolishing the United States Air Force.”
Read the whole thing, etc. More importantly, the University Press of Kentucky has decided to grace this fair Earth with a paperback edition of Grounded. To quote Stephen Colbert: “if you did not get this before, get it now. And if you did get it before, get it now.”
A few links to help you weather the relentless, brutal passage of time:
My latest at the Diplomat highlights some recent work on how the Tu-22M Backfire affected US and Soviet naval doctrine:
The Tu-22M Backfire bomber entered service in 1972, with the Soviets eventually producing almost 500 aircraft. Theories about the plane abounded (some argued that it represented the USSR’s most serious foray into a strategic nuclear bomber force), but eventually it became clear that the most important use for the bomber would come as a maritime strike aircraft. The Backfire gave the Soviet Navy a supersonic aircraft that it could use in mass to fire anti-surface missiles against U.S. carrier battle groups.
Cited in the article, but if the topic interests please read the five part series (I, II, III, IV, V) on the subject at Information Dissemination, as well as the original Naval War College Review article.
So you’ve probably seen all of this:
Over the years, Obama administration officials have described Netanyahu to me as recalcitrant, myopic, reactionary, obtuse, blustering, pompous, and “Aspergery.” (These are verbatim descriptions; I keep a running list.) But I had not previously heard Netanyahu described as a “chickenshit.” I thought I appreciated the implication of this description, but it turns out I didn’t have a full understanding. From time to time, current and former administration officials have described Netanyahu as a national leader who acts as though he is mayor of Jerusalem, which is to say, a no-vision small-timer who worries mainly about pleasing the hardest core of his political constituency. (President Obama, in interviews with me, has alluded to Netanyahu’s lack of political courage.)
“The good thing about Netanyahu is that he’s scared to launch wars,” the official said, expanding the definition of what a chickenshit Israeli prime minister looks like. “The bad thing about him is that he won’t do anything to reach an accommodation with the Palestinians or with the Sunni Arab states. The only thing he’s interested in is protecting himself from political defeat. He’s not [Yitzhak] Rabin, he’s not [Ariel] Sharon, he’s certainly no [Menachem] Begin. He’s got no guts.”
I ran this notion by another senior official who deals with the Israel file regularly. This official agreed that Netanyahu is a “chickenshit” on matters related to the comatose peace process, but added that he’s also a “coward” on the issue of Iran’s nuclear threat.
These quotes fill me with interesting thoughts and feelings!
- It’s very interesting to me (although not surprising) that Bibi’s efforts to look tough and resolute to one crowd (domestic audience, Israel backers in US),come off as cowardly and irresolute to another (the Obama admin). Policymakers face different priorities; it’s almost impossible that they can look tough to everyone. Reaffirms my view that reputation is complex, multifaceted, and that generally it’s a waste of time to spend blood and treasure on displaying “resolve.”
- The depth of the animosity towards Bibi is intriguing, but not particularly surprising. Bibi’s most significant mistake in handling the United States has been his urge to turn Israel into a partisan issue, and throw in with the Republican Party. It hasn’t happened quite yet, but you can see the threat on the horizon. It’s an apocalyptical stupid move for Bibi to make, however emotionally satisfying it may be in the moment to rail against the weakness of a Democratic President.
- Speaking of apocalyptic stupidity, can we all agree now on just how bad the 2010 “Israel is about to bomb Iran” article from Jeffrey Goldberg was? You remember; Goldberg breathlessly transcribed the statements of Israeli policymakers on how they viewed the Iranian nuclear program as a VERY SERIOUS MATTER that would require VERY SERIOUS BOMBING unless Obama did something. That the article amounted to a transparent Israeli bluff should have been obvious at the time, but inexplicably some people took it seriously. Turns out now that the Obama administration has concluded that Bibi is chickenshit, in part because of the serial claims about Bibi’s dire views of the Iranian threat. Cry wolf enough times, even Americans will stop believing you.
Latest at the National Interest takes a look at the legacies of the Korean War:
The legacies of this war remain deep, complex and underexamined. Memory of the Korean War in the United States is obscured by the looming shadows of World War II and Vietnam. China remembers the conflict differently, but China’s position in the world has changed in deep and fundamental ways since the 1950s. Still, as we consider the potential for future conflict between China and the United States, we should try to wring what lessons we can from the first Sino-American war.
USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77)
Discuss: The end of American empire.
Interesting on Chip Kelly’s decision to kick the FG on 4th and 1 from the 2 yard line with 2 minutes left against the Cardinals:
When it’s in the middle to late 4th quarter (or overtime), I use a measure called win percentage
, which puts more emphasis on how 4th down decisions affect game outcomes. (This measure isn’t as useful earlier in the game, when the impact of a single play is harder to measure. Check out the methodology page
for more details.) Here’s the breakdown for the Eagles’ scenario.
||TEAMS DOING THIS
|THIS SUCCEEDS ABOUT…
||COACHES DO THIS…*
|Go for it
||70% of the time
||55% of the time
||64% of the time
||49% of the time
|Field goal try
||83% of the time
||100% of the time
||35% of the time
* Based on about 600 fourth downs with similar field position and distance to first down since 2002
In this case, teams who attempt a field goal would be more likely to win. This doesn’t mean this is absolutely the right call in every situation. But on average, in situations like these, I recommend doing what the coach did: attempt a field goal!
I would have guessed the other way, and had that guess confirmed by ensuing events…
Some thoughts on the dangers of anti-access/area denial system proliferation in East Asia…
The idea of supplying the various regional states that have territorial disputes with China has a great deal of appeal. A China that fears the military capabilities of its neighbors is easier to deter, especially as the commitments of these neighbors are more credible than that of the United States. The potential for an integrated system is even more interesting, giving the United States and its allies a major geographical advantage over China.
But there are problems.
“Allied tanker torpedoed” by U.S. Navy (photo 80-G-43376) Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons.
My latest at the National Interest takes a look at military failure:
In this article, I concentrate on specific operational and strategic decisions, leaving aside broader, grand-strategic judgments that may have led the United States into ill-considered conflicts. The United States may well have erred politically in engaging in the War of 1812, World War I, the Vietnam War and Operation Iraqi Freedom, but here I consider how specific failures worsened America’s military and strategic position.
I’m deeply disappointed that Scott and Paul failed to post this: