And so at risk of pursuing the mushy middle road, we in academia can grant that the Confucius Institutes represent an act of (not entirely disinterested) generosity on the part of the People’s of Republic of China, and we can do our best to take advantage of this generosity in both our research and on behalf of our students. The United States is not at war with China; it maintains correct diplomatic relations with Beijing and American business conducts commerce with China on a vast scale. At the same time, without worrying overmuch that we’re submitting to the “rhythm of totalitarianism,” we need to remember that the Institutes represent one (privileged) vision of China’s past, present, and future. The CI is not a center for disinterested research (although few places are), and we can’t expect academic even-handedness with respect to the critical political challenges affecting the U.S.-China relationship today.
Category: Robert Farley
Found this in the basement of a local church (the girls have music class in the next room):
The original is by Harry Anderson, finished in 1961. The most common interpretation (based on the title, Prince of Peace) is that the Savior is expressing support for the world-peace-bringing mission of the United Nations (his position on the United Nations Command in the Korean War is less certain). Alternative interpretations include “Giant Jesus Confirms Impotence of United Nations Security Council,” “500′ Nazarene Turns on UN After Slaying Godzilla,” “Enormous Christ Offers to Redeem Sins of Canadian Diplomat Who Double Parked His Dodge Station Wagon.”
I stop paying attention for a few months, and this happens:
Congratulations to Matt, who has an uncanny skill at the particular game. I’d offer an LGM prize, but Matt has always refused. Next year!
In order to avoid breaking my twenty-six year streak of attending at least one professional baseball game, this afternoon DJW and I made it to the Red’s final game of the season. The bulk of the drama was on Pittsburgh’s side, as the Pirates were trying to tie St. Louis and earn a playoff for the division title. For their part, the Reds were playing to give Johnny Cueto his twentieth victory of the season.
Cueto wasn’t dominant, but he pitched very well, pitching eight innings of one run ball and scattering six hits. In the bottom of the eighth, Jason Bourgeois tripled to lead off. Cozart lined out to third, bringing up the pitcher’s spot. To the deep surprise of nearly everyone in the stadium, Price sent Cueto to the plate. Cueto pushed it to a full count, then singled up the middle to score Bourgeois and take the lead. Price then lifted him for a pinch-runner. The Reds scored two more, then Chapman struck out the side in the top of the ninth to seal Cueto’s twentieth win.
I wonder about the clubhouse conversation; did Cueto insist on hitting, or was it Price’s idea? It was a nice bit of drama in an otherwise not-terribly-meaningful game.
My latest at the National Interest touches on some sources of ISIS’ military success:
ISIS has won by exploiting the vulnerabilities of its enemies, which take the form of Western military organizations, while lacking their fighting and communications discipline. This allows ISIS to identify, in both tactical and operational terms, weak points that can cause an entire enemy position to cave in upon itself. In essence, ISIS has an operational form that allows decentralized commanders to use their experienced fighters against the weakest points of its foes. At the same time, the center retains enough operational control to conduct medium-to-long term planning on how to allocate forces, logistics, and reinforcements.
I also have a piece at the Diplomat about the changing role of small navies:
Of course, in practice local conditions limited the advantages of large forces, and small forces sometimes won the day. Crafted appropriately, small forces could threaten larger fleets with platforms and weapons (such as submarines, torpedo boats, and missile boats) that could threaten large ships. This role, of deterring a much larger force, has been part of the mission-kit of small navies for a very long time.
On the September 22 edition of his show, O’Reilly claimed that the only credible plan to defeat the Islamic State had to include a mercenary force of 25,000 “English-speaking” fighters that would be recruited and trained by the United States. O’Reilly explained that his mercenary army would be comprised of “elite fighters who would be well-paid, well-trained to defeat terrorists all over the world.”
And North Korea needs the hard currency… and North Korean soldiers need the food. It’s a match made in heaven!
So now we’re bombing Syria, in a way we never imagined we might be bombing Syria!
Oh, how the world turns. I realize that I should have a stronger opinion on all of this, both on political and professional grounds. I suppose on both the campaign leaves me feeling cold; it should be fairly clear by this point that there is always the potential for someone worse than the people we’ve decided to bomb at a given moment. I’m also deeply skeptical that either the Kurds, the FSA, the Syrian Army, or the Iraqi Army will be able to take advantage of the airstrikes to do anything very useful against ISIS, although the attrition factor will probably wear on the group over time.
My latest at the National Interest takes a look at the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile:
The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) has generated a tremendous amount of interest over the past five years. If it works, it poses a very serious threat to U.S. Navy (USN) carriers, as well as to the other advanced warships of the USN, of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, and others.
This is an expansion and revision of an old LGM post.
I struggle to stay awake past eleven, so watching the Ducks 7:30 PDT start was a struggle even for a dire fanatic such as myself. I think the fact of the late start, combined with the fact that the Ducks struggled to put the Cougars away, is obscuring just how remarkable of a game Marcus Mariota played. Despite being sacked seven times, he went 21 for 25 with five touchdowns, and ran for 58 yards on 13 carries.
Hell of a performance.
In my latest at the Diplomat, I work through some of the details of the script of Ocean’s 14: Danny Joins Al Qaeda:
Ships are hard to steal in real life, but we do have a few examples. The crews of two Brazilian dreadnoughts mutinied in 1910, threatening to turn their guns on Rio De Janiero before giving up. In 1931 the Chilean Navy mutinied, with crews seizing ships and dockyard areas for about a week. Also in 1931, the Invergordon Mutiny briefly took control of four Royal Navy battleships. The Russian Navy, of course, suffered several mutinies in the early twentieth century.
Fictional thefts have enjoyed more success. In The Hunt for Red October, a small cadre of treasonous officers manages to steal a nuclear ballistic missile submarine. In Crimson Tide, the act is repeated under somewhat different circumstances. In Under Siege and again in Battleship, small groups with inside knowledge manage to steal the USS Missouri. In Star Trek III (oddly, probably the plot most similar to that of the Pakistani effort), a group of five officers orchestrates the theft of a Federation starship.
And so people have imagined stealing ships, and people have successfully stolen ships. With this in mind, how outlandish was the Al Qaeda plot to seize a Pakistani frigate and use it to attack U.S. warships? How hard is it to steal, and operate, a modern warship? After discussing the question with several naval professionals, the short answers seem to be: It depends, and it depends, but under any circumstances hijacking a warship would prove almost absurdly difficult.