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Category: Robert Farley

Sunday Book Review: The North African Air Campaign

[ 12 ] February 16, 2014 |


How much did the US Army Air Force contribute to Axis defeat in the Mediterranean, and what implications did that victory carry for the rest of the war? In The North African Air Campaign: U.S. Army Air Forces from El Alamein to Salerno , Christopher Rein argues that the extant literature on the campaign has misunderstood airpower’s contribution.  Biased interpretations on the part of both air and ground partisans have led to misconceptions about how the campaign played out, and about the nature and capabilities of the USAAF.

The History
Rein tracks the USAAF deployment to North Africa from late 1941, before US involvement had officially begun. US airmen deployed to Egypt in 1941 to begin preparing for US involvement, to support US aircraft being exported to the RAF, and to begin learning RAF tradecraft. The US involvement on the Eastern side of the Med accelerated with the Pearl Harbor attacks, as some of the squadrons that escaped from the Philippines found their way to Egypt, eventually becoming the Ninth Air Force.  These squadrons would (after a failed attempt to attack Ploesti, and an abortive scheme to support the Soviets in the Caucausus) eventually join the RAF in supporting Montgomery’s offensive across Egypt and Libya.  The Ninth Air Force would be joined by the 12th in the wake of Operation Torch, as the Allies slowly tightened the noose on Axis forces in Tunisia.  Following the surrender in North Africa, the USAAF would support amphibious operations in Sicily and Italy, and wage a very successful counter-air operation against the Luftwaffe, notwithstanding the unfortunate diversion of heavy bomber assets to a disastrous raid against Ploesti.

The Relevance
Rein argues, contra much of the historiography on this subject, that the USAAF had relatively sound doctrine and aircraft to undertake a tactical air campaign, but that the problems lay with training and experience. In particular, Rein argues that the struggles in the early part of the campaign came from the lack of joint training with US Army ground forces. Apart from several small engagements in the Pacific Theater, the US Army had virtually no experience with ground-air integration in conventional combat situations.  The lack of available aircraft prior to the war exacerbated this problem.  Much aircraft production in 1941 and 1942 was diverted to the Pacific, to preparing for the Combined Bomber Offensive, or directly to the RAF.  Over the course of the campaign, the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces developed the tacit knowledge necessary to carry out effective air tactics and operations, both through experience and through interaction with the British (and, to a lesser extent, the Germans). In particular, the USAAF developed tactics for the employment of fighter-bombers, a use of pursuit aircraft not conceptualized with any detail prior to the war.

Rein comes to grim conclusions regarding the effectiveness of strategic bombing during the North Africa campaign.  USAAF heavy bombers were used effectively for long-range interdiction at several points during the campaign, attacking transportation networks in Libya and Italy.  However, the diversion of these bombers to attacks on Axis oil production at Ploesti proved a costly catastrophe. On a single night, fifty-three heavy bombers were lost, a total that exceeded combined losses for the previous thirteen months.  The lack of these aircraft, Rein suggests, helped add to early Allied troubles in Italy.  Rein also argues, without qualification, that the commitment of additional heavy bombers to the anti-submarine role could have substantially reduced Allied shipping losses and, potentially, accelerated the end of the war. Overall, Rein argues that the diversion of resources to the CBO significantly hampered Allied effectiveness in the Med, although the USAAF and RAF nevertheless managed to wage a successful air campaign.

The misunderstandings associated with the North Africa campaign stem, in large part, from the broader disputes between air and ground power advocates. Airpower advocates interpret the campaign mostly in negative, doctrinal terms; ground commanders without a sense of how to use airpower dispersed assets, and left the (smaller) Axis air forces in control of the air.  On the ground side, commanders were frustrated with the inability of the USAAF to provide much in the way of force protection, although Rein points out that this also stemmed from misconceptions of the degree of support that airpower could provide for advancing ground forces. The term “penny packets” emerges from this campaign, stemming from the argument that the US defeat at Kasserine Pass came, in large part, from the inability of airpower assets to concentrate and wage an effect counter-air campaign against Axis forces.  This dispersal violated the precept of centralized control, decentralized effect by parceling out air assets across various ground commanders. In fact, bad logistics and bad weather prevented the USAAF from playing its role at Kasserine Pass.

These problems of command and control a) stemmed from inexperience, rather than bad doctrine, and b) were largely solved by mid-1943. Nevertheless, as the modern USAF has struggled to forget its origins in strategic bombing theory and doctrine, the “penny packet” argument has replaced the “independent decisive effect of airpower.”  In comics terms, this amounts to a replacement of a “Golden Age” origin story with one from the “Silver Age.” After independence, of course, the USAF would utterly gut its tactical capabilities, in spite of promises made to the Army and to General Eisenhower.

Conclusion

This is an outstanding work on a campaign that remains misunderstood. Rein writes well, and has considerable practical and theoretical experience of airpower (a USAF Lieutenant Colonel, Rein teaches at the US Air Force Academy). The book is relatively short, but explains the strategic and operational issues sufficiently that even relative novices should be able to follow the action.  Rein also draws implications from this episode for the later history of airpower, although the lack of space and development makes these feel a touch strained.  Nevertheless, I heartily recommend this book.

 

Centralized Control, Decentralized Effect

[ 6 ] February 16, 2014 |

I have created a page for Grounded which collects as many of the articles, reviews, and responses that I could remember to list.  Also buying information, etc. If there’s anything I’ve forgotten, or that I should add, please let me know.

Nobody Cares About Missiles

[ 33 ] February 16, 2014 |

There’s so much wrong with this:

The problems with the ICBM force, military and outside experts say, stem from the Cold War’s end and the pressures of the nation’s post-9/11 conflicts. Those twin challenges have dulled the glory and pride once associated with the nuclear mission. “Many current senior Air Force leaders interviewed were cynical about the nuclear mission, its future, and its true (versus publicly stated) priority to the Air Force,” a 2012 Air Force report said.

The pressure to cheat can be intense: Some tests were scored to two decimal places—99.44%, for example, like the purported purity of Ivory Soap. “The cheating is pervasive,” says a former Minuteman crew operator who left the service in 2010. “It’s pervasive because the leadership places so much emphasis on rote test scores to advance.” In the wake of the recent scandal at Malmstrom, airmen retook tests under intense scrutiny to ensure there was no cheating; the average test score was 95.5%. “So they’re not cheating to pass —they’re cheating to get 100s because so much emphasis is placed on test scores to advance,” this former missileer says…

Cheating was encouraged by higher-ups. “The commander would sit down with you and say, `These tests are ridiculous—you can try to do it all by yourself, which is noble, but you’ll but you’ll never be promoted,’” says the missiler who left the service in 2011. “There was times I was saved from failing by cheating. The testing got so ridiculous that it was no longer testing your ability to be a missile operator—it was testing your ability to take tests.”

The higher-ranking squadron and group commanders played along. “Some of the colonels were so lazy they’d call and tell me to fill in the answers for them,” the ex-missileer said of their quarterly recertification tests. “I very rarely saw the colonels take the test honestly.”

As I’ve argued, the problem isn’t the indiscipline of a particular subset of Air Force officers.  That indiscipline in the nearly inevitable result of institutional indifference to maintaining a capability that yields little in the way of resources or prestige.

 

 

Instincts Gone Wrong?

[ 41 ] February 15, 2014 |

Along with a lot of Kentuckians, I’ve generally been impressed with Rand Paul’s purely political skills. During his initial campaign, there was grudging acknowledgment that he could probably win in circumstances favorable to insurgent Republicans, but that he had not displayed much in the way of political acumen, and was unlikely to make much of a splash beyond being the Senate’s resident curiosity.  I think that’s largely been proven wrong, as Paul has taken advantage of his platform to increase his visibility without  reducing his viability.

I do wonder about this, however:

Blame is also owed to the media, in [Paul's] way of looking at it. “I think really the media seems to have given President Clinton a pass on this,” said Paul, adding: “He took advantage of a girl that was 20-years-old and an intern in his office. There is no excuse for that and that is predatory behavior.”

Excuse me while I choke on my coffee. Those eager to dredge up the past, would be wise to dredge accurately. The suggestion that the media gave Clinton a “pass” suggests that at the time this was happening, the libertarian ophthalmologist was perhaps too busy to read what was in the newspapers.

Half the voting public may now be too young to recall the details, but as a card-carrying member of the media then and now, I can say that my workplace at the time, the Washington Post, was so transfixed by poor Monica Lewinsky that you could hardly go to the water cooler or the cafeteria or the pens-and-notebooks cupboard without being presented by a colleague with some new detail of what might or might not have transpired between the president and his beret-wearing intern. This was true at every other newspaper or magazine. The story consumed every sentient being in the nation’s capital, including dogs, cats, members of Congress and anybody remotely aware of the Starr report and its salacious footnotes, which people read out loud to one another at the breakfast table.

I could be terribly wrong, and revisiting Monica Lewinsky might indeed prove a political winner in 2016 in a way that it did not in, say, 1998.  I’d be pretty goddamned surprised if that were the case, however.

 

Dispensing with Strategy and the Strategists

[ 10 ] February 12, 2014 |

On the heels of arguing that strategy isn’t so important, let me suggest that the impact of strategists is generally over-stated:

Does this mean that Obama is indebted to any particular theorists of restraint or “offshore balancing?”  Not likely. There are many strategic theorists who would have counseled such restraint. Stephen Walt is one of them, but other “offshore balancers” include Christopher Layne, Eugene Gholz, and the bulk of the Cato Institute. Numerous leftish commentators have also counseled restraint, especially in the wake of the Bush administration. But indeed, compared to George W. Bush, we could categorize nearly every strategic thinker in the United States as advising restraint.  In some situations, even the most hawkish of Presidents can look restrained. As Walt himself has argued, Obama is merely responding to situational constraints.

Shut Up, Nick

[ 63 ] February 12, 2014 |

Well, this is certainly a way to solve the Ducks:

The NCAA committee recommended a rules change that will allow defensive units to substitute within the first 10 seconds of the 40-second play clock, excluding the final two minutes of each half. So in effect, offenses won’t be allowed to snap the ball until the play clock reaches 29 seconds or less. If the offense snaps the ball before then, it would be penalized five yards for delay of game. Under current rules, defenses aren’t guaranteed an opportunity to substitute unless the offense subs first….

But some coaches, including Alabama’s Nick Saban and Arkansas’ Bret Bielema, have criticized hurry-up offenses, arguing that they give offenses an unfair advantage and don’t allow them to adequately substitute defensive players.

“All you’re trying to do is get lined up [on defense],” Saban told ESPN.com in September. “You can’t play specialty third-down stuff. You can’t hardly scheme anything. The most important thing is to get the call so the guys can get lined up, and it’s got to be a simple call. The offense kind of knows what you’re doing.”

Why yes; that is, indeed, the point.

Two thoughts: First, no huddle offenses are, without question, a lot of fun to watch. This is especially true when they’re conducted by teams, like the Ducks, that are very good at them.  Outlawing them in order to please Nick Saban makes college football altogether less interesting.  Second, the best defenses in the Pac-12 have, to my utter chagrin, demonstrated that the Ducks (and teams like them) can, in fact, be stopped.  This is a solution in search of a problem.

Trolling

[ 176 ] February 12, 2014 |

No surprise here:

In yet another instance of science belatedly confirming what common sense has already told us, a new paper from researchers at three Canadian universities concludes that Internet trolls aren’t just mean — they’re sadists and psychopaths.

The paper, published last week in the journal Personality and Individual Differences, surveyed a group of several hundred on their Internet behaviors and personal traits. It found that trolling correlated with higher rates of sadism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism, a certain lack of scruples when it comes to deceiving or manipulating other people.

“… it might be said that online trolls are prototypical everyday sadists,” the paper rules.

I used to try to convince people that there’s no way to conceive of a retort so clever, so devastating that the troll will actually throw in the towel, or feel bad about him/herself. By the time you hit the “reply” button, you’ve already lost the battle.  I don’t much bother with that anymore.

…although I’ll grant that the temptation to troll this thread is strong…

Foreign Entanglements: Coalitions, Caveats, and Blogging

[ 0 ] February 11, 2014 |

In this week’s episode of Foreign Entanglements, I speak with Steve Saideman about the recent difficulties with the International Studies Association:

We also talk at length about Steve’s new book, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone. Excellent book, check it out.

I’ve Got the Moves Like Keynes

[ 14 ] February 10, 2014 |

At 4:30, Cavett asks Mick about Keynes:

Via W. K. Winecoff.

Sunday Book Review: The Bombing War

[ 116 ] February 9, 2014 |

Richard Overy’s The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 catalogs the strategic bombing campaigns of the European theater of World War II.  Overy covers the two best-known campaigns– the Blitz and the Combined Bomber Offensive– in detail, but also examines the lesser known campaigns in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front. The East Asian campaigns, by Japan against China and the United States against Japan, lay outside the scope of this work. Two questions hovers over the book: First, who was responsible for the Bombing War, and could it have been prevented? Second, what was the overall effect of the Bombing War? The fairest answer to the first seems to be “The British and the Germans, mostly the former,” while the best answer to the latter would be “uncertain, but probably not all that much.”

Strategic bombing in Europe

Before detailing those answers, it’s worth describing the book’s contribution to our understanding of strategic bombing in the European Theater of Operations. Overy’s generally defines strategic bombing as bombing attacks directed against civilian targets, whether in pursuit of independent effect or as part of other military operations. Although he discusses many of the most important technical innovations, this is not, primarily, a book about aircraft. Overy gives detailed accounts not only of how military and civilian authorities undertook the campaigns, but also of how civilians managed to endure them. While the bulk of the book concentrates on the Blitz and the CBO (which can fairly be regarded as the two most important strategic bombing campaigns), it also examines strategic bombing in the other theaters.

Strategic bombing was not central to the Eastern Front, although both sides periodically engaged in some efforts.  The Soviets launched several attacks against German targets in the early part of the war, but inflicted little damage at the expense of most of their four engine bombers.  After this, the Russians concentrated overwhelmingly on tactical aviation in support of the Red Army.  For their part, the Germans engaged in some city-bombing campaigns, mostly notably against Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad.  Only in the last was the aerial bombardment sustained and extremely destructive.  German purpose in this bombing was most tactical and operational, intended to destroy infrastructure and soften up cities prior to German occupation.  Nevertheless, even this “tactical” bombing accounted for the deaths of some 50000 Soviet civilians over the course of the war. The Soviets considered developing their own strategic bombing arm toward the end of the war, but decided that this would needlessly duplicate Western Allied efforts.  Not incidentally, the Soviet also appropriated significant numbers of Western bombers following emergency landings in Soviet controlled territory.

The Mediterranean also saw its share of strategic bombing, with the focus of Allied efforts falling on Italy.  The Allies launched a pair of ill-fated attacks on Ploesti, minimally damaging the oil refineries there at tremendous cost in terms of aircraft, aircrew, and attention to the operational needs of the Italian and African campaigns.  The rest of Allied bombing concentrated on Italy itself, first across the peninsula and then, following the Italian surrender, against the northern industrial cities that remained under fascist control.  Airbases in Italy provided a useful alternative to those in the United Kingdom, as they generally enjoyed better weather than northern Europe.  Overy does suggest that several raids around the fall of Mussolini helped catalyze the Italian surrender, although given the strategic situation in the Mediterranean and the half-hearted Italian commitment to the war effort, it’s difficult to imagine that they accelerated the surrender by much.

Who was responsible, and why?

With respect to responsibility, Overy argues that the British decision to engage in (fairly desultory) strategic bombing raids after the fall of France played a significant role in German decision-making with respect to the Blitz.  The Luftwaffe was not equipped, either doctrinally or technologically, for an extended strategic bombing campaign.  The terror raids in the early campaigns had come directly for tactical and operational purposes, as the Luftwaffe regarded itself (beyond some exploration of other options in the late 1930s) as primarily a support arm for the Wehrmacht.  The RAF, on the other hand, viewed terror bombing as a war-winning strategy in an of itself.  The things that we call terror bombing prior to the Blitz were really very small compared to the firestorms of the latter part of World War II; the bombing of Guernica killed a few hundred civilians, Rotterdam 850, Warsaw perhaps 7000 or so.  Moreover, all were part of broader operational campaigns on the part of the Wehrmacht, rather than air operations intended to have independent decisive effect.

The Germans also had significant caveats regarding a strategic bombing campaign.  Some officers felt that such a campaign violated the laws of war, and other officers and civilians worried that the RAF was better prepared (with its nascent development of heavy bombers) to inflict serious damage on German cities in the long run.  Moreover, Overy argues that the Blitz was primarily targeted against British infrastructure, industry, and military targets; similar in form to the American precision bombing of the later years of the war, rather than the RAF night terror bombing. Of course, the Germans operated at a far lower level of sophistication than the Americans, with no four engine bombers or advanced bombsights.  The Germans also bombed primarily at night.

These distinctions were utterly lost on the British.  On the one hand, the British government had an interest in describing the Blitz as terror bombing, both as part of a general propaganda campaign against the enemy and to justify later British terror bombing.  On the other hand, German bombing accuracy was so inconsistent that the anti-industry, anti-infrastructure campaign was effectively indistinguishable from a terror campaign. In effect and perception, thus, the Blitz was a terror bombing campaign, one that killed about 45000 British civilians, and had a small effect on British war production (5% of total economic production).

This should hardly excuse the Germans; even if the RAF precipitated the Blitz, the Blitz far exceeded anything that the RAF had managed up to that point in the war. And we should also note that while many Germans during World War II had caveats about a great many things, Germans of the time were rather good at overcoming those caveats. Finally, air campaigns have a way of metastasizing beyond their initial parameters. Even lacking an early decision on the part of the Germans to undertake a long-term strategic campaign, the lack of success of Sea Lion and the continued resistance of the British likely would have turned some notional “counterforce Blitz” into the Blitz of history.

On the British side of the ledger, we have a night terror bombing campaign that was conceived early in the war and executed, without reference to any meaningful metrics of the success, for the duration of the conflict. In my view, Michael Walzer’s moment of “supreme emergency” (in which it was legitimate to attempt anything which might possibly work) runs from May 1940 until (at the very latest) December 1941, at which point it the United States has become engaged in the war and it has become apparent that the Soviet Union would survive the first of the Wehrmacht’s hammer blows.  Overy points out that there were off-ramps; Churchill was not particularly troubled by the moral aspects of the campaign, but was skeptical about the immense amounts of blood and treasure being fed into the machine. RAF commanders, including but not exclusively Arthur Harris, nevertheless continued to argue that sending four engine bombers to incinerate German civilians represented the most efficient use of British military resources.

Even if Churchill had said “no, too much,” it’s not obvious that the Americans could have been dissuaded.  Overy points out that the U.S. approach to strategic bombing was closer to the German than the British concepts, with a focus on daylight precision bombing against economic and logistical targets. Not coincidentally, American bombing would be, to the bombed, as indistinguishable from terror bombing as was the German. While the United States Army Air Force wasn’t completely unprepared for the tactically-oriented air campaigns of the Mediterranean, USAAF identity was bound up in the concept of strategic bombing for independent, decisive effect; this was seen not only as the most critical contribution that airpower could make, but also as the service’s ticket to independence.  Thus, even had the British decided to pursue a different strategy, it’s doubtful that they could have prevented the Americans from pressing the issue in 1943. Overy is not shy about pointing out that the two most democratic major participants in the Second World War also undertook the most murderous strategic bombing campaigns. It is hardly unreasonable to point out that the Axis powers, nevertheless, accounted for the vast majority of civilians deaths in the war, although the extent to which this justified the CBO should be in some dispute.

The impact of the Bombing War

With respect to the overall impact of the Bombing War, Overy’s answer can best be summarized as follows: the Bombing War destroyed Europe and the Luftwaffe, but not German industry or warmaking capacity.  This is a complicated answer, of course, but Overy supports it with strong data.  Both the Blitz and the CBO had some economic impact, the latter more than the former, but in neither case did this impact match either the expectations of or the investments made by the aggressors.  In both cases, the defenders were sufficiently able to reallocated economic factors away from civilian activities to continue the productivity of war industries, and to protect/coerce labor into maintaining effort. By 1945 German industry was surely suffering, but this was as much the result of the loss of access to resources and the direct peril posed by Allied armies as it was from the bombing. Put briefly, strategic bombing failed to have much more than a marginal effect on its economic targets.

The morale effect of the bombing was, according to Overy, more complex than is commonly understood.  The way in which people engaged in daily life surely changed because of the bombing, but not in the ways that were expected by the theorists and practitioners of strategic bombing.  Most notably, with the partial exception of Italy, strategic bombing never ruptured the relationship between civilians and politico-military elites sufficiently to bring about a surrender, or even a significant disruption in the warmaking effort. Indeed, Overy points out that Hamburg, the first target subjected to an Allied “firestorm,” was regarded at the time as a center of anti-Nazi, anti-Bolshevik, and largely anti-war sentiment within Germany. The firestorm generated by “Operation Gomorrah” killed 32000 German civilians over a six night period.

Overy also discusses the impact of the CBO on the Luftwaffe at some length. The CBO undermined German airpower both directly and indirectly, destroying German fighter strength while also denuding the tactical theaters of air support. It shifted significant German resources to air defense, reconstruction, and damage response. For Overy, this is the key contribution that the CBO made to Allied victory in World War II. The Wehrmacht, deprived of air support and even of air defense in the latter stages of war, was much easier to bring to the edge of defeat that it would have been without the CBO.  Although German armies conducted maneuver, flexible defense, and even offensive action under conditions of Allied air superiority, there is no question that the Wehrmacht was vastly more effective when it could count on the Luftwaffe.

Overy does not, however, dwell at any length on how alternative airpower approaches might have produced the same effects at considerably lower cost.  The offensive counter-air campaigns on the Eastern Front and in the Mediterranean also devastated German airpower, despite concentrating mostly on operational and tactical effect. Consequently, I struggle to believe that the most efficient way to defeat the Luftwaffe was to send extraordinarily expensive four-engine behemoths over Germany, with the purpose of incinerating German cities.  These behemoths surely attracted German interest, but in part because they represented a far easier, more juicy target than the tactical air forces waging war in France, in the Mediterranean, and on the Eastern Front. A concerted counter-air campaign, based on long range fighters, attack aircraft, and medium bombers might well have destroyed the Luftwaffe at nearly the same rate, and at considerably lower cost to the Allies and to the civilians of German-occupied Europe.  Heavy bombers could have been diverted to long-range interdiction and anti-submarine warfare. Indeed, Overy points out that among the largest components of the destruction of German airpower came through attacks by escorting Allied fighters against German airbases. Resources devoted to four engine bombers could have been shifted to other purposes, including additional tactical aircraft, transport aircraft, and non-air military uses.  Even with the expensive heavy bombers, all three of the major Allies dramatically outpaced German aircraft production, creating massive advantages on every front of the war by 1943.

What were those costs?  RAF Bomber Command lost nearly 55000 dead during the war, constituting a death rate of nearly 41 % of all Bomber Command aircrew.  The USAAF lost about 30000 dead across all the campaigns in the ETO. The costs in treasure are difficult to quantify, although some have tried; Richard Rhodes argues that research and production of the B-29 (which didn’t even see service in Europe) exceeded in cost the Manhattan Project, while John Fahey has detailed the catastrophic impact of the Combined Bomber Offensive on the British economy. The toll of Allied strategic bombing on Europe is difficult to calculate, but Overy gives estimates of 353000 civilian dead in Germany, with another 60000 or so in Italy and 75000 in the rest of Europe (mostly France), with virtually incalculable effects on civilian economic activity. Given all this, it’s hard for me to dissent from A.C. Grayling’s evaluation of the strategic bombing campaign:

Was area bombing necessary? No.

Was it proportionate? No.

Was it against the humanitarian principles that people have been striving to enunciate as a way of controlling and limiting war? Yes.

Was it against general moral standards of the kind recognized and agreed in Western civilization in the last five centuries, or even 2000 years? Yes.

Was it against what mature national laws provide in the way of outlawing murder, bodily harm, and destruction of property? Yes.

In short and in sum: Was area bombing wrong? Yes.

Very wrong? Yes.

Conclusion

My disagreement with Overy aside, there can be little doubt that this is an epic account, indispensible to students of the European Theater of World War II. Overy is a masterful historian, deeply knowledgeable about every aspect of his subject, and in command of the fundamental factors that brought the Bombing War about and that brought it to conclusion.  I wholeheartedly recommend, both for relative novices (who will learn much about the conflict), and for experts (who will find considerable value in the shading of Overy’s judgments on operational and strategic matters).

Hoffman

[ 5 ] February 9, 2014 |

Alyssa Rosenberg and Matt Lewis talk about the legacy of Philip Seymour Hoffman:

My Seven Year Old Dreams Made Manifest…

[ 46 ] February 8, 2014 |

This is my today.

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