People should really listen to Robert Pape.
And, for that matter, read his book.
I concur and would add:
The Bush administration said it viewed attempts by Venezuela or other countries to influence the transition in Cuba as unwarranted intervention. “The president is worried about people in the neighborhood who seek to destabilize neighbors using economic or other means,” Mr. Snow said.
Interesting. Seems to me that in 1982, in Hama, Hafez al-Assad wiped out an uprising against his regime by slaughtering 25,000 over a weekend. And in 1991, Saddam Hussein took down the Shiite uprising with similar viciousness. The idea that such monstrous tactics don’t work is ludicrous. They do work. But I think it’s fair to say that we would rather our civilization die than that we commit such acts.
The thing of it is that it isn’t a coincidence that Saddam and Assad were brutal dictators. Which is to say it’s not that on the one hand they were brutal dictators and then on the other hand they crushed insurgents with brutal measures. In order to make counterinsurgency-through-brutality work you need to be actually trying to establish or maintain a brutal dictatorship, crushing civil society and ruling perpetually through force. This is why the Western colonial powers, despite a willingness to engage in the occassional massacre, couldn’t make even though tactics work to maintain their empires.
Yglesias is correct, but that’s not quite how I would have phrased it. (Incidentally, I also don’t think that Clausewitz is cliche; I believe that he makes a very specific, oft misinterpreted argument, but one that’s quite right. Nevertheless, an argument for another day.) I think it would be more appropriate to say that brutal tactics can destroy an insurgency under some circumstances and not others. J-Pod cites Assad and Hussein, but leaves out the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, the Japanese war in China, the Nationalist Chinese war against the Communist Chinese, the Germans in Yugoslavia, and the French in Spain. In all of those situations the organization conducting the counterinsurgency campaign used the most brutal possible tactics (in an effort, in several cases, to establish a brutal dictatorship), yet the efforts failed. What J-Pod misses is that it’s not simply a question of having the will to engage in indiscriminate slaughter; even organizations that have no such qualms often lose.
I’m inclined to think that this is less a question of will than of military science. I’m sure that Kingdaddy could lend much more productive commentary, but my first cut at the question would be that extermination campaigns can work against opponents who are relatively isolated from the rest of the world, and thus lack supplies, sanctuaries, and a transnational leadership hierarchy. Indeed, although the determinants are probably different in some dimensions, my guess would be that the same factors that help determine success in a “civilized” counter-insurgency campaign are those that indicate success in a brutal one.
… which makes it all the harder to acknowledge when he nails one on the head. Some choice quotes:
I was just in the middle of writing a long and tedious essay, about how to tell a real anti-Semite from a person who too-loudly rejects the charge of anti-Semitism, when a near-perfect real-life example came to hand. That bad actor and worse director Mel Gibson, pulled over for the alleged offense of speeding and the further alleged offense of speeding under the influence, decided that he needed to demand of the arresting officer whether he was or was not Jewish and that he furthermore needed to impart the information that all the world’s wars are begun by those of Semitic extraction.
One does not abruptly decide, between the first and second vodka, or the ticks of the indicator of velocity, that the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion are valid after all.
And it has been obvious for some time to the most meager intelligence that he is sick to his empty core with Jew-hatred. This is not just proved by his twistedly homoerotic spank-movie The Passion of the Christ, even though that ghastly production did focus obsessively on the one passage in the one of the four Gospels that tries to convict the Jewish people en masse of the hysterical charge of Christ-killing or “deicide.”
Now it should be fairly acknowledged that one may, between the sixth and seventh scotch on the rocks, decide that Paul Wolfowitz is a genius, especially if one is Christopher Hitchens. Nevertheless…
What is it about “hawkish” pundits that they can’t understand nationalism?
In Iraq, the leviathan has somehow managed to give the impression that what previous mid-rank powers would have regarded as a little light colonial policing has left it stretched dangerously thin and bogged down in an almighty quagmire. Even if it were only lamebrain leftist media spin, the fact that it’s accepted by large numbers of Americans and huge majorities of Europeans is a reminder that in free societies a military of unprecedented dominance is not the only source of power. More importantly, significant proportions of this nation’s enemies also believe the spin. In April 2003 was Baby Assad nervous that he’d be next? You bet. Is he nervous now?
It’s not as if nationalism is new; in its modern form, it has been around since at least 1789. Admittedly, the introduction of nationalism as an ideology didn’t happen until the twentieth century in many parts of the world, and in many places identification with the nation-state still isn’t the paramount form of political identity, but you would still expect that advocates of empire would take note of a phenomenon which has been around for a couple of centuries and which has fundamentally challenged the imperial model of governance.
To be as brief as possible, occupying and controlling a country like Iraq is much more difficult today than it would have been in 1890. While the French were able to control all of Indochina in the late 19th century with a relatively small number of troops, the United States couldn’t pacify half of Vietnam with a huge investment of military force in the 1960s. For a variety of reasons, most notably the spread of mass media and the consequent creation of national languages and historical narratives, new types of identification have been created. Entire books have been written about this process; it’s not a secret.
Nevertheless, guys like Steyn and especially Ferguson continue to talk as if they’ve never heard of nationalism. Need to pacify Iraq? Good show; the Ottomans managed with a few battalions in 1884, so shouldn’t be a problem for us. The problem extends into the administration, where policymakers seem to believe that people in Iraq/Lebanon/Iran/Syria will be delighted when the bombs start raining down, as long as the bombs (mostly) hit their domestic opponents.
Modern advocates of empire MUST grapple with the difficulties that nationalism creates if they want to be taken seriously. As I’ll discuss later this week, the pre-eminent imperial advocate, Niall Ferguson, utterly fails to do this. His failure doesn’t absolve the rest, though.
I think it’s time we dispense with this fiction:
I think that [Drum’s] reference to “casual genocide” as the preferred strategy of pro-war people is pretty clear, and pretty absurd. Yeah, you see that kind of thing in blog comments sometime, but I think most people support current U.S. military efforts because they fear that ignoring the problem is likely to produce more death and violence over the long term, not less.
In the wake of J-Pod’s suggestion that we just didn’t kill enough Sunni men to intimidate the rest, and Rush Limbaugh’s Bin Laden-esque justification of the slaughter of civilians, we’re way past the point at which exterminationist sentiment could be blamed on a few commenters. With the twin disasters of Iraq and Lebanon and the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, “Exterminate the Brutes” seems like the only thing the 101st Fighting Keyboarders have left.
Also read Dan on why a “kill ‘em all” strategy is likely to fail today, assuming that it could ever be relied upon.
Day by day, even as Iran’s officials assess the military setbacks of Hezbollah, they have grown more and more emboldened by the gathering support in the Islamic world for the Iranian-backed Lebanese militia on the front line with Israel. They have grown more and more emboldened by what they see as a validation of their confrontational approach to foreign policy — and in their efforts to silence political opposition at home.
That is the view of at least some opposition figures, analysts and former government officials who say they find themselves in the awkward position of opposing Israel and sympathizing with the Lebanese people, yet fear what might happen should Hezbollah prevail.
But I’m sure that bombing Iran itself WOULD energize the reform movement.
Wow. Wouldn’t that be a kicker, if Fidel picked this moment to shuffle off the mortal coil?
Everybody knows that US Cuba policy wins no prizes for rationality. That the US has maintained the same policy vis-a-vis Cuba for 44 years is impressive; most countries, seeing no results, would have given up before 20, or 35 at the limit. Does anyone know the last time that a major presidential candidate has advocated a serious change in Cuba policy? The sheer inertia of the policy suggests to me that it won’t be altered until Cuba itself changes. Even then, there are no assurances. As Yglesias noted a while ago, statutory US policy takes seriously the fantasy that Cuban exiles will get all of their property back after Castro is gone. The President at the time of the transition seems to have considerable latitude regarding how and whether the embargo will be lifted. Operating under the assumption that any administration, Democratic or Republican, has to be more diplomatically capable than this one, I can’t help but wonder whether it would be better if Fidel lingered on a couple more years before kicking off. I also have no doubt that a Democrat would be better on Cuba than a Republican, given that the truly psychotic elements of the anti-Castro movement (I recall one guy asserting, on Fox News, that Castro had a hand in 9/11) seem more strongly tied to the GOP.
Praktike is quite right; one of the things that has disappeared in a cloud of Lebanese dust over the past two weeks has been Condi Rice’s reputation as a diplomat. I wasn’t quite willing to give her much credit as Sec State, but from what I know the people at State like her, and she hadn’t seemed egregiously more inept in this job than anyone else in the Bush administration. Certainly, it looked as if her SecState performance was an improvement on her NSA work.
But not now. If she’s not a hawk it’s even worse; if she has influence inside the administration it’s not apparent, and she’s proven completely incapable of putting together any international support for, well, any policy at all. As if it weren’t an absurd proposition in the first place, the “Condi for President” line seems not long for this world.
Give a hearty LGM welcome to my newly minted niece, Rowyn Alaina Farley.
It’s good to know that there’s another kidney out there for me.
HMS Duke of York was the third of the King George V class, the first “Treaty” battleships designed and built for the Royal Navy. Like other Treaty battleships, Duke of York was limited to a 35000 ton displacement. The United Kingdom had hoped that gun size would be restricted to 14″, and designed Duke of York around 14″ guns instead of around a previously decided 15″ arrangement.
The design had a number of problems. Because the Royal Navy expected to be able to rely upon many refueling bases, Duke of York’s range was very short. This meant that, during the Bismarck pursuit, Prince of Wales had to break off due to lack of fuel, and King George V was nearly forced to do the same. The decision to mount 14″ guns was a disaster. They could not be mounted in the planned three quadruple turret arrangement, so Duke of York only carried 10 guns. The 14″ guns had notably less “oomph” than the naval weapons carried by other navies; although Prince of Wales scored one penetrating hit on Bismarck at Denmark Straits, King George V’s shells bounced off Bismarck’s belt armor a week later. The quadruple turrets also had serious malfunction problems. On the upside, Duke of York and her sisters were heavily armored (although the armor wasn’t as well-arranged as it could have been), and could make a higher speed than their American or Japanese counterparts (with the exception of the US Iowa class).
Duke of York was, nonetheless, a powerful ship. She displaced 37000 tons, carried 10 14″ guns, and could make 29 knots. The differences between fast battleships are a bit over-stated, as situational factors and luck would probably have determined the outcome of combat between any but the most seriously mismatched of opponents. The day after Christmas 1943, just such battle took place. The German battlecruiser Scharnhorst received word of an Allied convoy, and put to sea on Christmas Day. Scharnhorst knew that British cruisers were about, but had no idea that the Duke of York was also escorting the convoy. Scharnhorst skirmished with several British cruisers before breaking off and turning for Norway. Blinded by damage to her radar, she didn’t detect Duke of York until the latter opened fire at a range of about 12000 yards. Scharnhorst turned to flee (she could outrun Duke of York), but a lucky shot hit a boiler, reducing Scharnhort’s speed to 20 knots. This made the result of the engagement a foregone conclusion; Duke of York continued to hit Scharnhorst, and British destroyers eventually moved in for the killing blow with torpedos.
Following the destruction of Tirpitz, last major German raiding threat, Duke of York was transferred to the Pacific, where she took part in the invasion of Okinawa. After the war Duke of York served as flagship of the Home Fleet for several years before being decommissioned in 1949. The Royal Navy fell victim to a general post-war belt-tightening in the UK, and Duke of York was sold for scrap in 1957.
(Images courtesy of Maritimequest.)
Trivia: The Washington Naval Treaty mandated the destruction of most pre-dreadnought battleships. Name the
fourfive US pre-dreadnoughts that survived the naval treaties.