Until two weeks ago, Steven Salaita was heading to a job at the University of Illinois as a professor of American Indian Studies. He had already resigned from his position at Virginia Tech; everything seemed sewn up. Now the chancellor of the University of Illinois has overturned Salaita’s appointment and rescinded the offer. Because of Israel.
Author Page for Robert Farley
It looks as if Ukrainian forces are making slow, measured progress against pro-Russian separatists. If that’s true, this is how I read the rest of the game playing out:
The Ukrainian government wants to re-occupy as much of Ukraine as possible, while at the same time forestalling Russian military action and preserving the hope of a positive economic relationship with Russia. Ukraine also wants a clear message of support from NATO, although it’s not obvious that anyone in Kiev expects that membership will be forthcoming. I suspect that the Ukrainian government is willing to risk some degree of military conflict; a short, sharp defeat at the hands of Russian forces would be painful, but would also help placate Ukrainian nationalists, and would cement the NATO commitment to support (if not defend) Ukraine in the future.
NATO has many partners, and they have a variety of different interests. None want to see war with Russia, however, and few if any would like to see a Russian invasion of Ukraine. Beyond that, NATO’s interests are in preserving an economic and political relationship with Russia, while maximizing Kiev’s control over eastern Ukraine. Tolerance for risk on the latter point varies considerably, but is only in a very few cases (perhaps Poland) as high as in Kiev.
I suspect that NATO will continue to play a supportive role, trying to modify Russia’s behavior with sanctions and the threat of sanctions. It will provide some material and intelligence support for Kiev, while struggling to prevent Ukraine from becoming over-optimistic about the extent of this support.
Putin does not want to invade Ukraine; if he actively sought this end, he would already have ordered military action, rather than allowing the new Ukrainian government to consolidate power and retake some lost territory. He wants two things; to minimize US and European sanctions, and to maximize the size of the buffer zones in the disputed regions. However, Putin has to contend with two other factions. Pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and Russian nationalists in Russia are both free to seek maximal gains, and can (in tandem) apply pressure to Putin. Putin is hardly invulnerable domestically, and has to take the strength of the nationalists seriously, especially as he’s come to depend on them.
With the separatists apparently no longer holding the upper hand, Russia has two tools; energy, and its military. Energy sanctions are a two way street, as both Europe and Russia lose through a prolonged disruption. The military balance, however, strongly favors Russia; the Russian military is stronger than it was in 2008, and enjoys a more favorable operational position. If Ukrainian government forces push to far, I suspect that the balance will shift and Putin will order much more aggressive military action against Ukraine. This will preserve the buffer zones, placate nationalists, and serve as a warning to the other post-Soviet republics. It will also incur greater sanctions, but if Russia avoids a drive on Kiev these will be manageable.
My guess is that we’ll see a short, conventional war of maneuver between Russia and Ukraine, that the Russian will win, but will restrain its activities to Donetsk, Luhansk, and environs. It’s going to be very difficult for the Ukrainian military to restrain itself short of complete victory over the separatists, and the drive for victory will probably spur Russian intervention. With luck, however, the war will be quick, only moderately destructive, and the political aftermath will be manageable.
The last redoubt of the Ottoman Empire is under siege:
In 1945, Ertogroul Osman moved into a two-bedroom walk-up apartment on the top floor of a three-story commercial building on Lexington Avenue south of 74th Street. Though it had a handsome mansard roof at the time and a prime uptown location, the stout 34-foot-wide property was practically a hovel compared with the 124-acre Yildiz Palace in old Constantinople where Mr. Osman was born and where his grandfather Abdul Hamid II ruled from 1876 to 1909. Had the empire not been dissolved, Mr. Osman would have taken the throne in 1994. Instead he spent 64 years in the same apartment until he died in 2009 on a trip to Istanbul with his second wife, Her Imperial Highness Zeynep Osman, who had joined him on Lexington Avenue after their marriage in 1991. Like her husband, Princess Zeynep’s royal family had had to flee its home in Afghanistan in the 1920s.
Now Zeynep, an Istanbul native, fears she may be forced out of her New York home. After her building was sold in 2011 for $10.1 million, her new landlord, Avi Dishi, paid a visit to the 1,600-square-foot apartment that October.
“The first words out of his mouth were: ‘I want you out. I paid too much for this building to have you here,’ ” Princess Zeynep, 69, recalled, sitting inside her large living room sharing platters of cookies and crackers — a courtly gesture she said she also extended to her landlord, along with any other guests.
What’s remarkable about this story is that it involves a conflict between the exceedingly wealthy heir of two imperial heritages and a land developer, and the former is by far the more sympathetic figure. Or perhaps that’s not surprising at all…
Via M Lister.
As occasionally hinted over the past year, I’ve been considering a book project built around a collection of Sunday Battleship Blogging posts of yore. This project may finally be coming to fruition, but I’m struggling with the title. As Thucydides once said, “when you’re too lazy to think for yourself, crowdsource it.”
Thus, my query to all of you: What would be a good title for collection of sixty-some-odd vignettes on battleships? The winning entry (if any) receives an autographed copy of the book, assuming it all comes together.
Reading about the guns of August puts me in the mood for Herodotus:
And now, as he looked and saw the whole Hellespont covered with the vessels of his fleet, and all the shore and every plain about Abydos as full as possible of men, Xerxes congratulated himself on his good fortune; but after a little while he wept.
Then Artabanus, the king’s uncle (the same who at the first so freely spake his mind to the king, and advised him not to lead his army against Greece), when he heard that Xerxes was in tears, went to him, and said:-
“How different, sire, is what thou art now doing, from what thou didst a little while ago! Then thou didst congratulate thyself; and now, behold! thou weepest.”
“There came upon me,” replied he, “a sudden pity, when I thought of the shortness of man’s life, and considered that of all this host, so numerous as it is, not one will be alive when a hundred years are gone by.”
My latest listical for National Interest takes a look at five potential areas of arms collaboration between Russia and China:
The continued deterioration of relations between Russia and NATO may not yet have resulted in a new Cold War, but it’s undoubtedly produce an environment in which Russia has independent reasons to try to hurt the United States.
While the arms trade between China and Russia exploded after the fall of the Soviet Union, shipments of major systems slowed in the early part of last decade. Part of the reason was demand; China felt that it no longer needed to pay top dollar for Russian systems that it could build itself. Another reason, however, involved Russian intellectual property concerns stemming from Chinese copying, and potential export, of Russian military systems. This made Russia reluctant to export its most sophisticated weapons.
In light of recent lineup additions, never a bad time to remind of our social media connections:
And here’s the entire list, if you’re into that sort of thing.
The next Guns N’ Roses album? No, my latest at the Diplomat:
Ankit’s recent post (building on Rebecca Grant’s longer list at Air Force Magazine) opens the question of whether China has structured its military institutions such that they support the sophisticated development and dynamic use of military aviation.
In short, how does the organizational configuration of Chinese airpower matter for how China will fight, plan to fight, and procure?
There is no single optimal way to organize military forces. Different organizational constellations produce different outcomes for warfighting, procurement, and strategic thought. Reorganizations are costly, and shouldn’t be undertaken at the drop of a hat, but nevertheless provide an opportunity to better align organizational imperatives with national goals.
One hundred years ago today, Goeben and Breslau were preparing their escape…
In the years prior to the war, Germany deployed naval squadrons around the world to protect its burgeoning colonial empire. War came so quickly that some of these squadrons were trapped in unfriendly waters, chased by superior British forces.
Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau amounted to a respectable, if not formidable, capability. Germany had two allies in the Mediterranean—Italy and Austria—but Berlin worried the two traditional enemies might fight each other, instead.
The Germans were unprepared for war. Goeben—displacing 25,000 tons and packing 10 11-inch guns—badly needed a refit, as well as refueling, and Mediterranean allies weren’t ready to accommodate the vessel. Vienna still hoped it could avoid war with Britain. Italy was unhelpful.
Longtime LGM readers will recall that I wrote a much longer version of the story several years ago.
Of all the stupid tropes that are used to describe the Israel-Palestine conflict:
What would politicians in Arizona, Texas and California do if Mexico were shooting rockets into Scottsdale, Houston or Los Angeles? You can bet it wouldn’t last almost ten years. More like ten hours, before the USA would unleash whatever force was necessary to protect the citizens of Arizona, Texas and California.
Would America keep the water and the electricity on for a people that were attacking her? Would anyone blame America for protecting their own people and showing strength? Would we care if the rest of the world disagreed?
No, we would care about one thing, and one thing only: protecting American’s and doing the best we could to minimize innocent civilians deaths.
Sure; in the past the United States has punctuated mild tolerance for pinprick attacks launched by indigenous peoples with vicious campaigns of extermination. Many Americans have come to regret this particular reaction; others have not. I daresay, however, that if a substantial group of Americans was subjected to land confiscation and occupation on a scale similar to that imposed upon the Palestinians, they would valorize heroic resistance in the face of impossible odds, however pointless and illegal that resistance might seem to outsiders, and that they would engage in terrorist activity in hopes of overturning the existing political and military order.
And with respect to “But but but Hamas is BAAAD!!”, I agree that this might matter if we were talking about justice. What we’re talking about, however, is the politics and psychology of vengeance.
Institutionally speaking, we are living in 1947. We created military services in order to provide institutional voice to certain kinds of capabilities. Interwar airpower enthusiasts argued that aviators needed an independent service because land and sea commanders could not appreciate the transformative implications of military aviation. Innovation, industry and doctrine would suffer as the parochial interests of the Army and Navy prevented aviators from spreading their wings, so to speak.