Subscribe via RSS Feed

Author Page for Robert Farley

rss feed

Bringing Santa into the 21st Century

[ 13 ] December 25, 2015 |

zhWzkFNbB3-4For Christmas at the National Interest, I took a look at the advanced capabilities of the North Pole Air Force (NPAF):

 

For decades, the media has perpetuated the myth that Santa made Christmas happen from a single sleigh pulled by eight (or possibly nine) magical reindeer. Santa Claus himself purportedly traveled the world in this sleigh, delivering immense loads of toys across the world in what amounted to a snap of the fingers.

Times change, and we are now able to uncover the truth.

FacebookTwitterGoogle+Share

Reconciliation

[ 15 ] December 22, 2015 |
Image-Japanese aircraft carrier Junyo 2 cropped.jpg

“Japanese aircraft carrier Junyo” by Official U.S. Navy Photograph. Licensed under Public Domain via Commons.

My latest at the Diplomat mentions Barak Kushner’s Men to Devils, Devils to Men, a recent book on the war crimes trials that followed the Pacific War:

Broadly speaking, both Chinese factions sought to demonstrate their commitment to the new international order by appearing magnanimous towards the defeated Japanese. For their part, the Japanese government voluntarily complied with most of the international demands, but the government never engaged in a thorough effort to explain the proceedings to the Japanese public, with the result that many Japanese never grappled with the reality of the war crimes.

Typhoon vs. Rafale

[ 14 ] December 19, 2015 |
RAF Eurofighter Typhoon.jpg

“RAF Eurofighter Typhoon” by Peter Gronemann – Flickr: RAF Eurofighter Typhoon. Licensed under CC BY 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

This article is less interesting for its conclusions (that the Typhoon and Rafale are pretty similar fighters), than for the metrics of evaluation.  If you know anything useful about military aviation, you invariably cringe at articles that begin “The F-35 can’t out dogfight a MiG-21!” or some such nonsense.  Modern fighter aircraft vary on several different axes, and these axes combine in complex ways.  A seemingly minor metric such as “Are the cockpit controls easy for the pilot to understand?” can differentiate a decent fighter from a great one, in ways that are hard to explain to lay audiences.

LGM Bowl Mania Reminder

[ 9 ] December 18, 2015 |
1915 Sooner Football team.png

“1915 Oklahoma Sooners” University of Oklahoma – 1916 Sooner Yearbook Licensed under Public Domain via Commons.

Picks need to be in by tomorrow for LGM Bowl Mania.  I have 62% confidence that I understand the confidence scoring system correctly.

League: Lawyers, Guns and Money

Password: zevon

The Grand Experiments

[ 23 ] December 16, 2015 |
Inboard plans of USS Monitor

“USS Monitor plans” by U.S. Navy – U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph.. Licensed under Public Domain via Commons.

On the occasion of the sea trials of the Zumwalt, my latest at the National Interest takes a look a five experimental ships from the past:

Earlier this week the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) began sea trials. The first of a probable three ships, Zumwalt once represented the future of U.S. naval surface warfare. Budget shortfalls, changed priorities and predictable cost overruns cut the projected purchase from a fleet-sustaining thirty-two units to an experimental trio of ships.

Still, Zumwalt represents a technological marvel, including an array of innovations that set her apart from every other ship in the U.S. Navy, and indeed the world. Her value as an experimental test bed for new concepts, architectures and technologies may, over time, exceed her value as a military unit. In this she joins a long tradition of experimental warships, vessels that often had more impact as technological marvels than as useful ships of war. Here are the five most important experimental vessels of the modern seafaring age

Wednesday Links

[ 18 ] December 16, 2015 |
Langston Hughes by Carl Van Vechten 1936.jpg

“Langston Hughes by Carl Van Vechten 1936” – This image is available from the United States Library of Congress’s Prints and Photographs division under the digital ID cph.3a42821. Licensed under Public Domain via Commons.

Some links to open your Wednesday…

Sunday Book Review: Torch: North African and the Allied Path to Victory

[ 30 ] December 13, 2015 |

Vincent O’Hara’s Torch recounts the preparation for and conduct of the Allied Torch landings of November 1942. O’Hara allows that some of the political and strategic criticisms of Operation Torch (that it represented a distraction from the much more important job of confronting Germany directly in northern Europe) are largely correct, but argues that the operation was necessitated by the lack of preparedness on the part of the US Army and US Navy in the Atlantic. Torch won valuable experience for the Americans, and gave the American-British coalition its first real taste of joint warfare. Author of several very readable accounts of maritime warfare in World War II, O’Hara makes a sound contribution to the literature on the war in North Africa.

House Burning Down

O’Hara gives detailed accounts of all of the invasions of Torch, pointing out the significant shortcomings that US forces faced getting ashore.  The Marines- and the expertise in amphibious ops that they had developed during the interwar period- mostly stayed in the Pacific, leaving the European theater to an Army that had not worked out amphibious ops in very much detail.  Similarly, the Atlantic contingent of the USN didn’t have much experience with fire support, or large combined operations.  Moreover, the Americans struggled to sort through command and control procedures with the British, and generally displayed far too much optimism about both their own ability to get ashore, and the expected levels of French resistance.

Why did the French continue to fight, despite overwhelming odds and a difficult political situation? O’Hara gives three reasons. First, many of the French officers and men worried about the consequences for metropolitan France if the colonial forces failed to resist. The Germans had yet to occupy Vichy, and obviously could impose harsh measures on both the occupied and unoccupied parts of France.

Second, the French military was deeply professional, and the word of Petain, both as military commander and political leader, carried a great deal of weight. Few of the French officers had any interest in De Gaulle, or the other French commanders that the Allies had managed to co-opt. Many officers insisted on receiving orders through the chain of command, which is one reason why Admiral Darlan was so important to the Allied invasion.

Finally, French resentment of the British (and to a lesser extent the Americans) ran strong. Much bitterness remained from the German conquest of France, the reduction of Syria, and especially from the surprise attack at Mers el Kebir. This manifested in a belief that Britain was more interested in stealing France’s empire than in winning the war against Germany. The less hostile relationship with the United States helped, but didn’t fully ameliorate the problem.

O’Hara goes into some detail about how Operation Torch affected French politics. Unsurprisingly, notice of the invasion provoked a crisis in France, with Laval heading to Germany in order to appeal to Hitler. Much of the rest of the leadership sat tight, hoping that a German invasion could somehow be prevented. In the end, the French leadership didn’t do much to play its (admittedly poor) hand; Darlan took control of the situation in North Africa, and Petain ordered remaining metropolitan forces to stand down.  The fleet made its symbolic act of resistance by scuttling itself in Toulon; one would imagine that if Churchill hadn’t ordered Mers el Kebir, the situation could have been resolved more amicably.

For their part, the Germans and Italians hoped to turn Torch into an opportunity to leverage the French into joining the war directly on the Axis side. Vichy retained control of a large metropolitan army, and a powerful naval squadron in Toulon. Thousands of French soldiers remained in German POW camps. However, Hitler was unwilling to make the concessions that Laval needed in order to sell the deal to Vichy, which included political autonomy and a guarantee of pre-1914 borders. O’Hara also goes into to some of the logic for the Axis overcommitment to Tunisia; not invading in numbers would have conceded all of North Africa to the Allies in short order, and the Germans saw it as a way of holding significant American forces in the Mediterranean.

Are You Experienced?

O’Hara’s case is that Torch, its immediate impact on the strategic situation aside, represented necessary experiential learning for the Atlantic components of both the Army and the Navy.  Neither service covered itself with glory; the Navy struggled with French coastal defenses, and had a lot of trouble identifying target beaches.  The USN performed adequately against an inferior French force at Casablanca, but it was a far nearer thing than it needed to be, especially given that the French were also rusty.

Torch gave the Army and Navy the opportunity to work out the doctrine and technology, figuring out what worked and didn’t work (why not to load landing boats before lowering them, for example). The performance of US troops ashore in the immediate aftermath of the landings was not fantastic, especially considering that the enthusiasm of the enemy for the fight was limited. Both the Navy and the Army had relatively good doctrine, but hadn’t had the chance to work out the kinks in practice.

Torch also gave the Americans a chance to appreciate that the British sometimes knew what they were talking about.  The British were notably less optimistic about the chances for a bloodless landing, and less sentimental about the resistance of the French.  They also had more experience with major amphibious landings, have recently conducted on in Madagascar.

 

Moon, Turn the Tides… Gently, Gently Away

O’Hara makes a compelling case.  Discussions of Torch often get bogged down in the debate between British and Americans over whether Torch represented a waste of time.  O’Hara makes a convincing argument that US forces were simply unprepared to conduct major ops against the Germans in 1942, and that Torch was necessary to working out the difficulties of joint warfighting (both between the services and alongside the British).  In this his account dovetails nicely with that of Christopher Rein, who tracked the emergence of the US Army Air Force in the same campaign. Indeed, the two books complement each other nicely, as the USAAF plays a relatively small role in Torch, while O’Hara doesn’t cover much of the ground and air fighting beyond the initial invasions.  My only quibble is that the book could have used some additional detailed maps of the landing areas, and of the transit paths of the major assault convoys.  However, this is only a small problem.

 

 

 

Benedict Anderson RIP

[ 29 ] December 13, 2015 |


Benedict Anderson has passed away.  Very few scholars have had a comparable impact, stretching across disciplines and sub-disciplines; the only name that leaps to mind is James Scott. Anderson didn’t have that big of an effect on my scholarship, but Imagined Communities has certainly left a mark on my teaching.

Restraint

[ 31 ] December 11, 2015 |
Hardware

“Commodore-64-Computer” by Evan-Amos – Own work. Licensed under Public Domain via Commons.

My latest at the Diplomat takes a look at emerging norms of cyber-restraint in the US-China relationship:

While many analysts have predicted that the opening of the cyberspace would lead to national conflict, and government conflict against subnational groups, Brandon Valeriano and Ryan Maness argue in Cyber War versus Cyber Realities that the chief characteristic of conflict in the cyber-age has been restraint. While the development of the cyber commons opens up wide avenues in which states can attack one another, most governments thus far have not pressed their advantages. In part because of uncertainty about their own vulnerability, states restrain themselves from escalating.

 

“Delusional”

[ 28 ] December 10, 2015 |


New review of Grounded up at Army Press:

Farley contends that the Air Force is not useless—merely an overpriced attractor for those who would throw around America’s weight on the cheap. He lays out a plan for integrating air resources into the Army and U.S. Navy; cites instances where reintegration has occurred, primarily Canada; and argues forcefully, if not convincingly, for the abolition of the free-standing air arm.

There is probably no real chance that any of the author’s suggestions will come to fruition. The Air Force lobby is quite strong, and its contractors are spread throughout the myriad congressional districts. Still, Grounded does raise interesting questions, challenges the status quo, and should give pause to those who might be inclined to assume that the Army of today is for now and always, ideal and immutable. Unstated is the question: If the Air Force can lose independent status, why not the Army and Navy too?

This last is a key point. I revisited this idea not long ago in a National Interest article, but it bears repeating that eliminating the Air Force would have far reaching cultural and structural effects on the Army and the Navy. We can imagine, for example, an aviator rising to the level of Chief of Staff of the Army, which is a thought that could give pause to some parochially-minded reformers.

Add Some Stealth to Your Holiday…

[ 4 ] December 9, 2015 |

Image: Flickr/forsvarsdepartementet Illustration: Catherine Putz, Diplomat APAC

Image: Flickr/forsvarsdepartementet Illustration: Catherine Putz, Diplomat APAC

Last week I wrote a holiday gift-giving guide for the Diplomat:

Not all of the major defense players in the region can (or want to) develop their own fighters. Big spenders like Malaysia, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, and others may seek fifth generation fighters in the future. Where are they planning to buy?

The Next Steps

[ 32 ] December 8, 2015 |

Project 1164 Moskva 2009 G1

RFS Moskva, George Chernilevsky

My latest at the National Interest looks at five tools of statecraft that the Russians can use to accomplish their aims in Syria:

It’s difficult to avoid the feeling that Russia and the Assad regime are simply treading water, trying to maintain what they hold instead of making serious inroads against either ISIS or the “moderate” Syrian rebel factions. Russia’s major losses thus far include a civilian jetliner, destroyed by an ISIS bomb, and a Su-24 Fencer, shot down by Turkish F-16s. Syrian government forces have lost numerous ground combat vehicles in attacks against well-armed, prepared rebel factions.

Now it looks as if Russia wants to step up its intervention. What do the Russians need to do in order to turn things around and win this war? Here are five capabilities that Russia needs to commit to the fight in order to save the Assad regime:

Page 3 of 48112345...102030...Last »