The February 2005 LGM archive has now been fully reconstructed. Some highlights:
Author Page for Robert Farley
Two things. First, my latest at the Diplomat noodles on about precedent in international politics:
What precedent does the Russian invasion of Crimea set for the settlement of territorial disputes in East Asia? We should begin with the major differences: East Asia lacks institutions similar to the European Union or NATO. The situation of Russia, which continues to support multiple irredentist communities around its near abroad, has no easy parallel in Asia. East Asia enjoys its share of difficult, complex national relationships, but none of these are quite like those between Russia and its neighbors. We should also note that there’s a gulf between claiming that a particular act (say, the NATO led air campaign against Kosovo) caused some other event, and suggesting that the actions of a major power establish “rules of the road” that other states tend to follow.
Second, I have some thoughts about the prospect of suspending the delivery of Vladivostok and Sevastopol, a pair of amphibious assault ships the French are building for Russia:
The French are committed economically to the deal, which has supported French shipbuilding. However, as the first ship is nearly complete and the second well under way, some of the French stakeholders (primarily labor)have already been appeased. With the recent displays of Franco-US friendship, and of Franco-US cooperation in Africa, I have to wonder whether the French could be convinced to delay or suspend delivery as a response to the Russian conquest of Crimea. And especially given that the second ship is named Sevastopol, the optics of transferring LHAs to the Russian Navy right now are genuinely terrible.
This is alarming:
According to the South Korean government, on Tuesday a South China Airlines plane carrying 220 civilians narrowly missed being hit by a North Korean missile after it flew into the missile’s trajectory. The missile and plane crossed the same path just seven short minutes apart. No one was harmed. The plane had been flying to Shenyang, China from Narita airport in Japan.
A South Korean Defense Ministry spokesperson told Bloomberg News: “The rocket could have hit the plane on its way down. North Korea had not given any warning [of the missile launch]. It was an unexpected and immoral act that goes against international norms.” The same spokesperson confirmed that Seoul had passed along information about the near miss to its allies in Beijing. Neither the airline nor China has responded to inquiries or acknowledged the near collision yet.
The chance of a ballistic missile accidentally hitting an airliner in flight is, to put it mildly, extraordinarily small. Nevertheless, you kind of wish Kim Jong Eun hadn’t shot all of the people who believed that informing neighboring countries of impending missile launches might be a good idea.
I mention it below, but it’s worth reiterating how facile the “resolve” argument is with respect to Russia’s incursion into Crimea. The causal argument runs thus: Putin believed, because of Obama’s unwillingness to launch military strikes on Syria, that the United States would not interfere with Russia’s seizure of Crimea. Because the United States had refrained from using military force in a case where Obama had made a (relatively) clear commitment to the use of force, the US would not use force to defend an area it had no (serious) legal obligation to defend.
Phrased in these terms, the argument is very nearly self-refuting. Essentially, partisans of the Resolve Fairy are demanding that Obama create in Putin’s mind the belief that a Russian invasion will be met with US military force, despite the fact that there is nearly zero chance that any administration, in a similar position, would use force. Say what you will about Vladimir Putin, but he is not a stupid man. If the most hawkish administration in recent history failed to counter a Russian invasion of a US client in 2008, what are the chances that the United States will do so now? Any threat to use force in defense of Crimea (or Georgia, for that matter), is a bluff, and not a particularly strong one. The notion that even a wildly successful military campaign against Assad would have convinced Putin that the US would intervene in Crimea is very nearly absurd.
And it gets worse, of course. Let’s imagine a world in which cruise missiles, a no fly zone, and a few airstrikes had managed to topple Assad (just work with me). It is widely believed that the destruction of a Russian client in Libya at the hands of NATO added to Putin’s conviction to support Syria at all costs. There’s every reason to believe that the US induced collapse of the Assad regime would have made Putin more, not less, risk acceptant; prospect theory is a thing. The same people whining about Obama’s “indecisiveness” about Syria would, in this case, have drawn a clear line between the Russian setback in the Middle East and Russian aggression in Ukraine.
And while we’re here, a moment about the Precedent Fairy. Partisans of the Precedent Fairy (generally associated with either the realist school or the left), argue for the causal power of US precedent on Russian behavior. The most common argument runs thus; because the United States intervened on behalf of an ethnic enclave in the Kosovo War, the Russians feel secure in making similar interventions on behalf of their own preferred enclaves. It’s worth emphasizing that the Precedent Fairy isn’t as wrong as the Resolve Fairy, or as dangerous; international society is a complex ideational system of laws, norms, and understandings, and the behavior of major powers does often affect how other states interpret the parameters of the possible. But it’s almost certainly wrong, in this case, to try to draw a direct line between Kosovo and South Ossetia, or Kosovo and Crimea. For one, Russia began intervening on behalf of favored enclaves before the Soviet Union formally collapsed, so precedent wasn’t particularly necessary. For another, Russia cares a lot more about Crimea than the US will ever care about Kosovo. It would have ample reason to intervene even without the precedent set by NATO.
What partisans of the Resolve Fairy and the Precedent Fairy do share is a substantial over-estimation of the importance of US behavior in Russian decision-making. The US is big and important, but stuff happens in the world that doesn’t have much to do with the attitudes or behavior of the United States. Russia has a rich foreign policy history to draw on, and assuming that Russia’s behavior depends on the last three things that Obama said is almost always going to be wrong.
- Timothy Snyder pushes back on allegations of fascist connections in the Ukrainian opposition.
- Jay Ulfelder wonders about the implications of scholarly engagement.
- Fred Kaplan argues that Obama could have done nothing to stop the occupation of Crimea.
- Dan Nexon is (justifiably) irritated by the return of the Resolve Fairy.
- Ukrainian military restraint has been remarkable, but the reserves are now mobilizing.
- Would Russia take a way out, if offered?
- Opportunities for miscalculation aplenty…
Stuff on Ukraine…
Around 400 people are in the airport of Belbek now. They have occupied runway and all plane movements have been stopped,” the news agency quoted the source as saying.
At the same time, AP journalists in Crimea have spotted a convoy of nine Russian armored personnel carriers and a truck on a road between the port city of Sevastopol and the regional capital, Sinferopol.
The Russian tricolor flags were painted on the vehicles, which were parked on the side of the road near the town of Bakhchisarai, apparently because one of them had mechanical problems.
Russia is supposed to notify Ukraine of any troop movements outside the naval base it maintains in Sevastopol under a lease agreement with Ukraine.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said movements of armored vehicles belonging to the Russian Black Sea Fleet were prompted by the need to ensure security of its base and didn’t contradict the lease terms.
As you may recall, Russia is deeply committed to the principle of state sovereignty.
In case you weren’t paying attention…
Amid fears of a Kremlin-backed separatist rebellion here against Ukraine’s fledgling government, armed men in military uniforms took up positions at two Crimean airports as Ukraine’s interior minister warned of “a direct provocation,” but there was no sign of any violence.
In Simferopol, the regional capital of Crimea, a large number of masked armed men were stationed at the international airport Friday morning. They were dressed in camouflage and carrying assault rifles, but their military uniforms bore no insignia. It was not clear who they were and they declined to answer questions.
A new frozen conflict? Depends on the reaction of the Ukranian military.
My latest at the Diplomat dabbles in some constructivism:
As Susan Sell has argued, international IP protection is, in and of itself, a power play on the part of major economic actors. The construction and maintenance of the rule systems owes itself to the entrepreneurial behavior of private business, working not only through the U.S. government, but also through international institutions. As such, power relations are embedded within the rules of the IP system, and within our entire way of talking about intellectual property. This is one reason why the IP provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership have proven so controversial.
But adherence to international institutional frameworks isn’t entirely voluntary. The demands of international organizations (and, in bilateral terms, of the EU and the United States) require the Chinese government to develop a position on intellectual property, a set of policies designed to support that position, and the bureaucracy necessary to execute those policies. While this bureaucracy may lack power initially, over time the state acquires what amount to habits of compliance, where it becomes more problematic to step outside the expectations of the international regime than to stay within them. In China Goes Global, David Shambaugh outlines this process with respect to China’s engagement with the various regimes of the liberal international economic order. Thus, the development of a bureaucracy to manage IP rights, which China has begun, almost inevitably produces a policy shift towards compliance.