For the last few years in particular, there has been a marked increase in the number of sessional, casual, teaching-only, adjunct, fixed term, temporary job ‘opportunities’ listed and circulated in the usual IR job venues. These various titles and categories point to one reality: precarious labor is a permanent reality within academia. The trend has been quantified and well documented: in US in the last 30 years the percentage of positions held by tenured or tenure-track faculty members fell from 56.8% to 35.1%. In an excellent post in the Chronicle, Peter Conn declares “Full-time tenured and tenure-track jobs in the humanities are endangered by half a dozen trends, most of them long-term.” The trend is not new; however, as the race to the bottom with regard to casual labor hits a new low, what is missing from the discussion is (1) the ways that permanent staff reproduce/support casual labor and (2)the myths associated with the ‘opportunity’ of casual labor for PhD students and unemployed academics.
A moviegoer lost his life inside a Pasco County theater Monday afternoon after a dispute over texting with a retired police officer.
According to the sheriff’s office, the dispute happened before the 1:20 showing of ‘Lone Survivor’ had even gotten underway at the Cobb CineBistro at Grove 16 complex on Wesley Grove Blvd…
Charles Cummings told FOX 13 he heard the victim say he was texting his 3-year-old daughter before Reeves pulled out a pistol.
“Their voices start going up, there seems to be a confrontation, somebody throws popcorn, then bang, he was shot,” said Cummings, who was there to celebrate his birthday. “I heard the victim say, ‘I can’t believe…,’ then he fell on us.
Also, great use of the phrase “lost;” apparently he just misplaced his life, rather than having it taken from him by an angry old man who put a bullet through his chest. I’m reminded of Brockington’s very depressing argument; “if Newtown foments change in the direction opposite to good policy, I’m not sure what can be done.”
Read this and be legitimately appalled, but also note that the writers and contributors almost certainly viewed it as a progressive contribution:
In many cases parents either overtly or subtly encouraged the feminine behavior. But when parents actively discouraged it and took other steps to enhance a male self-concept, homosexual tendencies of the feminine boys were lessened, although not necessarily reversed. Neither did professional counseling divert a tendency toward homosexuality, although it resulted in more conventional masculine behavior and enhanced the boys’ social and pyschological adjustment and comfort with being male.
The study was conducted by Dr. Richard Green, a noted sex researcher who is professor of psychiatry at the University of California, Los Angeles and director of its Program in Psychiatry, Law and Human Sexuality. Details of the findings and implications are described in Dr. Green’s new book, ”The ‘Sissy Boy Syndrome’ and the Development of Homosexuality,” to be published in February by Yale University Press.
Although the study examined extreme cases of boyhood effeminacy, Dr. Green believes the findings may have relevance to lesser degrees of feminine behavior in boys. Such boys, who may, for example, be athletically inept or prefer music to cars and trucks, often have difficulty making friends with other boys and identifying with typically male activities. Dr. Green suggested that to help the boys think of themselves as male, parents might assist them in finding boy friends who are similarly unaggressive and that the fathers might share in activities the boys enjoy, such as going to the zoo or a concert, rather than insist on taking the boys to athletic events. Counseling to guide such parents and enhance the child’s masculine self-image may also be helpful, Dr. Green said.
The study did not examine the development of homosexuality in boys whose childhoods are typically masculine. About one-third of homosexual men recall such masculine boyhoods. Nor does the study suggest that all boys with the sissy-boy syndrome are destined for homosexuality. Indeed, one-fourth of the extremely feminine boys followed to maturity developed as heterosexuals.
The “athletically inept or prefer music to cars and trucks” line inevitably reminded me of this:
And thus the difference between a great fighter and a terrible fighter can be remarkably small.As with the previous list, the critical work is in determining the criteria. Fighters are national strategic assets, and must be evaluated as such:
Did this aircraft fail at the tactical tasks that it was given? Did it perform poorly against its direct contemporaries?
Did the fighter show up, or was it in the hangar when it was needed? Was it more of a danger to its pilots than to enemy fighters?
Did it represent a misappropriation of national assets?
So what are the worst fighter aircraft of all time? For these purposes, we’ll be concentrating on fighters that enjoyed production runs of 500 or more aircraft (listed in parentheses); curiosities such as the XF-84H “Thunderscreech” need not apply.
But military leaders favored an independent air force because of what they had learned from the North African campaign: When ground commanders controlled aircraft, the results were disastrous. As Colonel F. Randall Starbuck writes in Air Power in North Africa, 1942–43: “One example, relayed by General Doolittle, was the incident where a ground commander asked him to provide a fighter to cover a Jeep that was going out to repair a broken telephone line. He refused. The plane that would have wasted its time on that mission shot down two German Me-109s.”
Did anyone even bother to wonder whether the guys sent to repair the phone line died?
The question has long vexed defense analysts, as the projected costs of fighters seem to expand even faster than those of other military hardware. Some of the reasons include the ever-increasing gulf between civilian and military technology, a gulf that demands extra specialization on the part of engineers, equipment, and workforce. Also, fighters (as opposed to interceptors, bombers, or attack aircraft) are literally designed to fight one another, making escalatory cycles particularly likely. Moreover, since modern fighters are generally expected to fulfill multiple roles (air superiority, plus attack, strategic bombing, and interception) packing mission capabilities into a single airframe naturally metastasizes costs.
Robert Farley (“Ground the Air Force,” December 19, 2013) is so far wide of the mark that he brings to mind the difference between the miss-by-a-mile bombs of World War II and the precision-guided bombs of today that fly through windows. The defense establishment is certainly in need of new ideas. But getting rid of the U.S. Air Force will do nothing to make the Pentagon more efficient or effective. In fact, such a move would do grave damage to our national security.
There might be some merit in reducing the Department structure, since the offices of the civilian secretaries tend, like all bureaucracies, to grow. Yet the civilian secretaries, of independent service branches, play a role in the civilian-military connection. In our post-WWII history there has been a constant sort of Brownian motion between the civilians and the uniforms in DoD, and that’s not liable to stop, no matter how the deck chairs get rearranged. For the political cost of making major changes, and the disruption of a distinctively American unified service culture, it seems to me that it would be a lot of smoke for not much steam.
I should have a full response to the Spalding piece up by Monday or Tuesday.
The following list is of the important books of 2013 that should be on your radar for 2014.
My specific interests are in the history and the nature of the organizations that make up our national security state. Broadly speaking, the books below are about our national security state, how it came to be, what it has become, and what it worries about. We talk a great deal about grand strategy, but the production of grand strategy and the delineation of the national interest depends, to large extent, on how we structure our national security institutions.
THE PENTAGON was built to wage wars abroad, but much of its war-making has been inside the building. Interservice rivalry is a hackneyed phrase that fails to convey either the brutality of the bureaucratic infighting over budgets and resources that has always defined the place, or the actual cost in blood, treasure, and a succession of shaming military defeats that have resulted from the Pentagon’s endemic in-house competitiveness. For more than 70 years, the very structure of America’s military establishment has been tragically misaligned, and you don’t have to be a peacenik to think it’s time for a major reform.