Perhaps most interesting, the report identifies several key caveats that underlie China’s effort to build a world-class navy. These include the health of long-term collaboration with Russia, the ability of the Chinese national innovation system to deliver advanced technology, the overall health of the Chinese economy, and the ability of the Chinese Communist Party and the PLAN to work well with one another. Of these, the first and the third pose the greatest concern; significant economic problems could severely crimp China’s effort at naval expansion, and a deterioration (for whatever reason) of relations with Russia would leave China in a very, very lonely place.
Author Page for Robert Farley
This evening at about 6:30pm EST, LGM will suspend normal posting activity in favor of two open threads (one Democratic, one Republican) on the Iowa Caucuses. Between 6:30pm and roughly midnight, new front-page activity will appear below those two pinned posts. Ideally, commentary on the Democratic primary will remain on the Democratic post, etc.
This would also be a great time to follow the LGM peeps on twitter…
On the latest Foreign Entanglements, Michael Cohen and I jabber about foreign policy and the Presidential primary:
My latest at the Diplomat covers some recent historiography on the Sino-Soviet Split:
In the Journal of Cold War Studies, Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia (reviewed by Avram Agov) survey the historical research on the Sino-Soviet relationship in the early 1960s. The authors focus their argument on the competition for ideological leadership between Beijing and Moscow. By their account, the ideological and security differences emerged and sharpened as the two giants tried to make space for themselves at the top of the international communist movement. The Soviet Union naturally saw itself as the leader of the movement, as it had the most powerful, longest established socialist regime. The Chinese regarded their revolution as indigenous, and saw the developing world as key to the long-term success of the socialist bloc. The two countries fought this battle in a series of pamphlets and conventions, often through proxies in the Communist world.
My latest at the National Interest takes a look at some under-remembered battles of 1916:
The centenary commemorations of World War I will undoubtedly concentrate on a trio of well-known battles; Verdun, the Somme and Jutland. All three ended inconclusively, and all witnessed tremendous bloodshed. Verdun and the Somme etched themselves into the national consciousness of France and Great Britain, respectively, while Jutland helped transform naval architecture.
But 1916 also witnessed a number of other, lesser known battles. Although they lack the same resonance in the West, the outcome of these battles helped determine the post-war map of Europe, not to mention the nature of warfare for the next generation.
Interesting find by Politico, but gets a key part of the story fundamentally wrong:
The [Joint Chiefs of Staff] report was an inventory of what U.S. intelligence knew—or more importantly didn’t know—about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Its assessment was blunt: “We’ve struggled to estimate the unknowns. … We range from 0% to about 75% knowledge on various aspects of their program.”
Myers already knew about the report. The Joint Staff’s director for intelligence had prepared it, but Rumsfeld’s urgent tone said a great deal about how seriously the head of the Defense Department viewed the report’s potential to undermine the Bush administration’s case for war. But he never shared the eight-page report with key members of the administration such as then-Secretary of State Colin Powell or top officials at the CIA, according to multiple sources at the State Department, White House and CIA who agreed to speak on condition of anonymity. Instead, the report disappeared, and with it a potentially powerful counter-narrative to the administration’s argument that Saddam Hussein’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons posed a grave threat to the U.S. and its allies, which was beginning to gain traction in major news outlets, led by the New York Times.
The article goes on to contrast the uncertainty described in the report with the public statements of Bush administration officials. It’s fair to acknowledge that there’s a significant disjuncture between the certainty with which the Bush admin publicly described intel, and the much more mushy reality of what the US intelligence community (IC) could prove. That said, in other cases officials made the case for war in terms of uncertainty; Condi Rice’s “Mushroom Cloud” comment was premised on precisely these terms.
And inside the administration, the uncertainty regarding the state of Iraqi WMD was viewed as a cause for war, in and of itself. Charles Duelfer is very good on this point; he was far from certain that Iraq had WMD, but he favored war because it was impossible to tell for sure. That may sound a bit crazy, but in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 this kind of argument carried a lot of weight within the national security community. To the extent that arguments were used strategically within the administration (not everyone was convinced that invading Iraq was a good idea; Colin Powell is the best example, but there are others) the “we don’t have enough intel to prove what Iraq is doing” case tended to support the hawks.
And so it’s really not the case that the distribution of a document raising caveats about the state of intel on Iraq might have slowed the rush to war; uncertainty was one of the key talking points of hawks within the administration (above and beyond all of the other reasons they wanted to invade Iraq). Rumsfeld may have decided not to distribute the report simply because he felt it unnecessary at that point to add to the case for war.
Also, if you’re so inclined you can still write in Foreign Entanglements for best International Relations podcast in this year’s Duckies…
Some links for your pleasure, as snow begins to destroy most of the eastern half of these great United States:
- Who didn’t love the F-104, except for the families of the pilots that it killed? Also see this, from our very own Major Kong…
- A lot of people trying to sell carrier-based fighters, but not a lot of carriers to fly them off of…
- A good explanation of some of the ins and outs of the Farsi Island incident…
- Who doesn’t love to find a 16″ shell in their garden?
- Ursula K. LeGuin unloads…
- Germany, I remember when you were cool.
- Uncle Cliffy, I’ve never been so proud.
Some projections have Lexington getting up to 15″ of snow tonight, which would mean that three of the top six snowfalls in history would have happened in the last year. That ain’t normal.
Oh, and this:
“Hey, I think she just winked at me.” – Rich Lowry on Sarah Palin. https://t.co/yTUrkCZQvt
— Robert Farley (@drfarls) January 22, 2016