Great Carrier Debate
My WPR column this week tackles the Great Carrier Debate of ’11, and tries to reframe some of the basic questions:
A third method of interpreting weapons acquisition — and naval aviation — is through a combination of the utilitarian and symbolic logics. In this framing, the symbolic has utilitarian import, while the utilitarian has symbolic effect. That the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers is viewed as the fundamental arbiters of world naval power is relevant for perceptions of U.S. power, and consequently for U.S. policy. If the America-class amphibious assault carrier has less — or different — symbolic resonance, then policymakers need to take that into account when making procurement decisions. Similarly, for Chinese policymakers, creating the impression that China is a serious player is an important policy goal, and should affect decisions about where weapons acquisition funds should go. If the United Kingdom wants to continue to be consulted about major intervention decisions, and if the differences in perception of the F-35B and the F-35C affect whether that will happen, then it makes sense to take advantage of symbolic politics.
They were critical in WWII, but since the last great carrier battle occured over 65 years ago, I think we really need to sit down and figure out if we want to keep building them.
I’m from the school of “no.” I know there’s an argument that our carrier forces since WWII have been one of the reasons for our military abilities. But at what cost?
First, they are very expensive to build and maintain. And, as you said, they are easy to take out with a missile or a sub. Hell, if you could figure out a way to cut off satellite communications, or electricity on board, the thing becomes just a large powerless hotel floating in the middle of some ocean.
Second, I also think carriers are prime examples of old school “Pax Americana” thinking. We can no longer afford to act as if the Cold War is still out there. It isn’t. There are still threats out there, but they’re many and varied. And maybe if we weren’t as intrusive all around the damned globe, some of those threats would die down. I wonder how much carriers being present off the coasts of hot spots hasn’t added to people hating America. I can’t answer that, but having them means we can make our presence felt in any coastal areas within days. So, we’re readilly abailable to support someone somewhere soon. And our track record for suppporting the wrong sides, ususally dictators, in the past half-century plus hasn’t helped.
Sure, everyone wants the latest toy, but our military budget is what’s really eating this country alive. And a lot of that is the new versions of old toys like carriers, which may have outlived their usefullness. And a lot of money is spent on pet projects of little military usefullness, but can sure help a Congressperson or Senator get reelected.
Them’s my $0.02.
I’ll now defer to the people who really know military history.
Also you don’t need 10 carrier groups to hoist the flag. Carriers promote the type of adventurism that only leads to debt and death.
Politicians love them though, especially since Republican presidents are guaranteed to have their name on one.
the last great carrier battle occured over 65 years ago
In fairness, the last great naval battle occurred over 65 years ago.
Actually, a supercarrier has been sunk by a submarine. The Japanese carrier Shinano, displacing more than 70,000 tons and converted from a Yamato-class super-battleship, was sunk by the USN submarine Archer-fish. The Shinano’s displacement was about twice that of the Essex-class carriers that were the most powerful warships of the time.
Not an attack carrier, Shinano had some serious design flaws and the Archer-fish made a skillful attack, with her four torpedoes hitting Shinano at a vulnerable point (intentionally). Also, none of the Essex-class carriers was sunk in battle, although many were hit with conventional bombs and torpedoes, as well as kamikazes that did considerable damage.
The loss of Shinano was still more proof of the vulnerability of carriers to submarines. In the biggest carrier battle of the entire war, Philippine Sea, the U.S. Navy sank three Japanese carriers. Two were sunk by submarines.
The longer range of modern combat aircraft, combined with bases for land-based air around the globe suggest that we can probably get by with fewer attack carriers, compromising between the present fleet and a fleet powerful enough for the show we need to put on as a great power.
No, aircraft carriers escorted by shitty ASW are vulnerable to submarines (at least in WW2). No American fleet carrier operating at normal speed underway was ever lost to submarine attack (the only example that comes close was Saratoga, torpedoed right after Pearl Harbor). But for the glory days of USN carrier aviation, 1943-45, no CV was lost to submarines.
USS Wasp
Well, using WWII examples is not really that helpful at the end of the day. It is my belief that modern aircraft carriers are sitting ducks against any adversary we need to be concerned about and it is the institutional structure of the navy that is primarily responsible for the suppression of this understanding. But since we never actually went to war with the soviets, there are no real life examples either way. (Well, you could look at all the navy exercises where the surface fleet is repeatedly made to look foolish by the subs, but I guess you could argue that our subs are just really awesome.)
Yeah, I don’t think people would’ve worried much about carriers in a shooting war with the Soviet Union what with the world getting nuked, but carriers have deficiencies nonetheless.
Even very small sub-state powers like Hezbollah and al Qaeda in Yemen have shown their ability to take out naval targets. A small to medium sized state could easily threaten them.
Taking out naval targets requires the naval units to be positioned near the shore. The most potent anti-ship weapon is the surface-to-surface missile that can be launched from a truck, a fast attack craft or a sub. To penetrate the aerial defences of the carrier task force, the launch needs to happen either en masse, to overwhelm the defence capacity, or from a sub that has penetrated the carrier task force defences.
Fast attack craft can cause serious concern to a carrier group only if they can be hid into an archipelago or on a tortously complicated shore: i.e. Agaean, Indonesia, Philippines, Northern Baltic or Norway. So, a medium power with truck or fast attack craft launched anti-ship missiles may deny a carrier task force the freedom to operate less than, say, 50 nautic miles off the shore or archipelago. However, it cannot deny the projection of airpower inshore, without a very good air defence system.
The question about the sub effectiveness is a completely different kettle of fish. I do not presume to say anything about it.
Actually, in the glory days of 1943-45 no US CV was sunk at all.
Aren’t large carriers a bit redundant for the US. With the large number of air bases it has world-wide it can conduct air operations over most of the globe using land-based aircraft combined with in-flight refuelling.
I don’t think symbolism needs to play a very large role in our procurement thinking.
There mere size of our budget and extent of our capabilities is so far beyond everyone else that they make the point pretty clearly.
Carriers are an awfully expensive symbol. Let me second Ed here and point out that if we really need the symbol, do we need so many of them?
Because the oceans are vast, and so are our strategic interests?
Even if we cut down the size of the carrier fleet, I don’t really see it going below 6-8 CVNs.
and even then you’d have a small number working up new aircrews, undergoing maintenance, in transit, etc. Hence the USN’s insistence on having at least 12 for global coverage.
May have mentioned this before in a comment somewhere, but in the mid-1990s I (as a DOE fed) attended a DOD conference on force projection, chaired by Admiral Owens, who was then (as I recall) Vice-Chairman of the JCS. Owens remarked that the Navy’s current war plans called for 9 CVNs, but peacetime deployment schedules required 11.