Great Carrier Debate

My WPR column this week tackles the Great Carrier Debate of ’11, and tries to reframe some of the basic questions:

A third method of interpreting weapons acquisition — and naval aviation — is through a combination of the utilitarian and symbolic logics. In this framing, the symbolic has utilitarian import, while the utilitarian has symbolic effect. That the U.S. Navy’s fleet of aircraft carriers is viewed as the fundamental arbiters of world naval power is relevant for perceptions of U.S. power, and consequently for U.S. policy. If the America-class amphibious assault carrier has less — or different — symbolic resonance, then policymakers need to take that into account when making procurement decisions. Similarly, for Chinese policymakers, creating the impression that China is a serious player is an important policy goal, and should affect decisions about where weapons acquisition funds should go. If the United Kingdom wants to continue to be consulted about major intervention decisions, and if the differences in perception of the F-35B and the F-35C affect whether that will happen, then it makes sense to take advantage of symbolic politics.