Thinking Differently about Somalia, Governance and Piracy
That’s what economist Benjamin Powell is doing at the Freeman, where he notes that Western observers who refer to Somalia’s “failed state” status generally overlook the importance of Xeer, the customary law system that holds clan-based society together none too badly.
As for piracy?
Although they are a concern, this is not merely a symptom of a “failed state,” as many media reports make it out to be. In one sense, that the piracy is committed against passing foreign vessels is a tribute to the internal effectiveness of Somali customary law. The pirates are well-armed and obviously not hesitant to use violence. Yet they do not plunder Somali ships. What’s more, they interact peacefully with other Somali when they are on land. Although the total number of pirates is small, it has been estimated that 10,000 to 15,000 people are employed by the pirates indirectly in related industries such as boat repair, security, and food provision. (Other enterprising Somalis have set up special restaurants to cater to the hostages.) That pirates use voluntary market transactions to purchase goods and services on land, rather than pillage, provides some evidence that Somali law is fairly robust if even these otherwise violent people respect it when conducting their internal affairs.
It’s an interesting essay that breaks from the tired twin narratives of Somali piracy and anarchy. And it leads to a very interesting empirical question: which is worse for human security in relative terms, the absence of a functioning central government or the presence of an abusive central government? History suggests people generally prefer order to anarchy, even if that order comes at a price – the Taliban were wildly popular in the early 1990s for this very reason. But Powell’s keen to measure this empirically, using development indicators like telecommunications infrastructure, infant mortality and the like. He finds that Somalis are not doing badly compared to other Africans, state or no state. But he hasn’t controlled for the presence of the humanitarian sector in the country (which is often good for things like infant survival) or for the fact that Somaliland actually has a functioning government, stability and relatively favorable indicators – might this account for Powell’s findings?
Even if so, the effort to empirically measure what has herewith been an argument by assertion about human security and failed states is a valuable one.
sorry, this isn’t particularly original, pirates have historically acted this way in port. as for leaving somali ships alone, just exactly how many somali ships worth taking are there? none too many, i’d submit. why waste valuable time and resources on ships (should there actually be any) that most likely have little of value on them?
i am less than impressed by mr. powell’s “analysis”. call me when he has something of actual value to contribute to the discussion.
The notion that priacy = failed state would have come as a shock to Elizabeth I.
Good one!
That pirates use voluntary market transactions to purchase goods and services on land, rather than pillage, provides some evidence that Somali law is fairly robust if even these otherwise violent people respect it when conducting their internal affairs.
Piffle. It provides evidence that pirates are more willing to go up against a handful of unarmed crewmen in order to get several million dollars than they are to go up against a large and heavily-armed Somali clan in order to get some food or some fuel.
And I’d second cpinva’s point about their leaving Somali ships alone. I wasn’t aware that Somalia had a large merchant marine whose valuable cargoes, ships and crews could be held for ransom. I thought it was a dirt-poor country with nothing more than a few fishing boats, and the pirates went after foreign ships because that’s where the money was.
Anarchy is the absence of formal, hierarchical government structure. It does not necessarily denote crime, lawlessness, disorder or chaos. Clan and religious law, and social custom would go a great distance in this case to keeping local order, though it might not please sticklers for western governance and juridical practice.
It should also be noted that when Somalia was largely conquered and governed by Islamists, that piracy dwindled almost entirely. Current piracy is almost entirely due to the US insistence on deposing that government, then inability of its forces to subdue the populace, or to produce order and anything approaching a stable economy.
The structure of piracy in Somalia seems to be nearly a Libertarian paradise. Individuals with assets and talents to lend band together on a contract basis. Some individuals contribute other seed capital, others their machetes and AK 47s, or boats or cooking skills. It is a loose network, and teams are made up of willing individuals at certain times to pursue vessels. Payment is entirely dependent on a successful outcome, survival and the eventual payment of a ransom, which is negotiated on the free market. Compensation relates directly to the risks undertaken by individuals and the magnitude of the prize captured. Failure is not rewarded at all. The strong and determined will take what they can, and because they can, they deserve it. I think Ayn Rand would approve enthusiastically.
The pirates are members of the villages and communities along the coast. They were born into it, know it, and remain members of it. They have no quarrel with their neighbors, and are seeking to better their lives and support their families in one of the most challenging locations in the world. If the pirates looted villages, they would be attacking their own families, lose their base of support, and gain very little in the short term. The wealth that the pirates gain raises their social prestige, but they do not seem interested in converting that to political power.
Current piracy is almost entirely due to the US insistence on deposing that government
Indeed, glad you said it. Observers the world over were wondering why the hell, in late 2006, the US wanted to go so far as to “pick” another war through its Ethiopian surrogate and a few of its own flying gunships. The Islamic Courts opened the Mogadishu hospitals, the airport and the harbors and kicked out the warlords, who flooded back in with the US-inspired invasion.
[...] Charli Carpenter at Lawyers, Guns, and Money on Thinking Differently about Somalia, Governance and Piracy. [...]
A quick internet search reveals that Somalia has a navy but no ships and that the only ships that can be considered to belong to Somalia are fairly small fishing boats so the claim that the Pirates don’t attack Somalia boats is meaningless.
I think the assertion is that Somali pirates don’t attack somali civilian vessels.
And what happens to their economy once they don’t have ransom money coming in?
Proto-state formation in Somalia…
By Dave Anderson: Successful states under the Westphalian model have a monopoly on the use of legitimate force within their boundaries. Hopefully those boundaries coincide with the areas that they control; otherwise there are either temporary autonomou…
RE: Somaliland
In the comments from the original article, the author claims that the study he is working from deals extensively with Somaliland and Puntland, finding that there is governance, but not government, which is more an outgrowth of the clan/traditional law system than anything else. I don’t know if he’s right, and I don’t really know a whole lot about Somaliland, except that most of what people will tell you about it is tied up in other regional political biases vis-a-vis Ethiopia.
Someone else in those comments pointed out that most of the really ugly stuff in Somalia is perpetrated on minority ethnicities/clans who are excluded from the traditional law system. Not like it was much better before the collapse of the state though.
Coincidently, I stumbled across this article earlier today before seeing Charli’s post and was contemplating a post about it. I’ve been recently reading quite a bit about Somaliland, and his claim seems to fly in the face of what most observers are claiming about the place, which is that it is, for internal purposes for the core territorial regions, Somaliland is, by current African standards, a moderately high-functioning state (The same can arguably be said to a lesser but non-trivial extent about Puntland). cf Seth Kaplan, “The Remarkable Story of Somaliland,” Journal of Democracy July 2008; Brian Hesse, “Lessons in Successful Somali Governance,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies January 2010, etc. Obviously, I’m in no position to judge whether the emerging consensus or Powell’s preferred study is correct, but to my knowledge there’s no particular reason to believe these scholars are under the sway of distorting biases driven by a commitment to the preferred Ethiopian narrative. I’ll put his research piece on my reading list, but based on his comment, I suspect he may be setting the ’statehood’ bar rather high. The failures in statecraft are common among weak states, but they are generally recognized as actual states nonetheless. When the basic components of state sovereignty are identified, there is almost always an aspirational character to that list.
The narratives are not entirely at odds, as a part of the moderate success of Somaliland’s emerging democratic governance may have to do with a set of institutional rules that guarantee a complex power balance between clans within the representative governance. I more plausible provocative thesis about Somaliland (suggested by Kaplan) is that the lack of international aid and assistance in establishing democratic institutions in Somaliland may have actually been valuable, as establishing a system that grafts clan balance of power into democratic governance formally might have been discouraged. And, of course, that choice could certainly cause problems for Somaliland governance down the road–from what I understand, it is part of the reason for the current ongoing delay in holding the next presidential election, although that election is apparently back on track for June.
they don’t really have a legitimate one now, since it’s all predicated on illegal activity, subject to immediate termination, on the whim of the world’s superpowers. which it will be eventually.
since all those ransom monies are criminal, they can’t be deposited in a legitimate bank, or invested directly in any other legitimate business activity. they basically must be spent quickly, or sent abroad, in the hopes they can someday be recovered.
i have to wonder what non-criminal enterprise will accept those tainted funds, knowing there’s a high likelihood they’ll end up forfeit to the state, with criminal charges for the management?
The issues with tainted money don’t seem to be a problem for drug dealers in the West, and Somali pirates have the advantage (in this case) of living in what I assume is a cash-only economy
since all those ransom monies are criminal, they can’t be deposited in a legitimate bank, or invested directly in any other legitimate business activity.
Of course. Because it’s utterly impossible for money obtained through criminal activities to be deposited in a legitimate bank or invested in a legitimate business.
Have you recently arrived on our planet, O Traveller? Do you need assistance with our language? A parking spot for your space capsule?
clearly, you need remedial reading and comprenension classes, it’s obvious you possess neither skill set.
your statement, not mine. nothing’s impossible. that said, how many functioning banks are there in somalia? take your time. how many pepsi distribution companies (as an example) are there in somalia? again, take your time.
call me back when the synapses start functioning.