The Triad
By Via Ezra, this is an interesting post from Gordon Adams:
For a major program to emerge, thrive, and survive, it takes basically three players: the service that wants and will advocate for the program, a contractor for whom the program is major business, and members of Congress who either sit on the key committees that decide on the program or represent the district or state where the program, or parts of it, are made. In a word: the Iron Triangle for the program….
When Secretary of Defense Robert Gates withdrew support from the F-22, he clearly persuaded the Air Force to withdraw the military leg under the F-22 stool. When the Air Force went public about its official view, the stool started to wobble.
Even a second leg became less sturdy. Lockheed-Martin, the contractor, announced it would not lobby (hard) for the program, perhaps because it has many other equities in other programs at DOD. This reduced the pressure on the third leg, the Congress. Key members – some from key states and districts, some from key committees – fought hard for the program. But a two-legged stool is weak, and a one-and-a-half legged stool even weaker.
What’s interesting to me is that many within the Air Force very clearly wanted to continue procurement of the F-22; support for the project among both the brass and the rank and file seemed pretty strong, in spite of the official position dictated by Gates. Indeed, it seems to me that the institutional part of the stool has two distinct parts. The first is the service itself, which has a variety of ways to fight for a project despite the official position of the Pentagon. The second part of that stool is the SecDef and the White House. Even if the SecDef wants to kill a project, he may not be able to override service opposition, especially if the service is willing to mobilize support in Congress and in industry.
In this case, Gates has enough cred (relative success in Iraq, bipartisan credentials) that he was able to crush service opposition. I have serious questions, however, about whether a weaker SecDef could have successfully imposed his preferences.