Home / General / Hard to Force

Hard to Force

/
/
/
652 Views

Daniel Goldhagen writes:

The sixth option is to compel Hezbollah’s suppliers and patrons — Syria and Iran — to end the terror. Neither country wishes a war with militarily superior Israel (Syria’s saber rattling notwithstanding). If every Hezbollah missile into Israel produced Israeli retaliation against Syria, and possibly Iran (including its nuclear production sites), Syria and Iran would be forced to make Hezbollah stop.

Wrong. Indeed, this displays a deeply flawed understanding of how military force and political will actually intertwine. Unfortunately, it’s a very common (almost willful) form of misunderstanding, especially on the Right.

There is no way, short of marching to Damascus or Tehran, of “forcing” Iran or Syria to give up their support for terrorist organizations. It’s possible that they can be convinced to do so, given some combination of sticks, carrots, and changing circumstances, but “forced” implies a process that is virtually impossible to bring about. Airstrikes, coercive raids, interdiction, and so forth (which is what I expect Goldhagen means) never forced any country to do anything. Increasing the costs to a target for a particular line of action may incline the the target toward a change in policy, but in the absence of direct coercion the change will not necessarily be in a pleasant direction. This works both ways; I have no doubt that various terrorist organizations have carried out attacks against Israel in the belief that the attacks would “force” Israel to cease or begin some particular policy. Blowing up five buildings in Damascus for every one destroyed in Haifa might convince the Syrians to engage in some other policy, but that policy might be to increase support for Hezbollah, or for Hamas, or to undertake some other means of attacking Israel’s interests.

There is, simply put, no way of ensuring that a target will interpret a strike and react to it in the way that the attacking country wants and expects. Even if the “message” is understood correctly (no small thing), the response is unlikely to be what the attacker desires. This is one reason why attempting to establish a reputation for resolve (which is basically what Goldhagen is suggesting) is such a futile exercise; it depends on the attacker understanding the values and internal political situation of the target so well that it knows a) that the message will be understood in the manner expected, and b) that the value threatened will be sufficient to arouse the target to action, c) that the value threatened will be greater than the target’s own preference to maintain “resolve”, d) that the target, among a whole myriad of responsive options, will select the response that the attacker wants, and e) that the internal political balance of the target will allow the execution of that response even if it is decided upon as policy.

To give an example, even if a) Tehran understood an Israeli attack as response to Hezbollah and not as an unconnected preventative effort on its nuclear facilities or as naked aggression, and even if b) whatever targets Israel selected were viewed as particularly valuable to the various elements of the Iranian state, and c) even if Tehran viewed the destruction of those targets as so damaging that it was willing to be seen as “backing down in the face of Israeli attacks” before its own population, and d) even if Tehran decided to rein in Hezbollah, rather than step up support in an effort to compel Israel to stop its attacks, e) there is no guarantee that all the players in the Byzantine world that is the Iranian government could be brought to pursue the same policy; the Revolutionary Guard, for example, might increase support for Hezbollah in spite of Tehran’s preference.

Force is diplomacy, and diplomacy is complicated. When we recognize the complications implicit in the use of force, it becomes a less rhetorically attractive option.

  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • Linkedin
This div height required for enabling the sticky sidebar
Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views : Ad Clicks : Ad Views :