The Other Options

Matthew asks:

But none of this changes the fact that it is Hezbullah that retains an armed “state within a state” in defiance of UN resolutions and the Taif Accords, that it was Hezbullah that raided across an internationally recognized border and is holding kidnapped Israeli soldiers, that it is Hezbullah that indeed keeps its missiles and rockets in and around people’s homes, and that Hezbullah was quite clearly coordinating its actions with Hamas.

What should Israel’s response have been? I’m waiting for the answer to that, because I haven’t heard a viable alternative yet.

As I’m fond of telling my national security students, there are always options. Israel did not need to embark on its current course; defenses of its policy should be made in reference to the other options available to it, not to the altar of “necessity” (which Matthew, in fairness, hasn’t done).

1. Go ahead and make a prisoner exchange. Unsatisfying, and invites further kidnappings and attacks. But it’s also the only realistic way to get the soldiers back alive.
2. Do nothing, other than launch some tit-for-tat strikes against things that Hezbollah values. Indicates that aggression comes with a price, and that kidnapping will not lead to concessions. Kidnapped soldiers die, and problem is not “solved” in any meaningful way.
3. Launch a series of reprisals more measured than those we have seen; let Lebanese infrastructure targets be. Indicate that further aggression has a large price. Kidnapped soliders die, and problem still probably isn’t solved.
4. Invade. Only option that has any chance of destroying Hezbollah. Very costly to both Israel and Lebanon, but at least puts Hezbollah outside of reach of Haifa and other major Israeli targets.

None of those options are great, but the course that Israel has embarked upon ain’t great, either. Sadly, the international system does not often present its members with problems that can be easily solved. I would probably have gone with some combination of 2 and 3, although I can appreciate that this would have been difficult to defend to Olmert’s constituents.