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How Iraq Screwed Up Iran

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Those in favor of attacking Iran (my reservations about the words “hawk” and “dove” persist) are fond of declaring that the invasion of Iraq has not hurt our position with Iran. This position is not defensible. Let me count the ways…

At best, the invasion of Iraq has had no effect on the Iranian nuclear program. At worst, it has spurred that program to new heights. Iran is not a dictatorship in the sense of, say, Stalin’s Soviet Union. Decisions are made a cadre of political and religious leaders. Some of these leaders are demonstrably more willing to deal with the West than others. Since the invasion of Iraq (and really, since the declaration of Iran’s membership in the Axis of Evil) the position of moderates within Iran has been dramatically undercut. Their arguments don’t get listened to, they don’t get elected, and they don’t get promoted to positions of importance. Now it’s possible that this wouldn’t have made a difference, and that Iran would at least have pursued nuclear weapons regardless of the invasion of Iraq. However, it’s clear that the invasion didn’t help the situation, and I think rather likely, that the invasion of Iraq has presented the Iranian leadership with an example of what happens to a country that doesn’t have nuclear weapons when the US comes calling.

The opportunity cost of the Iraq invasion in security terms has yet to be calculated. The conquest of Afghanistan was more or less complete by the end of 2001. This left plenty of time for the United States to develop infrastructure and bases for military action against Iran. Afghanistan is not the best place to use as a base of operations against another country, but the Soviet Union was able to operate a large army in the country, and I don’t think there’s any doubt the United States could have done so as well. Had serious military preparations been made against Iran, rather than against Iraq, it is at least plausible that the nuclear program could have been forestalled or delayed. Instead, the Bush administration decided to engage in a strategic blunder which had the effect of reducing our capacity to deal forcefully with Iran. This has, in effect, given Iran a three year window to pursue its nuclear program and build up its conventional forces. Dealing with Iran in 2006 or 2007 will be much more difficult than dealing with Iran in 2003. This is to say nothing of the impact of the Iraq War on domestic and international public opinion; neocons are not in the habit of taking such things seriously anyway, so I’ll refrain from boring them.

Whereas Iraq was once a security liability for Iran, it is now a security liability for the United States. Perhaps the only useful purpose Saddam Hussein fulfilled was providing Iran with a security problem. In 2003, the United States solved this problem for Iran, and created a problem for itself. US troops in Iraq are now vulnerable to indirect attack from Iran. I don’t expect that Iran would take direct action against US forces in Iraq, even in response to air attacks. However, Iran has multiple indirect levers for making the situation in Iraq much, much more difficult. Iran can disrupt the political process in Iraq by putting pressure on moderate Shia groups and supporting radical groups. It can grant safe havens to insurgents along the very long Iran-Iraq border. It can allow insurgent groups to coordinate attacks against US forces from secure areas. It can fund insurgent groups, and supply them with various types of weaponry. In short, occupying Iraq means that we now must defend Iraq. This is a lesson that a four year old learns easily enough; getting more stuff means more stuff to protect.

The Iranians also must know, at this point, that an invasion and occupation of their country is not in the cards. In 2003, this might not have been the case. Now, however, the idea that the United States could administer a conquered Iran is absurd. At worst, Iran will undergo a series of heavy air attacks, which may or may not serve to eliminate its nuclear program. In attempting to create a reputation for resolve, the Bush administration has fatally undermined its ability to present the other factor in credibility, which is capability. Kristol, Hanson, and Ferguson have been relatively cagey in their calls for military action against Iran in that they have specified no actual proposals, instead preferring to spend most of their time mocking Democrats. Even they must realize, however, that a full invasion and conquest of Iran is not a plausible foreign policy goal for the United States. Given this, the costs that we can present to the Iranians for pursuing nuclear weapons are limited, and Iran may choose to pay them.

Don’t let anyone try to convince you that the Iraq operation hasn’t been a strategic disaster for Iran policy. Kristol, Ferguson, Hanson, and all the others are quite correct that Iran is a threat, and that Iranian nuclear weapons are bad news. They may even be right that military force is the only option for solving this problem. However, the policy that these people advocated in 2003 to solve this problem has made it much, much worse. We can thank the Weekly Standard, at least in very small part, for the difficulty of the Iran problem in 2006.

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