The MacGyver Paradigm

A few years ago Anthony Cordesman coined the phrase “Buffy Paradigm“. The Buffy paradigm is a way of approaching foreign policy and national security problems that mirrors the environment faced by Buffy and the Scoobies in Buffy the Vampire Slayer. The Buffy paradigm refers to a situation in which we can expect that our expertise, preparation, and areas of competence will NOT accurately reflect that threats that we face. This places a premium on flexibility in action and preparation.

In the context of this interview, my Defense Statecraft students and I have begun thinking about the “MacGyver Paradigm”. The MacGyver paradigm refers to a military posture and training program that emphasizes flexibility, low level initiative, inventiveness, and minimal reliance on technology. MacGyver, as all thinking people know, could build a Formula One racecar out of tape, gum, and bits of wire. The MacGyver paradigm is about military organizations that rely very heavily on the human/intellectual capital side of the effectiveness equation, such that individual soldiers and units are flexible and capable enough to accomplish any number of different tasks, often with minimal support.

What sort of organizations pursue the MacGyver paradigm? Well, I think that the MacGyver paradigm more or less covers what Major General Grosvenor was trying to get at in his discussion of flexibility in the British Army. The United Kingdom is one of the few countries that can actually afford to pursue the reforms associated with the Revolution in Military Affairs. The British Army, however, has been reluctant to adopt technological fixes to problems because it believes that increasing technology, even communications technology, cuts down on the flexibility of forces and the initiative of officers and men. We might appropriately term such beliefs “MacGyver-esque”.

With the possible exception of Special Forces units, the United States military has pursued and continues to pursue policies at odds with the MacGyver Paradigm. It has been persuasively argued that RMA reforms will have the result of placing more tactical and operational responsibility in the hands of senior officers and of reducing the ability of junior officers to react to new situations. In this sense, the closer we get to Future Combat Systems,
the farther we get away from MacGyver. I suspect, given the threats that the Army is likely to deal with in the near to medium future, that this will be a bad thing.