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Fish. Barrel. Gun.

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I probably shouldn’t bother. . .

LTC Tim Ryan has a column in the World Tribune excoriating the US media for not reporting the good news in Iraq. The jist is that the media are responsible for some considerable portion of the increasing strength of the insurgency. Some choice quotes:

I believe one of the reasons for this shallow and subjective reporting is that many reporters never actually cover the events they report on. It appears many members of the media are hesitant to venture beyond the relative safety of the so-called “International Zone” in downtown Baghdad, or similar “safe havens” in other large cities. Because terrorists and other thugs wisely target western media members and others for kidnappings or attacks, the westerners stay close to their quarters. This has the effect of holding the media captive in cities and keeps them away from the broader truth that lies outside their view.

So, reporters are too afraid of being killed by insurgents to leave the protected zones, and thus can’t report on all the good news. I see. That is a problem.

What about the media’s portrayal of the enemy? Why do these ruthless murderers, kidnappers and thieves get a pass when it comes to their actions? What did the the media show or tell us about Margaret Hassoon, the director of C.A.R.E. in Iraq and an Iraqi citizen, who was kidnapped, brutally tortured and left disemboweled on a street in Fallujah? Did anyone in the press show these images over and over to emphasize the moral failings of the enemy as they did with the soldiers at Abu Ghuraib?

So, the media shouldn’t report US brutality as long as it fails to match or exceed the levels of enemy brutality? I see. Of course, one might object that most everyone knows about the brutality of the insurgents, that the activities of these insurgents will not affected one way or the other by media reports, and that shedding light on US brutality has a fair chance of at least moderating that activity. Of course, Ryan later argues:

There is no good news to counteract the bad, so the enemy scores a victory almost every day. In its zeal to get to the hot spots and report the latest bombing, the media is missing the reality of a greater good going on in Iraq.

This leaves me a little bit confused; if the media reported all of the horrible things that the Iraqi insurgents did, wouldn’t this also help them score a victory every day? If they continue to do horrible things, then reporting on it clearly demonstrates that we can’t stop them from doing horrible things, which shows that they’re winning. . . I suppose it all makes sense in LTC Ryan’s head.

Creating a democracy in Iraq not only will require a change in the political system, but the economic system as well. Study of examples of similar socio-economic changes that took place in countries like Chile, Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia and other countries with oppressive Socialist dictatorships shows that it took seven to ten years to move those countries to where they are now.

I was previously unaware that Chile was a Socialist dictatorship in 1973. You see, I thought it was a state who’s democratically elected socialist government was overthrown in a bloody coup, only to be replaced by a brutal right-wing dictatorship that held power for 16 years. Now I know better.

The operation in Fallujah delivered an absolutely devastating blow to the insurgency. Though much smaller in scope, clearing Fallujah of insurgents arguably could equate to the Allies’ breakout from the hedgerows in France during World War II. In both cases, our troops overcame a well-prepared and solidly entrenched enemy and began what could be the latter’s last stand. In Fallujah, the enemy death toll has exceeded 1,500 and still is climbing. Put one in the win column for the good guys, right? Wrong. As soon as there was nothing negative to report about Fallujah, the media shifted its focus to other parts of the country.

Of course, the breakout from the hedgerows led to actual territorial progress on the part of Allied forces. We knew we were winning because, you know, we took Paris and the rest of France from the Germans. The destruction of Falluja has caused no apparent measureable change in the behavior or effectiveness of the insurgency. Indeed, the numerical estimate of the strength of the insurgency has only increased since the Falluja offensive. I know it’s hard for wingnuts to understand, but massive evidence that two things are not the same is often an indication that they’re different.

So what are the credentials of these self proclaimed “experts”? The fact is that most of those on whom we rely for complete and factual accounts have little or no experience or education in counter-insurgency operations or in nation-building to support their assessments. How would they really know if things are going well or not? War is an ugly thing with many unexpected twists and turns. Who among them is qualified to say if this one is worse than any other at this point? What would they have said in early 1942 about our chances of winning World War II?

That journalists are dreadful misinformed regarding military matters is a fair point. However, I think that they’re learning. . .The inevitable conclusion of Ryan’s argument would be to leave all decisions regarding the employment of force to military officers, since civilian leaders and the public at large don’t have any more of a grasp on military matters than journalists do, and in general considerably less.

Of course, there are ways even for the relatively uninformed to determine the failure or success of military operations. In regard to World War II, the fact that battles were held progressively closer to Japanese, German, and Italian base areas and more distant from Allied areas might have been a tipoff. In Iraq, US casualty levels have steadily increased since the end of major combat operations, give or take a couple bumps one way or the other. Electricity production is now lower than it was prior to the start of the war, as is oil production. On a more qualitative note, LTC Ryan is quite right in suggesting that reporters don’t get out much; that they fear being killed by insurgents moving freely about the country is hardly an indicator of success. That the insurgency was apparently unexpected by both civilian and military authorities (I’m not going to let the uniforms off the hook for this one; it’s not all the fault of the Bush administration) might also suggest that the “experts” don’t have the firmest grasp on what the insurgency is, where it comes from, what motivates it, and how well it’s doing. Given that no one in charge has a fucking clue, I think it’s fair to ask some difficult questions. That is, after all, what democracy is about.

Alright, back to something hard, like figuring out what to do with the next 42 years of my life. Via Atrios.

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