Russian Nukes
By A couple of interesting stories about Russian nuclear missiles have been making the rounds.
As far as I can tell, the Russians are developing three new systems. One of these is simply a mobile version of the Topol-M that they’ve been working on for a while. Nothing terribly new here, as it simply improves second strike survivability. The NYT article also indicates that the Russian are working on a heavy lift missile that can carry extra warheads. Again, this is no big deal, as the Russians already have enough warheads to wipe out the United States many times over. Here’s a good summary of Russian missile systems. The third system, the Bulava, is a submarine launched version of the Topol-M. It was successfully tested a couple of months ago.
So, what is Putin talking about when he says that the new Russian missiles can evade a US missile shield? Well, it appears that the Russians believe the current Topol-M (or SS-27) is immune to a missile defense.
The SS-27 is currently portrayed as being immune to any ABM defense the United States can put into being. The missile is capable of making evasive maneuvers as it approaches the target, enabling it to evade any terminal phase interceptors. It almost certainly also carries countermeasures and decoys to increase the chances of its success. The warhead is shielded against radiation, electromagnetic interference and physical disturbance; previous missiles could be disabled by detonating a nuclear warhead within ten kilometers (6 miles). This vulnerability is the basis behind the use of nuclear ground-based interceptors, to detonate or damage the missile before it reaches its target. However, the SS-27 is designed to be able to withstand nuclear blasts closer than 500 m, a difficult interception when combined with the terminal phase speed and maneuverability. While the boost phase is the most vulnerable time for the SS-27, it remains protected. Hidden safely within missile silos and mobile launchers, a successful boost-phase interceptor would have to be fired from near or within Russian borders or from space. The SS-27 is also designed to survive a strike from any laser technology available, rendering any current space-based laser useless.
Given that a bottle rocket will be immune to the anticipated US ABM system, the Russian belief in the invincibility of the Topol-M is probably quite rational. It’s also irrelevant, as no one anticipates that the US ABM system would be able to handle a full scale Russian nuclear attack within the short, medium, or long term.
However, Putin may also be talking about development of a hypersonic cruise missile or hypersonic ballistic missile warhead. The ABM system as currently envisioned would have virtually no chance of destroying such a weapon, although other counter-measures (such as conventional interceptors) might have a shot if we knew an attack was coming. Even that is relatively unlikely, however.
So, what’s the big deal? Putin’s remarks are clearly intended for a domestic audience; he wants to convey an image of strength to the Russian people. Even if sensible analysts realize that the US ABM system is crap and unable to handle a Russian attack under any conditions, your average Ivan in the street may not be in the know. It seems to me that the object of Putin’s comments is reassurance about the role of Russia in the international system. And, really, there is something reassuring about Russia’s continued capacity to develop high-tech missile and avionics systems in spite of the social, political, and economic difficulties of the past fifteen years.
In the bigger picture, these developments help demonstrate how absurd the US drive for an ABM system really is. People seem to forget that the international system is interactive, and that developments in one state are matched by developments in others. Now, the Chinese are far, far behind the Russians in missile technology, but that won’t be true forever, and at some point they’ll be able to develop counter-measures of the same sort and variety as the Russians. Indeed, simply stepping up production of their current ICBMs would make a defense against Chinese attack worthless. An ABM system makes a little more sense in response to missile development by North Korea or Iran, but neither of those countries needs to target the United States in order to maintain a deterrent. A boost phase system makes a little bit more sense, but still runs into the problem of reliability; if you can’t hit the missiles with 90%+ confidence, the deterrent holds, and your system is worthless.